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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
WAKING SLEEP: 
THE UNCANNY IN MODERNIST LITERARY AESTHETICS 
With the dawning of the twentieth century, writers and critics found themselves 
facing a social world undergoing massive change, the forces of capitalist modernity 
leaving the individual increasingly disaffected and disconnected from her surroundings. 
This social world, rent as it was by alienation, offered a hostile environment for the sort 
of coherence that had traditionally been prized by Western aesthetics since the 
Enlightenment. How could a literary work attain a degree of coherence while reflecting a 
deeply dissonant modernity? Navigating this contradiction between literature’s inherited 
values and literature’s possibilities in alienated society can be seen as central to the 
project of literary modernism that emerges at this time. 
The uncanny, the experience of something appearing at once strange yet somehow 
familiar, offers a means by which these conflicting demands of coherence and relevance 
can be managed. Forwarding a theory of the uncanny that emphasizes its ability to bridge, 
if momentarily, the disconnect between a subject and her world while not hiding the 
reality of this disconnect, my dissertation seeks to place the uncanny at the center of our 
structural understanding of pivotal modernist texts. By employing the experience of the 
uncanny at crucial moments in the text, the work is able to achieve a coherence between a 
character’s psyche and their material surroundings otherwise difficult to come by when 
describing a social life often devoid of this coherence. Modernism’s innovation is to allot 
the uncanny the structural role of joining disparate elements of the text together; it is not 
that modernist works are more uncanny than that which came before, but more reliant on 
the uncanny on a structural level. 
In support of this theory of the uncanny’s role in modernism, I look at the works 
of two of modernism’s canonical writers: D.H. Lawrence and Katherine Mansfield. In my 
chapter on Lawrence, I begin with a reading of his posthumous novella The Virgin and 
the Gipsy, a work that relies heavily on the uncanny as a structural support, before 
looking back to one of the earlier Brangwen novels, The Rainbow, to discern how those 
novels prefigure a deeper embrace of the uncanny as a means of dealing with problems 
facing the modern novel. In my chapter on Mansfield, I trace the evolution of her short 
  
 
stories from her first published collection, 1911’s In a German Pension, though her later 
works, Bliss and Other Stories and The Garden Party and Other Stories. In these later 
collections, there is seen a movement toward a more uncanny short story, a movement 
which can be understood as an attempt to deal with the problem of depicting alienated 
characters while still bringing the story to a satisfying conclusion, a problem which 
bedeviled many of the stories in her early collection. Mansfield is thus seen as, over the 
course of her career, tending toward the uncanny as a way of reconciling content and 
form within her stories. 
  
 In this dissertation, I see the first step toward a longer, book-length study of the 
uncanny as central to the development of twentieth century literature, the changing role of 
the former reflecting changing pressures on the latter as modernism gives way to 
postmodernism. 
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The Snowdrop: 
An Introduction 
In D.H. Lawrence’s The Virgin and the Gipsy, when young Yvette Saywell returns 
to the Romani encampment after having had her fortune read, she meets with the palm-
reader’s husband, and is mesmerized by him, the narrator noting that, “her will had 
departed from her limbs, he had power over her: his shadow was on her... she was only 
aware of the dark, strange effluence of him bathing her limbs, washing her at last purely 
will-less”(84-5). In his thrall, Yvette experiences a sexual awakening, the girl described 
as, “full out, like a snowdrop which spreads its three white wings in a flight into the 
waking sleep of its brief blossoming. The waking sleep of her full-opened virginity, 
entranced like a snowdrop in the sunshine, was upon her” (85). The repetition of the 
phrase “waking sleep” deserves remark: what, precisely, does it mean? The first instinct 
is to see “waking sleep” as a description of Yvette’s virginity, with her lack of sexual 
experience likened to being asleep. Yet, in such an instance, one would expect Yvette to 
be described as “awakening” outright, rather than remaining in a paradoxical state of 
being both awake and asleep. It seems counterintuitive to compare a character learning 
about herself to a state of sleep, as such knowledge is usually associated with being 
awake. 
This comparison becomes far more suitable, however, when it is understood as 
describing the sense of the uncanny that Yvette encounters in her meeting with the man. 
The uncanny, the feeling of something being at once strange yet familiar, lends itself well 
to being described as an experience of “waking sleep,” as it is brought on by a blurring of 
the line between a subject’s psychic life and the material reality they inhabit. Of central 
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importance to this study is the development of a theory of the uncanny which at once 
holds to the Freudian insight attributing it to a return of the repressed while deviating 
from Freud’s account of how, precisely, this return becomes uncanny. In doing so, it seeks 
to explain the uncanniness of moments like Yvette’s encounter in the encampment as 
instances of a return of the repressed that undermines the distinction between the 
subject’s psyche and their surroundings. 
 It is the contention of this study that such moments of the uncanny take on a 
special significance in the literature of the early twentieth century; specifically, the 
uncanny helps works achieve a degree of coherence while depicting the dissonant world 
of modern capitalism, a remedy to what I will term the “aesthetic problem of alienation.” 
While the political problem of alienation involves constructing a society that subjects can 
be integrated into while still maintaining their freedom, the aesthetic problem of 
alienation concerns creating art that is formally coherent while still relevant to a world 
that appears incoherent. As such, this study engages heavily with Theodor Adorno, whose 
work represents a sustained and sophisticated exploration of this contradiction. For 
Adorno, life under modern capitalism resists depiction in art, as “it is just the essential 
abstractness of what really happens which rebuts the aesthetic image” (MM 144). In 
contrast to Fredric Jameson’s description of Adorno’s account of the modernist drive to 
innovate as stemming from “the deep conviction that certain forms and expressions, 
procedures and techniques, can no longer be used, are worn out or stigmatized by their 
associations with a past that has become conventionality or kitsch” (5), Adorno attributes 
modernism’s experiments more to past forms’ struggle with modernity than to their being 
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too passe. Among these experiments, this study posits, is the use of the uncanny at key 
points in the narrative to tie together the narrative’s various elements. 
 At this point, it may be argued that the writers examined in this study were most 
likely not thinking about this aesthetic dilemma, and thus their work cannot be seen as 
responding to it. In addition to overvaluing conscious influences at the exclusion of the 
unconscious, as though the sources of creativity are ever fully transparent to those 
engaged in it, this objection rests on the flawed assumption that the object of aesthetics is 
most properly the ideas held about art rather than the artworks themselves. If a novel is 
only subject to concepts consciously applied to it by its creator, then contemplation of 
that novel is ultimately an investigation of what its creator believed about it, as the novel 
is thus simply a reflection of its creator’s conscious thought; any argument about the 
novel will inevitably appeal to these beliefs instead of the novel itself. Thinking primarily 
about the author’s thinking about the work, aesthetic theory becomes the study of 
aesthetic theories, not of art. The sense that such a degree of remove from the artwork is 
necessary reflects nothing so much as the old superstition that art is beyond rational 
comprehension, and thus cannot be directly theorized. In order to avoid this, we have to 
be willing to wager that our concepts are present primarily in the work of art under 
examination. 
 Another potential objection, related to the first, is that this perspective, with its 
emphasis on form and structure, is ill-suited to the examination of prose fiction, referring 
to the notion that prose is “less formal” than, say, poetry. Yet, this idea runs aground as 
soon as one brings up judgment, since to judge a novel as good or not necessarily 
requires some reference to the way the individual scenes are connected to one another, 
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and how the various threads introduced are tied together. Such a requirement implies that 
form is crucial to the reader’s experience of prose, and that, as a result, prose is no less 
“formal” than other forms of literature. Indeed, it brings to light just how much of the 
meaning of a piece of prose is generated in part by the way it is structured. 
 The aim of this study is to better grasp how these modernist works were shaped 
by the conditions under which they were created. By establishing their use of the uncanny 
as a response to the unique difficulties of writing under modern capitalism, this project 
seeks to help uncover the logic by which these works were constructed. Toward this end, 
the first chapter, “Strange Substitutes,” will discuss the aesthetic problem of alienation, 
then develop a theory of the uncanny before explaining how this theory makes the 
uncanny well-suited to remedy this problem. Following this, “The Flood and the 
Rainbow” will look at two works by D.H. Lawrence, his novel The Rainbow (1915) and 
his novella The Virgin and the Gipsy (1930), and how his use of the uncanny shifts 
between them, with the later novella relying on the uncanny to help tie its various 
elements together. A similar shift is traced in “Psyche and Structure in the Short Story,” 
which views Katherine Mansfield’s development of the short story form over her career 
as a response to the problem of accommodating life under capitalism within that form. 
Eschewing the flat acceptance of her characters’ alienation of her first collection, In a 
German Pension (1911), Mansfield comes to regularly end her stories with moments of 
the uncanny by the time of the last published collection of her lifetime, The Garden Party 
and Other Stories (1922). 
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Chapter 1: 
Strange Substitutes: 
On Alienation and the Uncanny 
“The ‘clear’ and ‘beautiful’ prescriptions of so many works of art which remain 
content with the conscious and superficial layer of being, like it or not, are no longer 
able to arouse our interest. It is altogether possible that the violent economic and 
social contradictions of our time have had everything to do with the depreciation of 
this ridiculous lustre.” 
-Andre Breton
Introduction 
Freud begins “The Uncanny” by remarking that “it is only rarely that a psycho-
analyst feels impelled to investigate the subject of aesthetics,” but that “the subject of the 
‘uncanny’ is a province of this kind” (“Uncanny” 219), characterizing the concept as a 
concern of both theories of art and theories of the psyche. The contention that this shared 
interest is a rare one may seem strange, as from his earliest writings Freud has examined 
works of art and literature to find depictions of his theories. How does his study of the 
uncanny differ from his investigations into the incest motive in Hamlet or infantile 
sexuality in Gradiva, studies where he takes as his object works long examined by 
critics? One possible explanation is that these earlier studies consider the artworks only 
insofar as they illustrate certain psychic forces, while in “The Uncanny” what is under 
examination is precisely how these forces effect the artwork in which they appear; 
Gradiva is only of interest for its depiction of the amnesia effecting memories of 
childhood sexual experiences and Hamlet for its picture of oedipal resentment, while the 
exploration of the uncanny pays special attention to how this feeling is evoked in the 
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reader of a given work. Where previously the psychological and aesthetic features of a 
work are considered distinct enough for one to be focused on largely at the exclusion of 
another, in the concept of the uncanny this distinction is less clear. 
 The reason for this lies in the effect the uncanny has on the form of the literary 
work it inhabits, rendering any attempt to discuss the uncanny purely in terms of 
psychology or of art thwarted from the beginning. As examined in this chapter, the 
uncanny creates within the artwork a scene of coherence, as the work’s various elements, 
such as characters, settings, and events, become, however briefly, indistinguishable from 
one another. As a result, the uncanny cannot but have an impact on the structure of the 
work in which it appears, creating as it does a place where the diverse parts of the story 
coalesce. This function is precisely why the uncanny takes on a particular importance in 
certain works of literary modernism at the beginning of the twentieth century, as these 
works are called upon to depict a society increasingly riven by the divisions created by 
the capitalist mode of production. The threat posed to art by these divisions, which I term 
“the aesthetic problem of alienation,” will be established by a foray into the nature of the 
artwork and the modern phenomenon of alienation, with references to the works of 
Theodor W. Adorno, Karl Marx, and Georg Lukacs. After defining the problem, the 
chapter will move on to an exploration of the solution, the uncanny, contrasting Freud’s 
theory of the unheimlich as a “return of the repressed” with more recent attempts to 
explain the phenomenon by appeals to the subject’s “intellectual uncertainty.” Finding 
these more recent attempts wanting, I will propose an account of the uncanny that, while 
reasserting its basis in the return of the repressed, nevertheless differs from Freud’s. The 
chapter will then conclude with an examination of a work made synonymous with the 
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uncanny by Freud’s essay on the topic, E.T.A. Hoffmann’s short story “The Sandman.” 
This examination will serve two purposes: firstly, to demonstrate the validity of this 
newly-proposed account of the uncanny, and, secondly, to model how this account can be 
used to assist our understanding of literary texts, laying the groundwork for the following 
chapters.   
The Aesthetic Problem of Alienation 
Theodor W. Adorno, in his Aesthetic Theory, states that “only by virtue of 
separation from empirical reality, which allows art to model the relation of the whole and 
the part according to the work’s own needs, does the artwork achieve a heightened order 
of existence” (AT 5), the work of art required to remove itself from the forces that shape 
mundane reality to have the freedom to shape itself to its own unique ends, attaining, in 
Adorno’s parlance, autonomy.  The artwork attains its autonomy from empirical reality, 
gaining its special status, by its adherence to its own unique logic and its rejection of the 
everyday logic of utility that attributes meaning to things insofar as they are useful in 
satisfying the subject’s wants and desires. Against this logic of utility, the artwork adheres 
to a logic of appearances, in which its features derive their meaning from their manner of 
appearance, without reference to any potential use-value. For instance, it is only when the 
Venus of Willendorf ceases to derive its meaning from its status as a tool, as a magical 
charm used to ensure fertility, and to instead be meaningful because of how it appears, 
that the figurine becomes a proper work of art; at the point where the figurine’s curves, 
shapes, and sparse embellishments no longer gain their meaning from their ability to 
manipulate reality, but rather from the nature and effect of their appearance, it is an object 
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of aesthetic reflection. This is what Adorno means when he says that “artworks are alive 
in that they speak in a fashion that is denied to natural objects and the subjects who make 
them. They speak by virtue of the communication of everything particular in them. Thus 
they come into contrast with the arbitrariness of what simply exists” (AT 6), the parts and 
features of the artwork not means to an end, as they were in the magic charm, but instead 
taken as important in and of themselves. The way in which things appear in the artwork is 
therefore taken as inherently meaningful, including the fact that the artwork’s features 
appear together; for the logic of appearance to hold, this appearance together must seem 
meaningful, reflecting some sort of palpable connection between them. For this reason, 
coherence takes on special importance for aesthetic perception, as coherence between 
things that appear together implies that they somehow belong together, allowing their 
appearance together to be taken as meaningful, rather than as the result of blind 
coincidence. It is for this reason that Adorno remarks elsewhere that coherence “truly 
strikes me as the key to the objectivity of aesthetic judgment” (As 8), since coherence is 
central to the artwork’s status as cohesive object outside of and beyond the subject’s 
impressions of it.  The importance of coherence to the artwork lies behind Anton 
Chekov’s famous dictum that if there is a gun hanging on the wall in the first act, it had 
better go off in the third. The various elements of a work appearing together should be 
made to belong meaningfully to one another by the work’s end. Coherence demands that 
the world that appears around a character be made relevant to that character, in order for 
their appearance together to be meaningful. 
 Anything that threatens this coherence threatens the meaningfulness of 
appearances in the artwork, and thus the artwork’s status as separate from empirical 
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reality. For this reason, the depiction of modern life becomes fraught, due to just such a 
threat in the form of alienation. Alienation here is meant less in the existentialist sense, as 
an emotional-spiritual attitude that transcends any specific historical setting, and more in 
the Marxist sense. Marx, in his 1844 manuscripts, traces alienation to the conditions of 
production and labor prevalent under capitalism, noting “the alienation of the worker in 
his product means not only that labor becomes an object, an external existence, but that it 
exists outside him, independently, as something alien to him, and that it becomes a power 
on its own confronting him.” Without control over the object their labor produces, the 
worker does not recognize that object, or the labor they supplied to it, as their own, but 
instead as something irrevocably separate from them. As Bertell Ollman notes, “the 
worker’s products are alien to him in that he cannot use them to keep alive or to engage 
in further productive activity,” and as a result, “not only can he not use them, but he does 
not recognize them as his” (143). The worker’s alienation from the product of their labor 
has ramifications for their relationship to the wider world, as “the worker can create 
nothing without nature, without the sensuous external world. It is the material on which 
his labor is manifested, in which it is active, from which and by means of which it 
produces” (Marx, 70). Having no sense of connection to their product, the worker by 
extension has no sense of connection to the physical world in which its production takes 
place; unable to recognize their ability to effect the material world through labor, the 
worker sees this material world as distant and irrelevant to them. Rather than being 
simply the result of a given individual’s psychology, alienation, in Marx’s understanding, 
stems from the individual’s inability to see themselves in their physical surroundings 
because the products of their labor, the things that register their activity in those physical 
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surroundings, have been taken from them and made the property of another. Deprived of 
the object that manifests their activity, the worker is thus deprived of the place where 
their activities and needs are most clearly reflected in the physical world, and as a result 
that world comes to appear to the individual as uniformly indifferent.   
 The alienation produced by this arrangement is not confined to the workplace, but 
rather follows the worker home after their shift. The implications for the worker’s life 
experience are spelled out by Marx in a striking moment in his text, in which he describes 
the worker’s dwellings: 
Man returns to living in a cave, which is now, however, 
contaminated with the mephitic breath of plague given off by 
civilization, and which he continues to occupy only precariously, it 
being for him an alien habitation which can be withdrawn from 
him any day-- a place from which, if he does not pay, he can be 
thrown out any day. (117) 
Not owning what they produce, the worker can establish no ownership of the products 
needed for life, such as housing, and is instead forced to exchange his meager wages to 
occupy the property of another. As a result, there is a mediation between the worker and 
the requirements of life, the worker allowed to occupy this property not because of any 
direct ownership, but because he is continuously paying for the privilege, and can thus be 
turned out as soon as this payment is interrupted.  In this scenario, the worker will 
understandably view their lodgings not as a meaningful place, shaped by his own work 
and inhabited by memories, but as the strange, alien home of someone else, which he is 
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temporarily, and only tenuously, inhabiting. Alienated in how they make a living, the 
worker is alienated in how he lives his life.     
 Nor is the alienation produced by this arrangement limited to the workers, since, 
as Ollman points out “the capitalist’s relation to the product of the proletariat’s labor 
likewise places him in a state of alienation. For him, the object of another man’s life 
activity is only something to sell, something to make a profit with” (154). The capitalist, 
controlling what they have not created, sees the product stamped with an other’s activity 
and not their own; catching no reflection of themselves in the product they own, the 
capitalist can maintain nothing but a purely financial interest in that product. In this 
sense, alienation can be seen as inherent to the separation of labor from ownership central 
to the capitalist mode of production, in which the worker labors on what they do not own, 
and the capitalist owns that on which they do not labor. As the capitalist mode of 
production becomes the predominate way in which a society provides for itself, the 
alienation inherent to this mode permeates the society, coming to affect even those with 
no direct involvement in the relation of production.   
 And it is this prevalent sense of disconnection between a subject and their world 
that poses a problem for the artwork: if the subject finds the material objects surrounding 
them alien and meaningless, how is the artwork to depict the subject’s appearing 
alongside these objects as nevertheless meaningful? If the artwork insists on coherence, 
insists that the gun on the wall be made meaningful to the characters, it forgoes depicting 
those characters as genuinely alienated, and thus severs its connection to the world it 
seeks to depict. If, conversely, the artwork remains faithful to alienated life, and thus 
refuses to reconcile the gun to the characters encountering it, then it adheres to a logic 
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different from that of appearances, threatening its status as an artwork. It is this dilemma 
that constitutes the aesthetic problem of alienation: how can one depict the 
meaninglessness of alienated existence without at the same time rendering that 
appearance meaningless in the process, and thus undermining what makes art possible? 
 Adorno addresses just this problem during his lectures on aesthetics. When asked 
by a student about the seeming conflict between art’s need to be relevant to empirical 
reality and that reality’s hostility to coherence, he acknowledges “I am actually 
demanding two contradictory things of art. On the one hand, I claim that art must 
articulate the state in which we, humans, mankind, every individual finds themselves 
historically, and this state simply happens to be one of alienation. On the other hand, I 
demand of art that it give a voice to suppressed, mutilated nature, meaning the opposite 
of alienation” (As 77-8). As an experience of the world outside the exploitative, utilitarian 
mindset that marks the subject’s daily life, art describes a relationship to the world in 
which the subject and their surroundings are connected and meaningful, and is thus at 
odds with the experience of alienation that insists on the subject’s loss of connection and 
meaning. In order to square the circle, Adorno proposes the answer to the problem of 
alienation is to be found in alienation itself, alienation as manifested in the device of 
defamiliarization, where everyday objects are depicted in a way so as to appear strange 
and new to the reader. “Through the fact that the artistic formulation does justice 
radically to the actually existing alienation between subject and object, the object is, in a 
certain delicate sense, changed back into nature… changed back into that which, one 
could say, freed of its ideological ingredient” (As 78). In doing this, twentieth century 
writers like Brecht, Beckett, and Kafka who “by taking this process of defamiliarization 
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extremely far, by completely doing away with the self-evident certainty of what one 
terms ‘realistic experience,’ end up with something that, in a sense, [evokes] natural 
conditions, eating, drinking, drinking, sleeping, illness, physical harm” (As 78-9). 
Stripped of any and all meaning to the subject, objects at a certain point lose their status 
as commodities, so defamiliarized that they are no longer recognizable even as products 
of the alien forces of the market. At this point, they revert back to their primeval status as 
biological necessities, things to be consumed in order to continue life; freed from 
appealing in any way to the subject’s mind, the world instead can appeal instead to the 
subject’s stomach. By evoking nothing but the subject’s appetites, these objects cannot, it 
seems, but be familiar to the subject tied to those appetites by their physical being. The 
problem of alienation for the artwork is then, for Adorno, its own solution, its presence in 
art remedied by a fuller embrace of it. 
 Yet, instead of this appeal to bodily needs making alien objects seem familiar, it 
would seem more likely to make these familiar bodily needs seem alien and strange. In 
Marx’s example of the worker’s lodgings, the drive to find shelter is experienced by the 
worker as coming from without, from the landlord’s threat of eviction, rather than from 
any biological need originating from within. With the objects the worker needs in the 
hands of another, these needs themselves seem driven by the whims of another; tied up 
with the actions of others, the worker’s needs seem to originate from others. As such, 
alienation from one’s physical surroundings results in the alienation of the needs met by 
those same surroundings, meaning that these needs cannot be relied upon to be familiar 
enough to the subject to overcome that alienation. Instead of being reminded of familiar, 
human needs by the alienated objects that satisfy them, the subject finds their needs made 
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unfamiliar by their reliance on these very alienated objects. Adorno’s faith that 
defamiliarization will, once pushed far enough, transform into its opposite, becoming 
something familiar and relevant again, seems misplaced. 
If the dilemma cannot be resolved by the artwork’s embrace of alienation, perhaps 
it can be simply rejected in favor of a commitment to depicting a world drained of 
meaning as nevertheless meaningful. It is this possibility that lies at the center of one of 
the earliest (and still deeply insightful) articulation of alienation as an aesthetic problem 
and its implications for literature, Georg Lukacs’ Theory of the Novel. Lukacs contrasts 
the literary forms of pre-modern “integrated” societies (specifically ancient Greece) and 
modern “problematic” societies. By an integrated society, Lukacs means a society whose 
cultural, political, and social forms are adequate to the psychological and spiritual needs 
of those living in it, while a problematic society is marked by an unbridgeable chasm 
between what it offers its subjects and what its subjects require in terms of meaningful 
existence. Unlike Hellenic Greece, modernity is kept by advances in science and 
technology from conceiving of the cosmos as inherently spiritual and thus similar to 
humanity; modernity implies a disenchanted, mechanistic perspective on the universe, 
stripping it in advance of anything humanity could encounter as intrinsically meaningful. 
Social forms informed by this mechanistic perspective, like those of modern capitalism, 
can thus never be anything but alienating. For Lukacs, the ancient Greeks' experience of 
their world as inherently meaningful is reflected in form of the epic, which is able to rely 
on its characters’ integration into this meaningful universe to provide coherence; put 
differently, the epic, emerging from an integrated society, does not have to work to create 
a meaningful unity for itself, it needs only to reflect a unified and meaningful world (29-
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32). This happy circumstance is not shared by modern “problematic” society, where 
humanity’s inherent separateness from its world places the burden of creating meaning 
onto humanity itself. In such a situation, literature can hardly rely on the world as 
experienced to provide any sort of meaningful unity; any meaning and coherence found 
within a work must be generated by the work itself, instead of being borrowed from 
without. It is in reference to this that Lukacs famously called the novel “the epic of a 
godless age” (88), as it was precisely the novel that he saw as the form most reflective of 
the reality of alienation and most capable of overcoming it. 
What for Lukacs makes the novel so well suited to overcoming the alienation of 
modern “problematic” society is what he sees as the form’s inherent sense of irony. The 
novel (specifically, the nineteenth century realist novel, which for Lukacs is the form’s 
highest iteration) places at its center characters struggling to enact their ideals in a reality 
that is fundamentally resistant to them, taking shape as an account of the conflict between 
these two elements. Flaubert’s Madame Bovary serves as a clear example of this, the 
novel following Emma Bovary, her ideas about romance, and the affairs with which she 
attempts to enliven her staid, conventional life in the provinces. The novel presents an 
alienated Emma unable to find meaningful connection between her ideals and the world 
she inhabits, despite her efforts. The ironic tone of the narrator rendering this conflict 
provides the reader a degree of distance from the conflict, escaping the character’s 
viewpoint and allowing the reader a more “objective” perspective, one from which the 
two elements, character and world, can be considered side-by-side. Rather than 
experiencing Emma’s alienation along with her, the reader is able, through ironic 
detachment, to gain a clear and unbiased picture of both character and his/her world, thus 
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making it possible to detect connections between them that evade the character. Emma’s 
response to the romantic stories she’s read can now appear to the novel’s reader as, for 
instance, of a piece with the lack of sophistication marking provincial life. The alienation 
experienced by Emma is ironized, allowing the reader the distance from it needed to see 
the character and his/her surroundings from a perspective not influenced by that 
alienation; the reader can consider character and social forces alongside each other in a 
way not dominated by the character's feeling of alienation, allowing the character and 
his/her world to appear somehow connected and coherent. 
 The realist novel’s solution relies on an unstated assumption: that even within a 
modern civilization marked by alienation, the individual’s relationship with the social 
forces shaping the world they inhabit can still be made visible and apparent. The realist 
novel that Lukacs describes as the placing of a character against a resistant world must be 
able to show that this alienation vanishes from the more “objective” standpoint offered to 
the reader, which means it must be possible for the reader to “see” how the character is, 
despite the character’s feelings to the contrary, integrated into their world. It must be 
apparent to the reader that the character’s life is connected to the larger forces in society. 
Yet it was just these larger forces which, at the dawn of the twentieth century, 
were receding from their obvious connection with individual life.  Social forces under 
capitalism tends become increasingly abstract, as power is concentrated in a market 
mechanism that subordinates all intrinsic value to abstract exchange value, resulting in 
social forces becoming disembodied, more connected to the monetary value of things 
rather than the things themselves. Due to this, the subject's life comes to be determined 
by forces without any enduring physical form and thus invisible. Whereas the power of 
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the Catholic Church, for example, announces itself in the form of insignia, ritual, and 
architecture that makes its presence clear to the individual, the stock market lacks a 
similar tactile existence, leaving the individual's understanding of its sway on his/her life 
an issue of abstract knowledge. Walter Benjamin, describing the decay of personal 
experience’s importance in capitalist society at this period, gets at just this problem, 
reflecting that “never has experience been contradicted more thoroughly than strategic 
experience by tactical warfare, economic experience by inflation, bodily experience by 
mechanical warfare, moral experience by those in power” (84) than in the modern world. 
The ability of the individual subject to experience directly the forces that shape his/her 
life is undermined by the fact that these forces ("tactical warfare... inflation...") are 
entirely abstract, the subject unable to apprehend that which eschews any settled, physical 
form. The resulting difficulty posed to artworks, operating as they do by way of 
appearances, by social forces that do not properly appear, is particularly felt by the realist 
novel's ironic narrator. As Adorno notes, “the narrator’s implicit claim that the course of 
the world is still essentially one of individuation, that the individual with his impulses 
and feelings is still the equal of fate, that the inner person is still directly capable of 
something, is ideological in itself” (“Position,”31). The attempt to make the isolated, 
alienated individual in any way comparable to the titanic social forces that control them, 
without inevitably papering over the chasm between them, is frustrated from the outset. 
Yet, the ironic narrator identified by Lukacs as so central to realism is involved by his 
position in just such an attempt, his goal to show both the individual and society 
alongside one another relying on society's ability to be "shown" in a manner similar to the 
individual. While the French provincial world of Emma Bovary, where the forces of 
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social convention are clearly visible to the individual in the forms of the church and the 
municipal authorities, makes it possible to compare them to Emma's own existence, the 
social forces that shape life under capitalist modernity remain hard to clearly envision. If 
social forces cannot properly “appear” to the reader in a manner similar as the character 
and her struggles, the ironic narrator’s goal of presenting them alongside one another to 
reveal their “objective” connections is thwarted from the very beginning. The fact that 
inflation cannot be represented in the same direct way that hunger can means no amount 
of ironic distance can bring them into focus and make them appear directly as part of the 
same system. The result is a social order which, by its sheer invisibility, resists the 
creation of coherence in the work of literature by means of irony. 
The aesthetic problem posed by alienation thus cannot be fully remedied either by 
Adorno’s counsel to embrace it or by Lukacs’ to cast it aside in favor of the “truth” of 
social totality; instead, the impasse remains. Into it, the uncanny enters as a possible 
means of navigating art’s conflicting commitments under modernity, a way between the 
Scylla and Charybdis of the loss of relevance on one hand and the loss of coherence on 
the other. To grasp precisely what about the uncanny makes this possible, a detailed 
account of the uncanny, a picture of what it is and how it comes to be, is required. 
The Blossom Branch: 
On The Uncanny 
However, it is just such a general theory of the uncanny that Nicholas Royle, in 
his influential study of the subject, argues is impossible, as a fixed and firm description is 
at odds with the uncanny’s inherently protean nature. For him, “to write about the 
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uncanny, as Freud’s essay makes admirably clear, is to lose one’s bearings, to find oneself 
immersed in the maddening logic of the supplement, to engage with a hydra” (8). 
Attempts to set out a theory of the uncanny are inevitably stymied by the tendency for 
examples of the uncanny to evoke other examples in what he terms the “logic of the 
supplement,” leaving any definition drawn from these examples forever incomplete. As 
he puts it, “one uncanny thing keeps leading to another. Every attempt to isolate and 
analyse a specific case of the uncanny seems to generate an at least minor epidemic” (13). 
For Royle, the uncanny will always evade rigorous definition because as soon as one 
thinks one has encapsulated it, another example of the uncanny crops up and forces the 
definition to change to accommodate it. The concept eludes definition, and thus is defined 
by its elusiveness. Royle claims that “the uncanny is destined to elude mastery, it is what 
cannot be pinned down or controlled. The uncanny is never simply a question of a 
statement, description or definition, but always engages a performative dimension, a 
maddening supplement, something unpredictable and additionally strange happening in 
and to what is being stated, defined or described” (15-6). In this view, a solid definition 
of the uncanny cannot be achieved because the struggle to achieve that definition is a 
central, defining characteristic of the uncanny, the “logic of the supplement” sabotaging 
any settled description of the uncanny itself at the heart of any understanding of the 
uncanny.    
Yet, Royle’s understanding of the uncanny, with this logic of the supplement at its 
center, is founded on something of an inconsistency. Each new example of the uncanny, 
which is supposed to frustrate any stable understanding of the concept, must of course be 
recognizable as uncanny in order to serve as an example in the first place; yet, if one can 
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identify something as an example of the uncanny, it must already bear a good deal of 
resemblance to one’s idea of the uncanny. Given this, it is thus unclear how this new 
example would work to unsettle and confuse a notion of the uncanny it already largely 
comports with. Even in the case of an “avalanche of examples,” each example would 
meet enough of the criteria of the uncanny to be recognizable as such and share enough 
features with the other examples for an enduring core of “uncanny traits” to emerge by 
the avalanche’s end. In short, the “logic of the supplement” requires the recognition of 
examples without an idea by which to recognize them. Given this inconsistency, Royle’s 
pessimism should be countered with an effort to work out a general theory of 
uncanniness. 
 Freud describes the uncanny as “that species of the frightening that goes back to 
what was once well known and had long been familiar” (“Uncanny” 220), a startling 
encounter with something strange that the subject nevertheless also dimly recognizes, an 
unnerving feeling of intimacy with something that should be entirely unfamiliar. 
Distinguishing the uncanny from “the weird,” Mark Fisher notes “Freud’s unheimlich is 
about the strange within the familiar, the familiar within the strange, the strangely 
familiar, the familiar in the strange,” whereas “the weird brings to the familiar something 
which ordinarily lies beyond it” (10). The weird refers to something strange that shows 
up where it does not belong, in the familiar, everyday world, such as the ghost of a loved 
one appearing in one’s kitchen; the uncanny, on the other hand, is a blurring of the line 
between these categories by a thing that is at once both strange and familiar, such as 
encountering a number again and again at various points in the day. This strange 
familiarity is accompanied by the sense that a transgression has occurred, that something 
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“that ought to have remained secret and hidden but has come to light” (“Uncanny” 225). 
The uncanny leaves the subject feeling that they have seen something that they should not 
have, something at once strange, familiar, and taboo. Given this combination of the 
familiar and forbidden, the uncanny would seem like nothing so much a return of the 
repressed; indeed, it is exactly this element of the uncanny that, for Freud, betrays its 
origin in repressed material returning to the surface. He argues this in opposition to Ernst 
Jentsch’s theory of the uncanny as stemming from “intellectual uncertainty,” a subject’s 
pervasive doubt about what exactly they are experiencing. Against this, uncanniness is for 
Freud not about the lack of knowledge so much as too much knowledge about what 
should not be known. 
  Yet, as himself Freud notes, this explanation runs into a problem as “not 
everything that fulfills this condition- not everything that recalls repressed desires and 
surmounted modes of thinking...- is on that account uncanny” (“Uncanny” 245). The 
repressed always returns, but most of what returns is not uncanny, Freud thus 
acknowledging a certain limit to his account’s explanatory power. It is not surprising, 
given this discrepancy, that many contemporary accounts of the uncanny seek to explain 
it by looking outside of the mechanism of repression. For critics like Andrew Barnaby 
and Gia Pascarelli, this search involves coming to the defense, knowingly or otherwise, 
of Jentsch’s “intellectual uncertainty” theory of the uncanny. 
 Pascarelli, for instance, develops an account of the uncanny which aims to 
recuperate Jentsch’s theory in order to trace the emergence of the uncanny to the subject’s 
encounter with modern technology. For her, Freud’s contention that the return of the 
repressed causes feelings of the uncanny does not effectively counter Jentsch’s notion, 
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noting that “notwithstanding Freud’s interpretation of the uncanny as the frighteningly 
familiar, certain aspects of his theory suggest that that the uncanny indeed corresponds 
with ‘intellectual’ or ‘epistemological’ uncertainty, and, moreover, that the uncanny is 
generated by the mechanical or technological” (113). For Pascarelli, this is because the 
experience of the uncanny negates a central tenet of psychoanalysis. She notes that 
Freud’s understanding of the uncanny “is somewhat analogous to psychoanalysis, which 
adopts as its task the discovery of ‘unconscious’ material concealed from the patient that 
the analyst must interpret for the patient, or encourage the patient to interpret” (114). Like 
therapy, where the subject faces repressed ideas and feelings that have been dredged up, 
the uncanny forces subjects to encounter things once hidden. 
 Yet, this analogy is not without its flaw, as she asserts, “Freud’s description of the 
uncanny, however much it has in common with the unconcealing practice of 
psychoanalysis, is not reducible to the latter because the uncanny causes fear that is not 
necessarily productive or cathartic” (114). The encounter with repressed material under 
analysis leads to healing (at least ideally), while in the instance of the uncanny it only 
leads to fear and anxiety. Given this, Pascarelli considers the uncanny something which 
cannot be accounted for by psychoanalysis’ conception of psyche; because the uncanny 
holds little therapeutic value, it would seem distinct from the psychoanalytic 
understanding of the return of the repressed. That the return of the repressed is 
experienced in most neurotic symptoms, which are hardly beneficial to psychological 
health, would seem to undermine this line of thinking. Nevertheless, for Pascarelli, 
Freud’s stubborn insistence on the return of the repressed reads as a sign of anxiety about 
the validity and supposedly transhistorical nature of psychoanalysis, Freud keen to claim 
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the experience of the uncanny for the inherent forces of the psyche over and against 
historical and sociological explanations. This, for Pascarelli, leads Freud to ultimately 
misunderstand the uncanny, which for her “is intrinsically linked to alterations of 
perception, especially technically enabled or conditioned ones” (126). The technological 
achievements of the modern world, which Freud supposedly has to exclude to ensure the 
psychoanalytic model of the mind is universal across time, are here far more responsible 
for the uncanny than any uncovering of long-repressed thoughts. For Pascarelli, Jentsch’s 
theory of the uncanny, with its emphasis on the interruption of the subject’s normal 
understanding of the world, thus hits much closer to the mark than Freud’s, as Jentsch’s 
notion places the disorientation Pascarelli attributes to new technologies at the center of 
the notion of the uncanny.     
 To support her Jentschian account of the uncanny, she turns to one of the 
examples from Freud’s essay, when on a train he mistook his reflection for another 
passenger, noting that “what Freud has not considered is the particular uncanniness of 
modern travel,” uncanny due to the fact that “it entails accelerated movement through 
space and time... modern travel is therefore uncanny because it diminishes the possibility 
of recapturing the past,” brought on by a technological “diminishing of physical contact 
with people and places passed” (127-8). It is not the sudden reminder of the past, but the 
sudden loss of it caused by technology that is responsible for the uncanny, with the 
technology of travel undermining the subject’s understanding of time. As a result, “the 
normal scene is complicated by traveling, which exacerbates the confusion between 
subject and object, or in this case the subject and himself” (128), the disorientation of the 
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subject’s sense of time creating a disorientation in the subject’s sense of self, plunging the 
subject into general uncertainty. 
 Pascarelli’s contention is that the uncanny stems from fear felt at the disruption of 
the subject’s senses by modern technology, leading to a general intellectual uncertainty 
about their surroundings. Freud’s reflection in the train’s window is not responsible for 
feelings of the uncanny; rather, it is the fact that his grasp of his surroundings has been 
weakened by the distorting force of modern, mechanized travel that imbues the scene, 
including the reflection, with a sense of the unheimlich. Yet, because of this, Pascarelli’s 
account threatens to diminish the explanatory power of the concept by rendering the 
uncanny incidental, not the result of the subject, their psyche, or the objects encountered, 
but instead simply that these have been disrupted from without by technology. Indeed, the 
incidental is everywhere in this account: the sudden and arbitrary incursion of technology 
into a subject’s otherwise well-functioning senses, which incidentally causes a random 
thing or event which just so happens to be before the subject at that moment to seem 
uncanny. The uncanny is thus reduced to little more than a meaningless coincidence, even 
if it is a coincidence caused by specific technological forces. Additionally, the uncanny 
also loses much of its uniqueness in this account. Instead of describing a distinct feeling 
substantially different from others, the uncanny becomes just another instance of the 
common experience of discomfort caused by confusion. While the Freudian account 
attributes it to a common phenomenon, the return of the repressed, it nevertheless 
acknowledges it as an unusual case of return, qualitatively different from the norm; 
indeed, this peculiarity is central to Freud’s discussion of the topic. In contrast, 
Pascarelli’s account does not mark the uncanny out from any other comparable 
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experience, its origin in technology not seeming to differentiate the experience itself from 
other such instances of confusion. Pascarelli’s use of Jentsch to remedy certain problems 
of the uncanny risks the concept’s usefulness. 
 Although he does not evoke Jentsch directly, Barnaby similarly offers an account 
of the uncanny that attributes it to a sort of intellectual uncertainty, in this case the 
subject’s uncertainty about themselves. Barnaby argues that the uncanny results from the 
subject’s realization that others possess knowledge about their origin which the subject is 
only just discovering, or, as he puts it, “the secret unearthed in the experience of the 
uncanny is something that has been known to others who appear to know more about us 
than we ourselves and who therefore appear to have direct access to a past –our past—
that we do not share” (986-7).  This results in a “lag time” between the subject’s 
conception and their learning about it that works to undermine any sense of familiarity 
with the self; that such important knowledge of the self could nevertheless evade the self 
results in a kind of self-alienation, the subject estranged from their own being. According 
to Barnaby, it is because of this lag that the uncanny emerges, as this revelation is shown 
as at once intimate, concerning as it does the subject’s own existence, and at the same 
time alien, with the subject long ignorant of it. There is an interesting dimension of the 
tragic in Barnaby’s account, recalling nothing so much as Aristotle’s anagorisis, the 
moment when the hero realizes something which alters how he see himself. Like Oedipus 
learning the truth of his parentage from Tiresias, the subject in Barnaby’s account 
discovers their sense of self built on a falsehood, the resulting self-estrangement 
triggering feelings of the uncanny.  As Barnaby states, “the experience of the uncanny 
resides in this disorienting duality: what is at once insufficiently and too secretive, 
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insufficiently and too concealed, insufficiently and too familiar” (985). Learning of their 
origins, the subject faces something very close to and yet alien to them.    
 There is, however, an issue with this account, namely that this “disorienting 
duality” is, upon examination, one-sided, as it seems to focus entirely on one side of the 
uncanny, the making the familiar strange, while leaving untheorized the opposing move 
of making the strange familiar. In his argument, Barnaby summarizes Freud’s conception 
of the uncanny as “a moment of reversal, the point at which our sense of reality as what is 
comforting, safe, or friendly (heimlich) is suddenly exposed as unfamiliar, obscure, or 
self-estranging” (985), emphasizing the element of estrangement as central to the 
experience of the uncanny, to the exclusion of its other side, the strange simultaneously 
becoming somehow familiar. This version of Freud’s definition reflects how Barnaby’s 
account of the uncanny is much better at explaining the uncanny’s tendency to leave the 
familiar feeling strange than it is at explaining its equal and opposite tendency to make 
what is strange feel nevertheless familiar. The subject, upon encountering a truth recently 
unknown to them but not others, can indeed be expected to feel unsettled as their firm 
understanding of themselves gives way to feelings of strangeness and uncertainty; it is 
less clear why that same subject would also find anything familiar about this previously 
unknown truth. Intimacy does not equal familiarity, and although these truths 
encountered by the subject deal with their very being, this does not mean that the subject 
had any of the prior awareness of it required for it to be recognizable to them. Rather, to 
be familiar, these truths would have to have been known, if only ever unconsciously, by 
the subject, in which case the subject would be less ignorant than repressed. It is thus 
unclear from this account how it is possible for the subject to recognize the truth as 
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familiar while remaining nonetheless ignorant enough to feel estranged from this truth. 
Barnaby’s account of the uncanny is able to explain why the revelation of origins would 
be insufficiently familiar, but not why it would at the same time be too familiar.    
 These attempts to follow Jentsch’s lead in attributing the uncanny to some form of 
intellectual uncertainty struggle to capture what is specific and unique about it, failing to 
account for the paradox at the heart of the uncanny, the simultaneous strangeness and 
familiarity which is lost when it is forced to fit within the realm of conscious knowledge 
in which these two states are seen as antithetical to one another; these accounts must 
either sacrifice half of the paradox, as in Barnaby’s version, or the whole paradox, the 
concept made indistinguishable from any other instance of confusion as in Pascarelli’s. 
Given this, it would seem worthwhile to look again to unconscious psychic forces for a 
more compelling account of how the uncanny emerges. Indeed, as will shortly be shown, 
the uncanny is made possible by the very process of symptom formation, and exists in 
potentia wherever the symptom exists.   
 For Freud, “a symptom is a sign of, and a substitute for, an instinctual satisfaction 
which has remained in abeyance; it is a consequence of repression” (ISA 91). When an 
urge or idea is repressed, the symptom serves as an alternative means of expression, the 
emotional and libidinal charge of the original material displaced onto a more acceptable 
substitute. Implicit in this displacement is a degree of regression, as, after repression, “the 
new impulse will run its course under an automatic influence- or, as I should prefer to 
say, under the influence of the compulsion to repeat” (ISA 153), the frustrated libido 
tending to revert back to an object where the subject once found a less fraught enjoyment, 
but which sexual development had taken it beyond. For example, in Freud’s case study of 
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“Little Hans,” the boy’s horse phobia is shown stemming from oedipal fear and hostility 
toward his father, which has been moved to the figure of the horse, an animal whose 
endowment and open urination was once a source of sexual excitement for Hans. “This 
substitutive formation,” Freud notes, “has two obvious advantages. In the first place it 
avoids a conflict due to ambivalence (for the father was a loved object, too), and in the 
second place it enables the ego to cease generating anxiety” (ISA 125), Hans’ horse 
phobia allows repressed fear and hostility toward his father to return without damaging 
his love for his father by causing it to emerge elsewhere in a substitute, all the while 
assigning his fear to something easier to avoid.  Yet, this sort of displacement does not 
proceed arbitrarily, moving to any previous object of enjoyment, but rather moves along 
chains of association that connect the repressed material to its substitute. Little Hans 
associated horses with his father, having played “horsey” with him, seeing his facial hair 
and glasses as similar to a horse’s bridle, and experiencing a degree of sexual jealousy 
toward both. Connected to the substitute through associations, the repressed material can 
thus shift thoughts and feelings surrounding it to that substitute. 
 Through these associations, the substitute maintains ties with the original 
repressed material, ties which in theory would threaten to undo the symptom’s work of 
ensuring the repressed stays hidden. The substitute, however, also maintains a connection 
to the forces in the psyche keeping the repressed at bay. When repressed material 
attempts to return and make its way into the conscious, “the opposition which has been 
raised against it in the ego pursues it as an ‘anticathexis’ and compels it to choose a form 
of expression which at the same time becomes an expression of the opposition itself” (IL 
447-8). Repressed urges and emotions are channeled toward the substitute by this 
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repressing force, marking that substitute with this force and allowing it to continue to 
hide the repressed material. This mark can be seen in the very incongruity between the 
substitute and the emotions attached to it, as in the seeming incompatibility between 
Hans’ fear and the horses that spark it. Anticathexis marks the substitute as the product of 
repression with the resulting mismatch, guiding displaced emotions toward a mundane 
substitute which appears undeserving of them. It is this mismatch, the very thing that 
draws attention to the symptom, that at the same time helps obscure the repressed 
material expressed in the symptom, as the subject reasons, half-correctly, that the 
inappropriate emotions around the substitute must be about something else, in the process 
dismissing the hints to the identity of this something else contained in the substitute. As 
Jean Laplanche notes, “that which comes from the unconscious intervenes as a reality 
(itself conflictual) in the midst of the conscious ‘text,’ which therefore appears less 
coherent: sometimes lacunary; sometimes, on the other contrary, with moments of 
unjustifiable intensity and insistence” (“A Short Treatise…” 88), the irruption of the 
unconscious regarded by the conscious as an instance of odd and meaningless 
incoherence, rather than something potentially significant. It is apparent even to Hans that 
his fear of horses is absurd, and as a result he does not consider the horses truly relevant 
to his fear, remaining unaware of how the horses hold a clue as to the true source of the 
fear. The substitute is effective because of, rather than in spite of, its unconvincing nature, 
as it is here that anticathexis leaves its mark, allowing the repressed material behind the 
substitute to stay hidden. 
The symptom, then, functions by pairing a strange, inexplicable emotion or urge 
emanating from the unconscious with an unremarkable substitute that, the subject 
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believes, cannot really warrant it. This disbelief relies on the familiar substitute remaining 
familiar even after it has been imbued with a strange emotional resonance, and not 
becoming itself strange in the process. Hans’ horse phobia only works if horses, being a 
familiar part of Hans’ life, are not made strange by the unfamiliar emotion now attached 
to them. In such an event, the mismatch between the displaced emotion and the substitute 
vanishes, as the substitute, now estranged, could, as far as the subject knows, indeed 
warrant such an emotional response; the subject, now unfamiliar with the substitute, has 
no frame of reference to tell them that the displaced emotion is out of place where it is. 
Paradoxically, it is here, when the substitute is at its most convincing, that the symptom is 
at its least effective. The emotion now seen as befitting the substitute, the substitute 
comes to resemble the very thing that it was supposed to replace, a resemblance only 
strengthened by the chain of associations connecting the substitute back to the original 
repressed material. The uncanny’s characteristic confusion of strangeness and familiarity 
results from this, as the substitute ironically becomes more familiar, resembling repressed 
material, the more it becomes estranged. Contra Jentch’s notion that the uncanny stems 
from the subject’s “intellectual uncertainty,” the confusion between strangeness and 
familiarity at the root of the uncanny experience is not the subject’s, but is inherent to an 
object that happens to be both at once; the subject is not so much uncertain of whether or 
not the object is familiar or strange as the object is itself both familiar and strange.   
 Becoming a reminder of repressed material, the substitute also becomes a 
reminder of repression itself; in bringing to mind the repressed material, the subject is 
aware, however dimly, of this material while encountering the substitute, and as a result 
they coincide to the subject. The substitute’s aim of taking the place of the repressed 
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material becomes visible when that repressed material appears alongside the substitute, as 
it allows the subject to recognize their similarities, similarities brought about by the work 
of displacement. This accounts for the uncanny’s sense of revealing what should have 
stayed hidden, as the subject at once encounters the hidden thing and the work that went 
into hiding it in the form of the substitute. A particularly illustrative example is that of the 
double, which for Freud originally served as “an insurance against the destruction of the 
ego” (“Uncanny” 235). What should be added to this account is that the feared 
destruction of the ego stems from a fear of punishment for the autoeroticism implicit in 
infantile narcissism. In the double, the child projects the source of this illicit enjoyment, 
their own body, outward, the double a substitute serving as both an expression and a 
denial of the forbidden, preserving the enjoyment while attributing it to someone else. 
Yet, the double’s resemblance to the child’s own self betrays its origin, harkening back to 
the body that it was supposed to replace. In the uncanny, the offending material and the 
demand it be hidden sit alongside each other without the one negating the other. It is this 
coincidence of the substitute and the original material that distinguishes the uncanny from 
other instances of the repressed returning: when Hans fears horses, it is his repressed 
oedipal feelings coming back; if, however, this fear were to remind him of the fear of his 
father and thus making him dimly aware of the horse’s status as substitute for his father, 
his experience would be an uncanny one. The importance of this distinction lies in the 
subject’s experience of the substitute. The return of the repressed leaves the line between 
the subject and the substitute intact, Hans firmly distinct from the horses, to which the 
boy is just overreacting; the uncanny, on the other hand, reveals the substitute to be a 
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product of the subject’s own psyche, thus undermining any such clear separation between 
the subject and their world. 
 The uncanny, as an instance of original and substitute coexisting, would seem as 
nothing so much as an instance of dream-logic, given that “the dream has a very striking 
way of dealing with the categories of opposites and contradictions. This is simply 
disregarded. To the dream ‘No’ does not seem to exist. In particular, it prefers to draw 
opposites together into a unity or represent them as one” (ID 243). In the dream, negation 
does not exist, with elements at odds with each other coexisting and conflating, the 
dream’s imagery the result of this melding together of the repressed and that which seeks 
to hide it. In contrast to the symptom in waking life, which uses the substitute to obscure 
repressed material, the dream creates substitutes that acknowledge the presence of the 
repressed material behind them even as they seek to cover it up. Freud illustrates this with 
an example from the dream of one of his patients, in which “the dreamer is climbing over 
a railing. As she does so, she is holding a branch of blossom in her hands,” recalling 
angels carrying tall lilies in images of the Annunciation and thus associated with 
virginity. At the same time, “the branch is covered with red blossoms, each one 
resembling a camellia,” a flower traditionally symbolizing passion and desire, in addition 
to the color red’s associations with menstruation and the coming of sexual maturity. “The 
same blossoming branch,” Freud concludes, “represents both sexual innocence and its 
opposite. The same dream, too, which expresses her joy at going through life immaculate, 
in some places allows the opposite train of thought-- that she had been guilty of various 
sins against sexual purity (in childhood, that is)-- to shimmer through” (ID 243). The 
dream creates its images by combining the forbidden with what is meant to obscure the 
  33 
forbidden, the dreamer’s suppressed sexual desires and her attachment to the chastity 
keeping them at bay coexisting in the branch, the two coalescing rather than negating one 
another. While Hans’ horses suppress any trace of the repressed material, save for its 
emotional valence, the dream-image of the flowers betrays the repressed even as it seeks 
to cover it over. The uncanny is this dream-logic of combination intruding into waking 
life, the substitute, like the dreamer’s blossom branch, referring at once to what is hidden 
and that which does the hiding. The presence of this dream-logic helps account for the 
feeling of unreality associated with the uncanny, the dream-like quality of the uncanny 
object out of place within the daylight world of waking rationality. 
 The loss of distinction between subject and object, between dreaming and waking, 
would seem to make the uncanny similar to the notion of “the abject” as laid out by Julia 
Kristeva in her seminal The Powers of Horror. For Kristeva, the abject is a keen disgust 
before “what disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect borders, positions, 
rules” (4), a revulsion at the presence of something that undermines the rules and laws 
that promise to keep the subject separate from the raw stuff of life that would otherwise 
overwhelm it. Experiencing the abject means that, for the subject, “the clean and proper 
(in the sense of incorporated and incorporable), becomes filthy, the sought after turns into 
the banished, fascination into shame” (8), desire is reversed, turning into its opposite, and 
transforming the desired into the dreaded. The cause of this reversal is the experience of 
“jouissance,” the enjoyment beyond pleasure that threatens to overwhelm the subject and 
dissolve any distinction between them and the object (9).  The desired becomes the 
obtrusive, disgusting thing, the abject, and the subject will seek to reject it to recover their 
separateness from it and from the world. As such, “abjection preserves what existed in the 
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archaism of the pre-objectal relationship, in the immemorial violence with which a body 
becomes separated from another body in order to be” (10). Abjection endangers the 
subject’s tenuous freedom, threatening to return them to the state of suffocating unity 
before the maternal body is recognized as something separate, the mother’s body being 
the first true object in the child’s world. The precise distinction between the abject and 
the uncanny is most clear when Kristeva notes “I experience abjection only if an Other 
has settled in place and stead of what will be ‘me’”(10), while, on the other hand, the 
subject experiences the uncanny when they find themselves, their own mind at work, in 
the place where they expected the other. The double is uncanny rather than abject because 
the subject’s own psyche looks back, in this instance quite literally, from where they 
expected someone or something beyond themselves. Although they both feature a 
blurring between subject and object, for the abject this is because the object subsumes the 
subject, whereas the uncanny sees the subject subsuming the object. In this sense, the 
uncanny is something akin to a feeling of vertigo, a loss of solid ground brought on by 
the subject’s revelation that their seemingly stable, reliable world is indeed the result of 
the roiling forces of their own psyche. 
 It is not surprising that the uncanny, emerging as it does out of an over-
estrangement of the substitute, would permeate a society characterized by alienation. 
Deprived of their familiarity by capitalism’s disassociation of the subject and object, 
substitutes are more apt to become estranged enough to alert the subject to the 
unconscious forces attached to the substitute. Marx’s worker, denied anywhere the 
familiarity of home, will inevitably experience much of his world as “unhomelike,” the 
unheimlich bound to crop up as a result. The historical conditions of capitalism are 
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particularly conducive to the psychic conditions of the uncanny, resulting in an endemic 
uncanniness to any life under capitalism. 
The Reason of Sleep Produces Monsters: 
“The Sandman”  
 Freud, like Jentsch before him, sees the uncanny illustrated with particular 
vividness in E.T.A. Hoffmann’s classic short story, “The Sandman,” holding it up as a 
prime example of the unheimlich in literature. The reasons for this differ with each 
account of the uncanny: Freud attributes it to the story’s ability to evoke repressed 
oedipal urges, while Pascarelli traces its sense of the unheimlich to its depiction of 
technology. My own contention is that the story achieves its uniquely uncanny feel by 
forcing the main character to confront his own sexual urges and the work his psyche has 
undertaken to repress them, the Sandman emerging as a substitute who nevertheless 
reveals what he is intended to hide. 
The story centers on Nathanael, a young student haunted by dark and bizarre 
memories from childhood involving “The Sandman,” a mysterious figure of legend who 
is said to pluck the eyes from children. While attending university, Nathanael falls in love 
with the beautiful but strange Olimpia, discovering only later that she is an automaton 
created in part by the Sandman. The story begins with an epistle where Nathanael relates 
the strange events of his youth, how the strike of nine o’clock would often be 
accompanied by his parents sending him to bed, with threats that the Sandman would 
punish him if he did not comply. Fascinated by the thought of such a figure, Nathanael 
sneaks into the study one night to find his father and the Sandman, revealed to be the 
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repulsive family acquaintance Coppelius, standing next to each other before a strange 
hearth. For Nathanael,     
“His [Coppelius’] entire appearance was repellant and disgusting; 
but we children had a particular aversion to his big, gnarled, hairy 
hands, and anything touched by them ceased at once to be 
appetizing. Once he noticed this, he took delight in finding some 
pretext for fingering a piece of cake or fruit that our kind mother 
had surreptitiously put on our plates, so that our loathing and 
disgust prevented us, with tears in our eyes, from enjoying the titbit 
that was supposed to give us pleasure.” (89) 
Coppelius is shown here as constantly obstructing Nathanael and his siblings’ chances for 
enjoyment, interceding between them and the objects of desire before them. Standing in 
the way of enjoyment specifically from their mother, Coppelius appears an oedipal figure 
for the children, further evidenced by their revulsion from this enjoyment, implying that 
they have renounced their desire for it at the behest of some paternal figure and now 
regard it with a queasy disdain. The focus on Coppelius’ use of his hands to dissuade the 
children is relevant, as it likely refers to corporal punishment as a means of enforcing 
paternal restrictions on pleasure. Given this paternal air, it makes sense Freud would 
interpret this Sandman as an oedipal figure whose presence stokes lingering anxieties that 
he sees as the source of the story’s uncanniness. For him, “the feeling of something 
uncanny is directly attached to the figure of the Sand Man, that is, to the idea of being 
robbed of one’s eyes,” and since “anxiety about one’s eyes, the fear of going blind, is 
often enough a substitute for the dread of being castrated,” the Sandman achieves his 
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uncanny effect by reminding one of “the dreaded father at whose hands castration was 
expected” (“Uncanny” 230-2). Once repressed, castration anxiety now returns in the 
guise of the Sandman, the fear produced a familiar one. Yet, it should be observed that 
Coppelius is not a solemn, austere figure of paternal power, as Freud conceives of him, 
but one who takes direct and sadistic enjoyment in denying his children these pleasures. 
Rather than a stern and staid father figure, Coppelius represents the “obscene father” of 
oedipal fantasy, one who selfishly hoards enjoyment and denies his children out of a cruel 
glee at their deprivation and pain. This obscene father does not simply punish children to 
limit their enjoyment but to increase his own. 
 His obscenity is on full display when Coppelius, upon discovering the boy, lays 
his hands on him, Nathanael relating that 
“he seized me so hard that my joints made a cracking noise, 
dislocating my hands and feet, and put them back in various 
sockets. ‘They don’t fit properly! It was all right as it was! The Old 
Man knew what he was doing!’ hissed and muttered Coppelius; but 
everything went black and dim before my eyes, a sudden 
convulsion shot through my nerves and my frame, and I felt nothing 
more.” (90-1) 
Coppelius’s interest in Nathanael’s body parts is strange, given that he has already agreed 
to spare the boy’s eyes, which are the Sandman’s main concern. While for Freud “this 
singular feature, which seems quite outside the picture of the Sandman, introduces a new 
castration equivalent” (“Uncanny” n 232), this act of dismemberment symbolizing 
castration, Nathanael’s response, however, hints at another explanation, the boy’s 
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experience of seeing “black and dim before [his] eyes” before feeling “a sudden 
convulsion,” an essentially orgasmic one, implying an intense masochistic pleasure at 
Coppelius’ hands. That these hands belong to a figure of paternal power speaks to the 
masochistic fantasies of punishment by his father at work in Nathanael’s enjoyment; the 
same hands that serve as a check on oedipal pleasure become themselves a source of 
pleasure when turned on the boy to punish him. Freud notes that children frequently 
develop fixations on being beaten, stemming from the child’s internalizing their father’s 
punishment of a sibling. Initially gratified simply at being shown preference by the father 
by not being punished, the child comes to take sexual enjoyment in the beating scene 
when they imagine this punishment turned on themselves out of guilt over taboo erotic 
attachments. Or, as Laplanche notes, “the sadomasochistic sexual drive, the enjoyment of 
pain, has its origin in the masochistic phase, but on the basis of a turning round of a 
primary heteroaggression” (Life and Death 91). The child imagines themselves as the 
target of such a punishment to atone for sexual transgressions, sexualizing the 
punishment in turn. In such beating fantasies, Freud detects a dual purpose, in which 
“being beaten is now a convergence of the sense of guilt and sexual love. It is not only 
the punishment for the forbidden genital relation, but also the regressive substitute for 
that relation” (‘A Child’ 189). The punishment for enjoyment becomes itself a source of 
enjoyment, a shift made possible by the subject reverting back to when sexual pleasure 
was not necessarily tied to the genitals, but could be felt in the body’s erogenous zones 
independently of and separate from one another. In the beating fantasy, these other body 
parts are alone stimulated while the genitals are avoided, the subject receiving pleasure 
while remaining safe from any forbidden contact. Nathanael’s experience of 
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dismemberment while in Coppelius’ grasp reflects his regression to the less integrated, 
more diffuse pleasure provided by the beating fantasy, the aroused areas enjoyed in 
isolation, without reference to his other parts. Coppelius’ gleeful sadism in his handling 
of the boy thus appears as a projection of the boy’s fervent desire to be beaten by such a 
figure. This also helps explain Coppelius’ otherwise cryptic statement that “the Old Man 
knew what he was doing!,” as reflecting the beating fantasy’s blend of guilt and pleasure, 
the rightness of paternal authority (“the Old Man” an obvious reference to a father figure) 
asserted even as the scene is permeated with illicit enjoyment. 
 Coppelius emerges here as a substitute for Nathanael’s father, the incestuous 
desires and masochistic fantasies the boy has about his father displaced onto Coppelius, 
no doubt accounting for Nathanael’s discomfort around him. The boy, to his horror, gains 
some inkling of this fact, Nathanael recounting that, just before his being discovered, “as 
my old father bent down to the fire, he looked quite different. A horrible, agonizing 
convulsion seemed to have contorted his gentle, honest face into the hideous, repulsive 
mask of a fiend. He looked like Coppelius” (90). In looking like Coppelius, Nathanael’s 
father reveals himself as the true Coppelius, as the taboo origin of Nathanael’s 
masochistic fantasies, the “horrible, agonizing convulsion” on his father’s face speaking 
to the presence of the sadistic pleasure Nathanael had attributed to his father’s shadowy 
colleague. Witnessing his father’s strange visage, Nathanael gets a potent reminder of the 
incestuous desires he had repressed; at the same time, this resemblance to Coppelius also 
alerts the boy to the displacement that has taken place, Coppelius suddenly looking like 
Nathanael’s father attesting to the boy Coppelius’ role as a substitute for his father. 
Standing in the study, Nathanael confronts his forbidden desires and his own psyche’s 
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attempts to hide those desires from him manifested before him, the vision a deeply 
uncanny one.    
 This revelation has a decidedly dream-like quality, as it is made possible by the 
seeming encroachment of dream-logic into a waking event, the condensation of 
Coppelius with Nathanael’s father acknowledging a secret connection between the two. 
The blurred line between dreaming and waking can be seen throughout this episode, from 
its taking place after the child’s bedtime to its conclusion, when Nathanael comes awakes 
after being manhandled, “a warm, gentle breath passed over my face, and I awoke from a 
death-like sleep; my mother was bending over me” (91), the boy awakening as though 
everything before had been some unsettling nightmare. What occurred in the study is thus 
granted something of an uncertain status, not clearly an objective event, yet not entirely 
attributable to the fevered workings of the character’s mind either; rather, the uncanny 
scene exists as a murky conflation of both, psyche and reality combined and 
indistinguishable. 
 Freud observes that beating fantasies such as Nathanael’s tend to undergo a 
change, morphing from a scene of the subject being beaten to one of the subject 
witnessing the beating of another, this other serving as the subject’s substitute. Thus 
altered, the fantasy “arouses activities of the imagination which on the one hand continue 
the phantasy along the same line, and on the other hand neutralize it through 
compensation” (‘A Child’ 195), the subject free to enjoy their masochism vicariously 
through another, therefore escaping the guilt associated with such enjoyment. When, 
years later, Nathanael enters his beloved Olimpia’s bedroom to find that “the Professor 
had seized a female figure by the shoulders, while the Italian Coppola was holding it by 
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the feet, and both were tugging at it for dear life, while quarrelling violently over it. 
Nathanael started back, filled with deep horror, on recognizing the figure as Olimpia” 
(113-4), what he encounters is his childhood beating fantasy in altered form. Coppola, the 
most recent guise of the demonic Coppelius, is manhandling the girl much as he had 
Nathanael, with the Professor, Olimpia’s “father,” doing the same, again becoming 
evidence that a displacement has occured, Coppola’s role as a father-replacement made 
clear by their similarity. In the middle of this scene, however, Olimpia has assumed 
Nathanael’s role, experiencing the beating in his stead. While for Pascarelli the revelation 
that Olimpia is a machine symbolizes how Nathanael has been duped by technology, the 
sight of her disjointed parts when “Coppelius then thew the figure over his shoulder and 
rushed downstairs with a frightful yell of laughter, so that the figure’s feet, which were 
hanging down in an unsightly way, gave a wooden rattling and rumbling as they knocked 
against the steps” (114), would seem more likely to remind Nathanael of the pleasurable 
disassembly he enjoyed at Coppelius’ hands, his pleasure now taken on by her. Contrary 
to Freud, for whom “the automatic doll can be nothing else than the materialization of 
Nathanael’s feminine attitude toward his father in his infancy” (“Uncanny” n 232), 
Olimpia in his reading representing Nathanael’s emasculation before his father, she 
would instead seem to evoke both Nathanael’s own masochistic fantasy and the way in 
which she functions as a substitute for him, hiding this fantasy from him. What Nathanael 
confronts in Olimpia’s bedroom is the way his feelings for her are shaped by the desires 
he has displaced onto her. 
 These desires are already at work when Nathanael meets Olimpia for the first 
time, the narrator, describing her appearance, notes “the slightly strange curve of her back 
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and the wasp-like slenderness of her waist seemed to be the result of excessive 
tightlacing” (108). The girl’s very figure is is seen as marked by painful acts of 
constriction, her body seeming always constrained in a tight grasp. Looking bound, she 
cannot but spark sadistic and masochistic thoughts in those who see her. Nathanael would 
appear to be among them, while watching her perform at the piano, “he felt as though 
red-hot arms had suddenly seized him; unable to restrain himself, he shrieked out in 
agony and rapture: ‘Olimpia!’” (108-9). The “red-hot arms” would seem to recall his 
treatment by the infernal Coppelius, the “agony and rapture” he feels before Olimpia 
likened to the blend of pleasure and pain of being in Coppelius’ grasp; through her, he 
can enjoy such masochism without having to be the direct target of any torture. 
 Olimpia’s place in Nathanael’s fantasy life helps explain their rather strange 
interaction as they take their first dance. After Olimpia’s performance, 
“when the dance had already begun he found himself standing 
close to Olimpia, who had not yet been asked for a dance, and, 
scarcely able to stammer out a few words, he seized her hand. 
Olimpia’s hand was ice-cold: a shudder went through him like a 
hideous, deadly frost. He stared into Olimpia’s eyes, which beamed 
at him full of love and yearning, and at that moment a pulse 
seemed to begin beating in her cold hand and her life’s blood to 
flow in a glowing stream. Love and desire flared up in Nathanael’s 
heart; he embraced the fair Olimpia and flew with her through the 
ranks of the dancers” (109). 
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Nathanael surprises and takes hold of her, as if reenacting Coppelius’ taking hold of him, 
to begin the dance. The dismay he feels at her cold, unresponsive hand can be thus 
understood as disappointment in her lack of any perceivable pleasure while in his hold. 
When discussing this distorted version of the beating fantasy, Freud offers the caveat that 
“only the form of this fantasy is sadistic; the satisfaction which is derived from it is 
masochistic” (‘A Child’ 191). The beating fantasy, even as the punishment is turned on 
another, is not properly sadistic, as it is not the infliction of pain but the second-hand 
enjoyment of that pain which is the source of pleasure. Nathanael grasps Olimpia not to 
enjoy hurting her but to enjoy her enjoyment of his grasp, and thus feels dejected when 
she seems unresponsive and inert in his hands. It is only with the reassurance offered by 
Olimpia’s longing gaze that he can take pleasure in his contact with her, the warm life 
starting to course through her in fact the heat of Nathanael’s desire now stoked. This 
desire drives him to continue his grasp on her, pulling her onto the dance floor in order to 
further indulge in the sight of her luxuriating in his hold. The scene in Olimpia’s bedroom 
makes this dynamic explicit, as it not only reminds Nathanael of his repressed beating 
fantasy, but makes him aware that this fantasy has been displaced onto his beloved 
Olimpia in an attempt to hide it. In doing so, the scene achieves a sense of uncanniness 
by its dream-like combination of substitute with what it was meant to substitute for, 
Olimpia becoming part of the fantasy she was supposed to obscure and negate.        
 This reading of “The Sandman” brings to light two crucial points. Firstly, the 
uncanny scene does not function in isolation, but relies on facts of the character’s psyche 
established elsewhere in the work. The uncanniness of what Nathanael witnesses in 
Olimpia’s bedroom is only understood by connecting this scene back to his childhood 
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encounter with Coppelius. The details of the scene are not alone enough to account for its 
uncanniness, the way these details relate to other scenes required for any understanding. 
The tendency to overestimate the importance of technology creating the uncanny feeling 
in “The Sandman,” such as in Pascarelli’s reading, can be seen as stemming from an 
inadequate appreciation of this, Olimpia’s rattling joints taken at face-value as machinery, 
rather than a reference back to Nathanael’s sexual development. Moments of the 
unheimlich do not exist independently within the larger work, but result from their 
position in the work’s structure. 
 Secondly, these moments of uncanniness, understood as expressions of a 
character’s unconscious, undermine any clear distinction between the character’s psyche 
and their physical surroundings; Nathanael being manhandled is his repressed fantasy 
made flesh, confronting him with a glimpse of the inner workings of his own mind. The 
uncanniness brought on by a character’s recognition, however dim, of their own psychic 
forces roiling their normally stable surroundings creates a node within the text where any 
separation between the character and their world vanishes. This second point explains 
how the uncanny emerges as a possible remedy to the problem that alienation causes the 
artwork: in conflating the mental and material lives of a given character, the uncanny 
offers a means of creating coherence between them, momentarily overcoming the gulf 
imposed between them by the forces of modernity. At the same time, springing from 
these same forces, the uncanny does not involve any betrayal of the artwork’s connection 
to contemporary life, but rather reinforces it; rather than offering coherence against 
alienation, it promises a coherence within alienation. It is for this reason that that uncanny 
can take on an important structural role in certain literary works of the early twentieth 
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century, at a time when literature was being asked to address a world that was 
increasingly inaesthetic. 
 In the following chapters, this structural role will be further examined, first in the 
works of D.H. Lawrence, then in the short stories of Katherine Mansfield. The Lawrence 
chapter will argue that his posthumously published novella, The Virgin and the Gipsy, can 
be seen as reworking his novel The Rainbow in a way that emphasizes the uncanny in the 
place of the earlier novel’s more expressionist-inspired search for beauty. In the 
Mansfield chapter, her development as a short story writer will be traced, as she comes to 
embrace the uncanny by the end of her career. In both of these cases, the authors in 
question come to the uncanny as a means of depicting modern, alienated life without 
sacrificing the structural coherence of their works. Paying attention to these writers’ use 
of the uncanny allows critics to better grasp the ways their works are responses to unique 
aesthetic challenges of modernity, furthering the appreciation of these works as dynamic 
products of a rapidly changing world.   
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Chapter 2: 
The Flood and the Rainbow: 
D.H. Lawrence’s Uses of the Uncanny
Introduction 
In the epilogue to his Movements in European History, D.H. Lawrence reflects on 
the recently concluded First World War, stating mournfully that, “the war, now called the 
Great War, came in 1914, and smashed the growing tip of European Civilization” (MEH 
255). Yet, the mass destruction of the war is for Lawrence the symptom of much deeper 
societal problems plaguing the industrialized world, asserting that, “if we continue in our 
ideal of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, liberty for every man and every nation to get as 
much as he can for himself, equality of opportunity for every sharp and unscrupulous 
man or nation to get the better of the more honest or less shrewd man or nation, then 
there is bound to come more war, many more wars” (MEH 258). The cause of conflicts 
like the Great War, according to Lawrence, is to be found in the prevalence of capitalist 
competition that has dominated societies since at least the great bourgeois revolutions of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries1, the constant jostling for advantage in the 
market inevitably building to a crescendo of outright warfare. Because of this general 
discord, “nations are slowly strangling one another in ‘competition.’ The cancer of 
finance spreads through the body of mankind. Individuals are diseased with the same 
disease. To get money, to spend money, nothing else remains. And with it goes all the 
strangling and the bullying and the degradation, the sense of humiliation, and the 
worthlessness of life, which is the bitterest of all” (MEH 266). Set against one another 
1The notion of “bourgeois revolution” is used here as it is defined by Alex Callinicos, who 
describes them as “political transformations which facilitate the capitalist mode of production” 
(Callinicos), most often used in reference to events like the English and French revolutions 
which were waged against feudal hierarchy and privilege.   
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with no higher goal to aim for than success in the market, these modern subjects appear 
to Lawrence to be condemned to live without meaning, since there is no room in such a 
competition to consider loftier, more fulfilling goals. To remedy this state of affairs, 
Lawrence encourages the upcoming generation to disregard such competition and seek 
out instead meaningful connection in their own lives, stating that, “every youth, every girl 
can make the great historical change inside himself or herself: to care supremely for 
nothing but the spark of noblesse that is in him and in her, and to follow the only leader 
who is the star of the new, natural noblesse” (MEH 266, emphasis original). For 
Lawrence, it is up to the young to try to find the inherently meaningful, and thus 
ennobling, in life and ignore the demands of competition. 
 This admonishment occupies a great deal of Lawrence’s fiction, depicting as it 
often does the struggle of a young protagonist to overcome the alienation of modern 
existence and forge some sort of meaningful connection with the world in which they 
live. In these works, the character’s experience of finally achieving meaningful contact 
with their world is central to the work’s structure, drawing as it does the various parts of 
the narrative such as character and setting together into a single coherent point. Yet, the 
precise way Lawrence makes this connection between the young character and their 
world varies across his career, Paul Morel’s artistic appreciation of the world in Sons and 
Lovers a far cry from Mabel’s slyly erotic engagement with hers in “The Horse Dealer’s 
Daughter.” This abundance of different methods, I would assert, is the result of Lawrence 
experimenting with ways around the dilemma of depicting life in the discordant, 
alienating world of capitalist competition while allowing his characters to resist this 
discord enough to find the meaningful natural noblesse in their own lives. One such 
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method is his use of the uncanny to bridge the divide between alienated subjects and an 
alienating society, perhaps best seen in the novella The Virgin and the Gipsy (1930), 
whose surreal conclusion sets an experience of the unheimlich as the central joint 
connecting the narrative’s various themes and images. This is in contrast to Lawrence’s 
uses of the uncanny elsewhere, including as something to be avoided and overcome by 
the characters, as seen in his novel The Rainbow (1915). The change in the position of the 
uncanny within the narrative seen here reflects Lawrence’s desire to move away from the 
style embodied in The Rainbow, specifically its Expressionist use of abstraction, and find 
a new mode of narrative expression better suited to the society he sought to depict. By 
suffusing the novella’s climactic scene with a sense of the uncanny, Lawrence achieves 
coherence between his alienated character and her world, conflating her psychic and 
material realities, while also avoiding the abstraction of The Rainbow. 
  In order to better grasp the differences in these uses in the uncanny within the 
structure of a narrative, this chapter will begin with a close reading of The Virgin and the 
Gipsy to establish just how it generates and utilizes the unheimlich. Afterwards, the 
novella will be compared to The Rainbow, with a particular focus on scenes that are 
similar to those found in the novella but which nevertheless have a much different 
relationship to the uncanny. Following this comparison, the chapter will conclude with a 
brief consideration of what it means for the understanding of how Lawrence’s criticism of 
modernity found expression not only in the content but also the structure of his prose.     
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“Listen to the voice of the water”: The Virgin and the Gipsy 
Written in early 1926 but only published after Lawrence’s death in 1930 (Jones 
116), The Virgin and the Gipsy straddles genres by combining the realistic and the 
fanciful. Joseph Allan Boone, for instance, notes that “the novella assumes the aura of a 
fairy tale, its plot suffused with a timeless, dream-like quality” (96), a notion echoed by 
Michael Bell, who states that the story contains fairy tale elements but, “rather than the 
story being a fable as such, it sets a fabulous episode within, and against, the reality it has 
established as normative within the world of the story” (59), emphasizing how the 
narrative follows at moments the conventions of realistic fiction, while at others gives 
way to the fantastical. These shifts in genre are the consequence of the narrative’s 
embrace of the uncanny, with the instances of apparent fairy-tale logic the result of a 
conflation between a character’s psyche and the material reality. 
The novella follows Yvette Saywell, a young woman who has just returned with 
her older sister Lucille from school on the continent to their Midlands home, a rectory 
held by their father. This home is shared with their extended family, and dominated by 
their paternal grandmother, referred to as “The Mater,” described as “one of those 
physically vulgar, clever old bodies who had got her own way her all her life by buttering 
the weaknesses of her men-folk” (VG 6). Their father, the Rector, has remained single 
since Cynthia, “his unrestrained and beautiful wife” (VG 5) and the girls’ mother, 
abandoned the family to run off with her young, penniless lover; in her absence, the 
Rector insists on maintaining an idealized image of his ex-wife, an image of her as a 
“pure white snow flower [that] bloomed in perpetuum” (VG 6, emphasis original). 
Anything that disturbs either the Mater’s hold on the house or the Rector’s image of 
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Cynthia is not allowed, resulting in a quietly crushing atmosphere that Yvette will spend 
the novella resisting, until the house is finally washed away in a sudden flood. 
 At first glance, the Mater appears to harken back to ancient figures of female 
power, an archaic remnant of some primitive, matriarchal religion, to which the rest of 
the family are devotees. For instance, Boone describes her as “this grotesque relic... 
associated with rank materiality, mat(t)er in its most chthonic, nonproductive state. As 
such, Lawrence’s Mater-- as her name also implies-- forms a debased version of the 
archetypal Magna Mater of ancient religion” (99). Yet, this interpretation seems 
undermined by the admission of the fact that, rather than being elemental and enduring, 
the Mater’s position in the rectory is both recent and tenuous, the narrator noting that the 
Mater had, before Cynthia left, “been somewhat diminished and insignificant as a widow 
in a small house,” and that “if She-who-was-Cynthia ever came back, there wouldn’t be 
much left of the Mater” (VG 6-7). The Mater took her place of prominence only after 
Cynthia had fled and would not be able to maintain it if she returned. The Mater can only 
flourish when Cynthia is gone because she represents the thing that the Rector’s idealized 
image of his wife cannot admit, her selfishness. The narrator notes that, with Cynthia 
gone, “the peculiarly dangerous sort of selfishness, like lions and tigers, was also gone” 
(VG 7, emphasis original), replaced by the harmless image of a snow flower. This 
selfishness returns in the figure of the Mater, who bends those around her to her will, the 
narrator noting that, “under her old-fashioned lace cap, under her silver hair, under the 
black silk of her stout, forward-bulging body, this old woman had a cunning heart, 
seeking forever her own female power” (VG 8). Like Cynthia, the Mater’s primary 
concern is with her self and her own happiness over others’. To keep his “pure” image of 
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Cynthia, the Rector must repress this attribute, displacing this selfishness onto the Mater. 
Taking on this feature that the Rector cannot accept in his memories of his wife, the 
Mater makes his sanitized version of Cynthia possible. If Cynthia were to return, the 
Mater’s position in the house would end as the Rector’s pure picture of his wife would 
neither be possible nor necessary, with the Mater losing her raison d’etre. 
 Cynthia’s selfishness has been displaced onto the Mater, but not without 
undergoing a transformation: instead of tearing families apart as Cynthia’s did, being the 
“dangerous sort of selfishness,” the Mater’s is more palatable to the Rector as it limits 
itself to those within the family, and thus allows the family to remain intact. For example, 
the Mater justifies her demand that her daughter Cissie sleep in bed with her with 
reference to her devotion to her late husband, stating that, “for fifty-four years I never 
slept a night without the Pater’s arm round me. And when he was gone, I tried to sleep 
alone. But as sure as my eyes closed to sleep, my heart nearly jumped out of my body, 
and I lay in palpitation” (VG 13). The Mater here does not claim Cissie’s comfort for her 
own sake, but because she is still so committed to her late husband, unable to bear his 
absence. While Cynthia’s selfishness meant coming into conflict with her duties as wife, 
the Mater’s are enacted through these duties, getting what she wants from Cissie by 
invoking her continued fidelity to her husband. Yet, by expressing her selfishness through 
and toward her family, invoking her husband to gain the comfort of her daughter, she is 
driven to exercise increasing control over them, so that they will meet her desires. As a 
result, the Mater becomes the “devouring mother,” the figure of a mother who threatens 
her children’s autonomy by her need to possess and dominate them, to integrate them into 
her own self, a fear stems from the infant’s anxiety at being dependent on their mother for 
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the pleasures of sustenance and the lack of active agency that implies (Freud, “Female” 
237). The Mater can be seen as such a devouring mother when the narrator states that 
“the family was her own extended ego. Naturally, she covered it with her power. And her 
sons and daughters, being weak and disintegrated, were naturally loyal” (VG 9). The 
Mater’s narcissism does not allow her to recognize her children as separate and 
independent of her, but instead as merely appendages of herself that exist to serve her 
will. This is further evidenced when the narrator notes that “[the Mater] was like the old 
toad Yvette had watched, fascinated, as it sat on the ledge of the beehive, immediately in 
front of the little entrance by which the bees emerged, and which, with a demonish 
lightening-like snap of its pursed jaws, caught every bee as it came out to launch into the 
air” (VG 16), marking her as a figure of ravenous consumption who seeks to swallow up 
those around her. The devouring mother is also an abject figure, as the suffocating lack of 
distance between her body and the subject makes that body and its pleasures disgusting. 
When the narrator states that, “she was perfectly complacent, sitting in her ancient 
obesity, and after meals, getting the wind from her stomach, pressing her bosom with her 
hand as she ‘rifted’ in gross physical complacency” (VG 13-4), her pleasures are made 
repulsive as her body encroaches on others with its expanding girth and its emissions, her 
overwhelming presence resulting in feelings of abjection.    
 Given that everyone and everything in the house is subjected to the Mater’s open 
and unabashed enjoyment, it is unsurprising that the house itself becomes abject as well, 
the narrator stating that, “the hard, stone house struck the girls as being unclean, they 
could not have said why. The shabby furniture seemed somehow sordid, nothing was 
fresh” (VG 12-3). The house feels tainted to the daughters, not due to anything objective, 
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but rather by its complicity in the vulgar pleasure of their grandmother. As everything is 
thus imbued with the Mater’s desires, there is no room for their own, leaving the girls 
feeling alienated from the rectory. This is well illustrated when Yvette attempts to open a 
window in the living room, since “the room was never fresh, she imagined it smelt: smelt 
of granny.” In response, the Mater says to Yvette that, “I think you might remember there 
are older people than yourself in the room,” adding that the window will let in “a draught 
to give us all our death,” before the Rector comes over and shuts the window at the 
Mater’s behest (VG 13), Yvette’s desire for fresh air overridden by the Mater’s for stuffy 
warmth. The Mater’s enjoyment takes precedence over everyone else’s, leaving them 
smothering in her inescapable presence while their own desires remain cut off from 
finding any expression in their surroundings. The result is a feeling of detachment and 
alienation, exemplified by Yvette’s thoughts one night sitting at the rectory’s dinner table, 
the narrator noting, “dimly, at the back of her mind, she was thinking: Why are we all 
only like mortal pieces of furniture? Why is nothing important?” (VG, 40, emphasis 
original). Human beings appear like commodities to her: lifeless, interchangeable, 
without relevance, reflecting their lack of meaningful connection to her wants and 
desires. 
 The remedy to this alienation begins, counterintuitively, with a separation. On an 
excursion through the countryside, Yvette and her friends come across a Romani 
encampment, and decide to have their fortunes told by a woman there. As Yvette awaits 
her turn, she notices a handsome man, the palm-reader’s husband, looking at her from the 
caravan, the narrator stating, “the gipsy man at the top of the steps stood imperturbable, 
without any expression at all. But his bold eyes kept starring at Yvette, she could feel 
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them on her cheek, on her neck, and she dared not look up,” leaving her, “abstracted, 
agitated, hardly heeding: in one of her mesmerised states” (VG 23). This man is 
obviously attracted to Yvette, a feeling Yvette would seem to reciprocate, as evidenced by 
her “agitated” and “mesmerised” response. This attraction helps explain her sudden 
hesitation, the narrator noting that, “when it came to Yvette’s turn, and the woman looked 
up boldly, cruelly, searching for a long time in her face. Yvette said nervously: ‘I don’t 
think I want mine told. No, I won’t have mine told! No I won’t, really!” (VG 23), as she 
is afraid that the woman will discover her desire for her husband, fearing the jealousy of 
the woman looking “boldly, cruelly” at her. The woman responds to this hesitation by 
saying, “You have some secret? You are afraid I shall say it. Come, would you like to go 
in the caravan, where nobody hears?” (VG 23). By telling Yvette that she knows the girl 
has a secret, she communicates to Yvette that she is aware of her feelings for her husband 
and that the girl’s reluctance is an attempt to keep the older woman from discovering 
these illicit desires. Her offer to take her into the caravan suggests to Yvette that these 
desires should indeed remain hidden, and she should not reveal them to her compatriots 
or, more importantly, to the man. In agreeing to do so, Yvette is agreeing to hide from 
woman’s husband her passion for him, thus keeping her desires from coming to fruition, 
even as she is confessing them to the palm-reader. Yet, even as she directs Yvette to 
obscure her desires, the woman nevertheless acknowledges them and their potential to 
disrupt the woman’s married life, Yvette’s desires granted a reality and power that they 
could never find in the rectory, where they are crowded out by the Mater’s. 
 This interpretation gains support in Lawrence’s description of the Saywell girls 
and their friends just before they encounter the Romani camp, stating 
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Yet they had a peaked look too. After all, they had nothing really to 
rebel against, any of them. They were left so free in their 
movements. Their parents let them do almost entirely what they 
liked. There wasn’t really a fetter to break, nor a prison bar to file 
through, nor a bolt to shatter. The keys of their lives were in their 
own hands. And there they dangled inert... If there had only been a 
few ‘strict order’ to be disobeyed! But nothing... (VG 17) 
Yvette and her friends are free to do whatever they want, but, because of this, there are at 
the same time no consequences for anything they do, leaving them feeling that their 
liaisons are ultimately meaningless. Since the world already allows them to pursue their 
desires, this pursuit cannot as a result change the world, making it impossible for them to 
leave their mark on their world no matter what they do. Their freedom, the simple 
absence of interference, leaves them disconnected from their world, and is ultimately 
only the hollow freedom of alienation. The purposelessness of their passions results in a 
passionless malaise taking hold, the narrator noting that “they could really do as they 
liked. And so, of course, there was nothing to do but sit in the car and talk a lot of 
criticism of other people, and silly flirty gallantry that was really rather a bore” (VG 17), 
the ultimate meaninglessness of their pursuits removing any urgency from pursuing much 
of anything. Yvette, however, escapes this when her arousal is recognized by the Romani 
woman, her jealousy alluding to the possibility that her desires could have some real 
effect on the wider world. 
  The promise of, for once, seeing her desires reflected in her surroundings draws 
Yvette back to the camp, this time alone. Immediately upon her arrival, she is reminded 
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of the palm-reader’s warning to repress her feelings for the Romani man. Finding an old 
woman cooking stew over a fire, Yvette asks if dinner is being prepared, to which she 
answers, “Dinner, yes!’...‘For him! And for the children!’ she pointed with the long fork 
at the three black-eyed, staring children, who were staring at her from under their black 
fringe” (VG 45). The old woman, who is suspicious at Yvette’s approach, answers the girl 
in a way that emphasizes the fact that she is not welcome (“For him,” as if to say, not for 
you) and draws attention to the children produced by the man’s marriage, who would 
likely be impacted by any infidelity. The palm-reader’s injunction lingers even in her 
absence, the camp permeated with her call for Yvette to repress her attraction to the man. 
The camp’s association with repression helps explain the uncanniness that marks Yvette’s 
interactions with the man while she is in it. When Yvette sits around the fire with the 
man, the narrator notes that “her will had departed from her limbs, he had power over 
her: his shadow was on her” (VG 46), before going on to state that, 
On her face was that tender look of sleep, which a nodding flower 
has when it is full out, like a mysterious early flower, she was full 
out, like a snowdrop, which spreads its three white wings in a flight 
into the waking sleep of its brief blossoming. The waking sleep of 
her full-opened virginity, entranced like a snowdrop in the sunshine, 
was upon her... the childlike, sleep-waking eyes of her moment of 
perfect virginity looked into his, unseeing. She was only aware of 
the dark, strange effluence of him bathing her limbs, washing her at 
last purely will-less. She was aware of him, as a dark, complete 
power (VG 46-7, emphasis original). 
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 Yvette experiences the man as exercising some strange control over her, as though he as 
taken over her will. This coincides with an acknowledgement of her desire for him, the 
narrator noting, “the dark, strange effluence of him bathing her limbs,” attesting to 
Yvette’s physical excitement in his presence. Yet, within the camp, with its reminders that 
she avoid these feelings, Yvette wants to deny this attraction, which leads her to reverse 
it, turning her desire for him into his desire for her. Yvette’s turning around of her own 
desire back on herself, in the process attributing it to him, is evidenced in the focus on the 
luridness of his gazing at her, as when he is “looking at her cheek, that was still blanched 
by the cold, and at the soft hair over her reddened ear, and the long, still mottled hands on 
her knee” (VG 45). Her desire to look at him has been transformed into his desire to look 
at her, while preserving her enjoyment, Freud noting that “the exhibitionist shares in the 
enjoyment of [the sight of] his exposure” because “the essence of the process [of turning 
a desire back on oneself] is thus the change of the object, while the aim remains 
unchanged” (IV 127), the act still enjoyable to the subject even when it is displaced onto 
another. The excitement Yvette experiences before the man’s “strange effluence” can thus 
be seen as her own desire to look turned around on herself. Having thus attributed her 
own desires to him, they seem to still belong to him even when she feels them, as though 
he had somehow replaced her will with his own. The feeling of being mesmerized, then, 
stems from Yvette experiencing this desire for him even as this desire has been displaced 
onto him, a coincidence of the repressed and its substitute, resulting in the encounter’s 
uncanniness. The narrator’s repeated description of Yvette as being in a “waking sleep” 
reflects this dynamic, as it is precisely in dreams that such coincidence of the repressed 
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and its substitute are common; when this dream logic finds itself in the waking world, it 
appears as the “waking sleep” of the uncanny. 
 Yvette’s “waking sleep” is explicitly tied to her sexual being, her “full-opened 
virginity,” this sexual being itself likened by the narrator to a snowdrop flower. The 
choice of image here is, of course, not innocent (no pun intended): it is precisely as a 
“snow-flower” that the Rector insists on remembering Yvette’s mother, as opposed to an 
image referencing her later impurity and adultery. Yet, the seeming irony of Yvette 
becoming like the purified image of her mother the moment she is taken by her own 
adulterous passion alludes to the ambivalence at work in that image from the beginning. 
After all, as the narrator notes, it is precisely as a snow-flower that the Rector perseveres, 
“the pure girl he had wedded and worshipped” (VG 6), Cynthia retaining her “purity,” or 
her virginity, within that image. Yet, as the “wedded and worshipped” implies, this is a 
virginity that is oriented toward its fulfillment in sexual experience; as a “snow-flower,” 
Cynthia remains forever untouched, and forever preparing to be touched. The Rector, in 
seeking to keep Cynthia as his snow-flower, keeps her at once pure and sexually 
available, speaking to his libidinal investment in the image. This double meaning inherent 
in flower imagery is something Lawrence is conscious of, mentioning in his tract 
Pornography and Obscenity the common practice of comparing young women to 
flowers, saying that, “she, poor thing, knows quite well that flowers, even lilies, have 
tippling yellow anthers and a sticky stigma, sex, rolling sex. But to the popular mind 
flowers are sexless things, and when a girl is told she is like a flower, it means she is 
sexless and ought to be sexless” (LEA 248). Flowers are at once highly sexual and spoken 
of as though entirely non-sexual, applied to the young in an attempt to render them non-
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sexual as well.  When the Rector thinks of Cynthia as a snow-flower, he is doing 
precisely this, treating an inherently sexual being as entirely devoid of passion, 
transforming the inherently sexual snow flower into something without such drives in 
order to do the same to Cynthia.  However, as Lawrence is quick to point out, the same 
mind that conceives of the young woman as a sexless flower also takes perverse pleasure 
in that unacknowledged sexuality, stating, “Du bist wie eine Blume, Jawohl!2 One can see 
the elderly gentleman laying his hands on the head of the pure maiden and praying God 
to keep her forever so pure, so clean and beautiful. Very nice for him! Just pornography! 
tickling the dirty little secret and rolling his eyes to heaven” (LEA 246). This underside to 
the snow flower image, sexually-charged even while pure, only becomes clear in the 
novella when it is applied to Yvette in the camp; the use of the snow-flower/snowdrop for 
both Cynthia and Yvette not only reinforces the girl’s similarity to her mother, but it also 
reveals the disavowed eroticism at work in the image. In turning Yvette into a snowdrop 
when she experiences sexual desire, the narrator grants the same sexual desire to the 
supposedly sanitized image of Cynthia as snow flower. The Rector, in maintaining this 
image of Cynthia, is thus revealed as enjoying the hidden eroticism of his memories of 
his former wife even while disavowing it beneath the cover of the “pure” snow flower. In 
Yvette, this eroticism returns, attached to and imbuing the very flower-image meant to 
repress it, resulting in the uncanniness of that image, its dream-like, surreal quality. 
 Curiously, the novella interrupts this uncanny moment just as it is about to reach 
its culmination, with Yvette on the cusp of expressing her repressed desires for the man. 
                                               
2 The Cambridge Edition’s explanatory note states “The opening line of the poem (1825) by 
Heinrich Heine (1797-1856) (Oh, you are like a flower! Yes, indeed!)” (LEA 366). 
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Yvette is invited into the man’s caravan, under the guise of washing her hands, when the 
narrator notes, “she stood still at the foot of the steps. A motor-car was coming. He stood 
at the top of the steps, looking around strangely... Then they heard the cry of a woman’s 
voice, and the brakes on the car. It had pulled up, just beyond the quarry” (VG 47). Yvette 
is just about to enter the place where her fantasies were hidden with the object of those 
fantasies, when she is suddenly and abruptly held back by the emergence of the 
Eastwoods. The wealthy soon-to-be Mrs. Eastwood has just recently left her husband, an 
engineer named Simon Fawcett, and is in the process of obtaining a divorce so that she 
can legally marry the much-younger, penniless Mr. Eastwood, a former army officer (VG 
48-9), their situation nearly identical to that of Cynthia and her young paramour. The 
Eastwoods would then seem to be a reminder to Yvette of her mother’s transgression and 
subsequent guilt, bringing to the girl’s mind memories of the scandal resulting from 
infidelity as she herself veers close to adulterous passion. There is a crucial difference, 
however, between Cynthia and Mrs. Eastwood, in that, for Mrs. Eastwood, “the husband 
had agreed that she should have custody [of their two children], as soon as she was 
married to Eastwood,” (VG 52). Unlike Yvette and Lucille, Mrs. Eastwood’s children will 
not be left with their father, feeling abandoned by and vaguely guilty for their mother’s 
flight. The marriage to Mr. Eastwood is enough for Mr. Fawcett to deem her suitable to 
raise the children, returning them to her as soon as the couple is wed. Given this, it would 
appear that the Eastwoods are not simply a reminder of Cynthia and her lover, but 
represent for Yvette the fantasy of her mother restored to respectability by her marriage to 
her lover and returning to rescue her and her sister from the deprivations of life in the 
rectory. In the image of the Eastwoods, Yvette sees her mother’s illicit liaisons re-
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inscribed within the realm of conventional domesticity, a domesticity that offers a place 
for both she and Lucille to escape the abjection and humiliation of the Saywell 
household. 
 Breathing life into this fantasy is the time that Yvette spends in the Eastwoods’ 
cozy little cottage, a site of convivial and orderly domesticity, wherein “the major drank 
beer from a silver mug, the little Jewess and Yvette had champagne in lovely glasses, then 
the major brought in coffee... as the afternoon drew on, they went to the kitchen, the 
major pushed back his sleeves, showing his powerful athletic white arms, and carefully, 
deftly washed the dishes, while the women wiped” (VG 52-3). Within the confines of the 
cottage, there is a warmth and harmony that feels to Yvette like scenes from a lost 
childhood, one far removed from the squalid, oppressive realities of the rectory. In her 
time with the Eastwoods, Yvette glimpses what appears like a paradise that never was, 
where her mother’s actions are reconciled with marital life and that marital life takes the 
form of a comfortable home life available to the Saywell daughters. The glamour of this 
fantasy is reflected in the very physical surroundings of the cottage, the narrator’s 
description noting the “strange curving cupboards inlaid with mother of pearl, 
tortoiseshell, ebony, heaven knows what else,” the “strange tall flamboyant chairs, from 
Italy, with sea-green brocade,” and “astonishing saints with wind-blown, richly-coloured 
carven garments and pink faces” (VG 52). The ornate, colorful, and exotic decoration of 
the Eastwoods’ cottage is a blissful antidote to the drab, dingy, and dispiriting interior of 
the rectory, the former’s rococo glitz the idealized dream version of the latter’s cluttered, 
gimcrack domesticity. At the same time, the self-indulgent, decadent sense of style 
displayed in the cottage is a beautified version of the decaying home ever-indulging the 
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Mater, precisely the sort of escape that would be imagined by Yvette as she is trapped 
within the rectory. 
 This fantasy helps explain why the Eastwoods interrupt Yvette’s seduction. Yvette 
would likely associate adultery, and by extension her own adulterous desires, with her 
mother’s scandal, which left the girls at the mercy of their father and the Mater. The 
resentment Yvette would have to feel toward her mother for this abandonment would then 
return as she pursued her own illicit liaison. As a result, Yvette is left in the 
uncomfortable position of experiencing ambivalent emotions toward her mother: angry 
with her for selfishly following her own desires and leaving them behind in the rectory, 
yet at the same time representing their hope of escaping the rectory, as evidenced by the 
fact that Cynthia “contrived, at intervals, to get a little note through to her girls, her 
children” (VG 7), coming to represent the world outside. The Eastwoods emerge to 
resolve this contradiction by offering an image of Cynthia redeemed, the selfishness that 
separated her from her daughters erased. This drive to exonerate Cynthia is can be seen in 
the Eastwoods’ reaction to Yvette admitting to them her interest in the Romani man. 
When Mr. Eastwood encourages Yvette to pursue this desire, Mrs. Eastwood responds 
with, 
“Charles! You’re wrong! How could it be the real thing! As if she 
could possibly marry him and go round in his caravan” 
“I didn’t say marry him,” said Charles. 
“Or a love affair! Why it’s monstrous! What would she think of 
herself!-- That’s not love! That’s-- that’s prostitution.” (VG 58, 
emphasis original) 
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 Mrs. Eastwood is made the voice of propriety, distancing herself, and by extension 
Cynthia, from any transgression, while attributing any libertinism within the couple to the 
young lover, further vindicating Cynthia. By making her mother respectable, and in the 
process of again taking custody of her daughters, Yvette can maintain that she did not in 
fact abandon her, thus evading any ambivalent feelings. Yvette’s resulting attachment to 
this fantasy leaves her unable to fulfill her desires for the Romani man, as to do so would 
remind her of her mother’s actions, thus undoing the image of Cynthia redeemed that the 
fantasy cultivates. The Eastwoods interrupt Yvette’s seduction because the fantasy they 
manifest stands opposed to any adulterous fling, aiming to keep any such reminder of 
Cynthia’s transgressions hidden. Their appearance reveals Yvette to be no less invested 
than the Rector in the idea of Cynthia’s purity and equally unable to accept her desertion 
of the family. 
 The Eastwoods’ role in repressing Yvette’s desires is reflected in the girl’s sudden 
ignorance about sexuality after meeting the couple, asking Lucille what it is “that brings 
people together? People like the Eastwoods, for instance?-- And Daddy and Mama, so 
frightfully unsuitable-- and that gipsy woman who told my fortune, like a great horse, and 
the gipsy man, so fine and delicately cut? What is it?” (VG 53). Sexual attraction is not 
only situated solely within the marriage bond, as is witnessed by Yvette asking about 
Cynthia and their father instead of Cynthia and her lover, but this attraction is placed 
beyond her ken, with Yvette claiming no experience with its force and power. Her 
intimacy with the Eastwoods has not, as one may expect, made her more knowledgeable 
of how such couples work, but has left her insisting that their connection is all the more 
mystifying to her. This is made all the clearer when, after Lucille responds to her question 
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with “I suppose it’s sex, whatever that is,” the sisters lament their own lack of sexual 
impulse, with Yvette stating “perhaps we haven’t got any sex, to connect us with men” 
(VG 53). Sexuality is, by Yvette’s fantasy of the Eastwoods, confined fully within a 
marital structure she is outside of, relieving her of any sexual desire and disavowing the 
connection she experienced with the Romani man. Sex being a concern of married 
couples means she cannot have sexual desires for him, nor him for her, as they are safely 
beyond her. 
 On the level of the narrative, the appearance of the Eastwoods makes possible the 
coherence between the various parts of the story at the novella’s climax. While the 
uncanniness of Yvette’s encounter with the man connected her to the encampment, it had 
no way of creating a similar connection between her and the rectory, or the rectory and 
the camp. Had she been able to consummate her passions in the caravan, her sexual 
awakening would have been confined to the encampment, leaving her alienated 
relationship to the rectory and her family unchanged. This separation of sexual life from 
larger life would be unsatisfactory for a writer like Lawrence, who, as Bell notes, “writes 
about the erotic, but is not for the most part an erotic writer. This is because his typical 
concern is not to isolate the erotic, but to understand its place within a wider sense of life 
and human relationships” (52-3), always seeking to relate the various facets of a character 
to each other and to that character’s world. Indeed, for Lawrence, what separates 
pornography from art proper is the former’s tendency to leave sexuality cloistered and 
hidden away from the rest of life. According to Lawrence, “the whole question of 
pornography seems to me a question of secrecy,” pornography characterized by treating 
sex as a dirty little secret and ensuring that “the dirty little secret is rubbed and scratched 
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more and more, till it becomes more secretly inflamed,” providing “the sneaking thrill 
fumbling under all the purity of dainty underclothes, without one single gross word to let 
you know what is happening” (LEA 243-4), thus allowing sex to remain hidden and 
divided from other lived experiences rather than acknowledged as a part of a coherent 
whole. Thus, to function as art rather than pornography, the novella needs to bring 
coherence to Yvette’s character and her story, and thus her sexuality cannot be 
sequestered in the camp, but must be connected back to her life in the rectory. To make 
this possible, the consummation must be delayed. 
 Confirmation for the Eastwoods’ role as hiding from Yvette illicit passions, both 
her mothers’ and her own, comes from a perhaps unexpected place, the change in Yvette’s 
attitude toward the Mater. After her father forbids her to continue visiting the Eastwoods, 
Yvette’s feeling toward her grandmother, who it was early noted that “it was not fair to 
hate,” is altered, the narrator stating that “it was Granny whom she came to detest with all 
her soul...  her Yvette really hated, with that pure, sheer hatred which is almost a joy” (VG 
63). Suddenly, Yvette finds herself hating immensely someone whom she had once 
considered impossible to hate, a change that is not occasioned by anything the Mater had 
said or done. One possible explanation for this change is that this hatred is the result of 
resentment, as Yvette’s father claims his demand she cut ties with the Eastwoods is for 
the sake of the Mater, whom the Rector insists “was a faithful wife and a faithful mother, 
if ever one existed. She has already had one shock of shame and abomination to endure. 
She shall never be exposed to another” (VG 61). Given this, it is feasible for Yvette to on 
some level hold her grandmother responsible for depriving her of the Eastwoods’ 
company. However, the Rector, in the same speech, states that, if she continues to see the 
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Eastwoods, she “must not expect to associate with your Granny, and your Aunt Cissie, 
and Lucille” (VG 61), citing the rest of the family as well in his threats. Given this, why 
would Yvette single out the Mater for her hatred, and not extend that hatred to Aunt 
Cissie and Lucille, if they were all invoked to remove the Eastwoods from her life? 
 Rather, it would appear that something else is at work, alluded to in the Rector’s 
description of the Mater as “a faithful wife and a faithful mother.” The Mater, 
representing the “safe” selfishness that reconciles itself with the bonds of marriage, 
stands for precisely what is promised by the Eastwoods: desires which find a place within 
the accepted structure of marriage, and therefore present no threat to that structure or the 
happy domesticity that it supposedly offers. This can be seen in the narrator’s description 
of the Mater in the light of Yvette’s fresh hatred for her grandmother, nothing that “the 
old woman sat with her big, reddened face pressed a little back, her lace cap perched on 
her thin white hair, her stub nose still assertive, and her old mouth shut like a trap. This 
motherly old soul, her mouth gave her away” (VG 63). Here, the Mater as devouring 
mother again asserts herself, the maternal and the selfish coinciding in this description, 
the old woman appearing as at once perfectly domestic (a “motherly soul” in her “lace 
cap”), and at the same time ruled by selfish appetites (her “assertive” nose and her 
“mouth shut like a trap”). As hungry, devouring mother, the Mater has squared the circle 
and made her desires fit within the marital system. In the Mater, Yvette sees a reminder of 
the fantasy she has been commanded to repress, namely the fantasy of a mother who, able 
to reconcile her desires with married life, would not have left her stranded with her father. 
Yvette’s grandmother, in this sense, becomes for Yvette an instance of the return of the 
repressed, with its accompanying pain and discomfort. That Yvette suddenly acquired a 
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hatred for the Mater immediately after being forced to cut ties with the Eastwoods and 
push away the fantasy-world they offered her is, in this view, no accident. Rather, now 
that such has been rendered forbidden and unclean, the Mater cannot but herself seem 
unclean and detestable, given that she reminds the girl of the forbidden. 
 Without the Eastwoods or the Romani man, Yvette stagnates in the boredom of the 
rectory before encountering the Romani man again, this time along the road. The man 
informs Yvette that “the old gipsy dreamed something about you,” a dream which told the 
girl’s fortune, sending along a message to the Yvette, “She said: be braver in your heart, 
or you lose your game. She said it this way: be braver in your body, or your luck will 
leave you. And she said as well: Listen for the voice of the water” (VG 66). Like the 
secret palm reading and Yvette’s state of “waking sleep,” the fortune works to reinforce 
the encampment’s image as a “dream-like” place where the forbidden is hidden and 
alluded to at the same time. This is reflected in the fact that the fortune contains two 
versions of the same message. The first, “be braver in your heart, or you lose your game,” 
seems to be a fairly direct allusion to Yvette’s sexual desires, with “heart” being 
associated with romance, and “lose your game” able to refer to both playing a game or 
going on a hunt, both common metaphors for love and courtship. The second, however, 
“be braver in your body, or your luck will leave you,” is much less direct, the more 
pointed allusions to romantic desire replaced with the less specific, more general “body” 
and “luck,” effectively obscuring the romantic message contained in the first version. 
That these two versions nevertheless appear alongside one another, the fortune 
simultaneously expressing and hiding what is to be repressed, marks the fortune, and the 
encampment it came from, as beholden to the logic of dreams. 
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The last part of the fortune, “listen for the voice of the water,” obviously 
foreshadows the flood that will ravage the rectory at the narrative’s climax, and associates 
the waters with dreams as it was a dream that foretold their coming. This association is 
strengthened by the fact that the waters connect back to Yvette’s seduction, as it was 
under the pretense of washing her hands that she was invited into the caravan, the place 
where she was induced to hide her desire for the man, to indulge in this same desire. As 
such, it harkens back to the coincidence of repression and the repressed, of her passion 
for the man and the palm-reader’s subtle call to suppress it. This is illustrated when the 
flood waters suddenly appear at the rectory, Yvette standing near the brook than ran past 
the rectory when, “she heard somebody shouting, and looked round. Down the path 
through the larch-trees the gipsy was bounding... simultaneously she became aware of a 
great roar, which, before she could move, accumulated into a vast deafening snarl,” 
before she saw “a shaggy, tawny wave-front of water advancing like a wall of lions. The 
roaring sound wiped out everything” (VG 69). The flood forces Yvette to face her feelings 
for the Romani man by drawing him to the rectory to warn her of the onrushing water, 
while at the same time working to hide the man, its “roaring sound wiped out 
everything,” including what the man’s shouts, drawing her attention from him and 
drowning out what he is saying with its roar. The flood thus induces Yvette to at once 
remember and repress her desires, an instance of dream logic in waking life granting the 
rushing waters a sense of the uncanny. This sense is only heightened as the waters rush 
into the rectory. Yvette and the man began fleeing upstairs to higher ground, when they 
see “the short but strange bulk of Granny emerge in the hall, away down, from the dining 
room door. She had her hands lifted and clawing, as the first water swirled round her legs, 
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and her coffin-like mouth was opened in a hoarse scream” (VG 70). The Mater’s 
“clawing” and her wide open mouth represent her ravenous claims on those in her family. 
The Mater’s status as devouring mother is brought to the surface here, forcing Yvette to 
confront what she had previously only dimly perceived, that the Mater is a selfish figure 
who hides that selfishness beneath a veneer of selfless devotion to family. Yvette sees this 
truth about the Mater summed up for her in the image of the Mater drowning, “her face 
purple, her blind blue eyes bolting, spume hissing from her mouth. One old purple hand 
clawed at the bannister rail, and held for a moment, showing the glint of a wedding ring” 
(VG 71), the wedding ring, a representation of her fidelity, affixed to the clawing hand 
recalling the selfishness she hid beneath that fidelity, coinciding here. That the Mater’s 
selfishness becomes clear as a consequence of the flood makes sense when the flood’s 
connection to  Yvette’s desires for the man are recalled: reminded of her adulterous 
passions and, by extension, her mother’s, Yvette remembers her mother’s own 
selfishness, and thus recognizes it in laundered form in the Mater; at the same time, what 
laundered it, the Mater’s commitment to the family, remains, coexisting alongside what it 
was supposed to hide. 
 The same can be said for the rectory itself, a house dedicated to maintaining the 
image of “Cynthia the pure snow flower,” as it weathers the flood. Reaching the house’s 
upstairs, Yvette and the Romani man attempt to find somewhere safe to ride out the 
inundation, searching the shuddering house for a stable place. In their search, the Romani 
man opens a door, and, “the wind, roaring with the waters, blew in as he opened it. 
Through the awesome gap in the house he saw the world, the waters, the chaos of 
horrible waters, the twilight, the perfect new moon high above the sunset, a faint thing, 
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and clouds pushing dark into the sky, on the cold, blustery wind” (VG 73). There is 
something unreal and oneiric in this vista: its interior door leading to the churning, 
flooded wilds of the outdoors, the rectory would appear to en0compass its own exterior, 
to paradoxically contain its outsides among its insides. The surreal nature of this vision is 
heightened by the fact that those outsides currently threaten to destroy the rectory, 
resulting in a scene where the rectory seems to integrate into itself the thing which 
endangers it. The vision recalls precisely the same fantasy that the Mater did, a fantasy of 
the desires that threaten domestic safety being reconciled with and housed inside that 
domestic frame: through the door, the rushing waters and the repressed desires returning 
along with them, embodied in the Romani man, appear to be just another room within the 
rectory, as though the adulterous desires brought along with the waters fit comfortably 
within the home-life provided by the rectory. Through this door, the fantasy that Yvette 
had to repress returns in the midst of the force of repression, hopelessly entangled with 
that repression, resulting in a strange, uncanny sight. 
  This same dynamic appears to be at work as Yvette and the man, after stripping 
off their soaked clothes, take refuge beneath the sheets of an upstairs bed: “Warm me,’ 
she moaned, with chattering teeth. ‘Warm me! I shall die of shivering.’ A terrible 
convulsion went through her curled-up white body, enough indeed to rupture her and 
cause her to die. The gipsy nodded, and took her in his arms, and held her in a clasp like a 
vice, to still his own shuddering”(VG 74). The clearly sexual implications of this 
moment, alluded to by both its language of “convulsion” and “shuddering,” at the same 
time also allude to the stress the rectory itself is undergoing at this point, the house itself 
described as shuddering as the waters rush around and through it. The rectory, the 
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household built on keeping illicit desires like Cynthia’s a secret, seems itself to be 
writhing with the pleasures afforded by these very same illicit passions, the house 
seemingly taken with orgasmic convulsions of the type experienced by Yvette and the 
Romani man in their bed. Yvette’s tryst, and Cynthia’s which it recalls, sees its pleasure 
seeping into the very thing that was supposed to work to deny it, the repressed desires 
seemingly accepted and enjoyed by the very house that was supposed to hide the 
existence of such desires, and the waters, meant to repress fantasies, evoking Yvette’s 
fantasy of such desires reconciled to a harmonious home. The uncanniness of these 
convulsions, both in the couple and in the house, stems from the desires the house at once 
represses and implies.       
 This moment, with both the lovers and their surroundings shuddering with fear 
and delight, also marks the novella’s climax, the work’s various strands and elements 
coming together in this encounter. The rectory inundated by flood waters recalls Yvette’s 
desires for the Romani man, and by extension Cynthia’s own adulterous passions, as well 
as the fortune-telling of the camp and the oppressiveness of the rectory, embodied in the 
Mater and her safe selfishness. As the lovers huddle beneath bedsheets, the various parts 
of the novella are brought together, all evoked by this single event as the work nears its 
conclusion. The uncanniness of the flood allows fantasy and reality, Yvette’s desires, 
hopes, and dreams as well as her material surroundings, to be conflated in a way that 
confers on these disparate threads a degree of pleasing coherence. Yet, it is hardly 
pleasing for Yvette: the surreal nature of the event leaves the girl’s estrangement from the 
rectory intact, the coherence not diminishing the alienation she feels toward her life there. 
Although the rectory is destroyed, this does not result in Yvette finding a happier home, 
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but instead leaves her detached and uprooted, quite literally homeless. In this way, the 
uncanny flood allows the story to coalesce without betraying the fundamental fact that 
Yvette remains within a society whose emphasis on competition and material gain makes 
alienation unavoidable. The flood waters, short-circuiting the distinction between 
character psyche and reality, induce the “waking sleep” that allows connection without 
that connection undermining the work’s relevance to lived social experience. 
“The same brackish, nauseating effect of a marsh”: The Rainbow 
The uncanny plays a much different role in an earlier work, Lawrence’s 1915 
novel The Rainbow, being far less central to the narrative’s cohesion. The novel follows 
three generations of the Brangwen family as they experience the economic and social 
modernization of their home in the English Midlands through the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. As Andrew Eastham states, in The Rainbow, “Lawrence is 
establishing a genealogy of modernity that is also a phenomenology-- a representation of 
the experience of consciousness at a fundamental moment of historical transition” (127), 
this modernization reflected in the changes in the Brangwens’ relationship to their 
surroundings, as their deepening engagement with capitalist modernity leaves them 
increasingly alienated from their world. With each successive generation, the Brangwens 
become more detached from their home, Eastham noting that the family moves from 
displaying, “a consciousness that is organically related to its natural environment, to a 
consciousness that continually attempts to recapture this connection by an effort of will, 
to a modern consciousness that experiences its own detachment as an ambivalent 
condition of freedom and horror” (128), over the course of the novel. By the novel’s end, 
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the family’s third generation, as embodied by Ursula Brangwen, is a fully modern, 
alienated subject.   
 Depicting such alienation while also structuring itself around characters finding 
fulfillment and meaning, the novel faces much the same dilemma as The Virgin and the 
Gipsy. Yet, unlike the novella, The Rainbow does not try to solve this dilemma by relying 
on the uncanny to bridge the seemingly unbridgeable gulf between modern subject and 
the society they inhabit. Instead, it gets around this deadlock by allowing Ursula to 
connect to a figure of pure spiritual hope and bliss in the form of the titular image, while 
the uncanny is part of the fallen, alienated world that Ursula rejects in the name of the 
rainbow and the future it heralds. This can be illustrated by a look at some of the 
similarities between the two works.          
 Like The Virgin and the Gipsy, The Rainbow features a scene of flooding that is 
pivotal to the narrative, the Marsh Farm hit with a deluge that wrecks the property and 
kills old Tom Brangwen. Lydia, awakened in the night by the waters and the sudden fear 
for her husband’s life, comes down stairs and “stepping down the step into the kitchen, 
she put her foot into water. The kitchen was flooded… water was running in out of the 
scullery. She paddled through barefoot, to see. Water was bubbling fiercely under the 
outer door” (R 229). Also like the flood that destroyed the rectory, this flood can be read 
as an expression of a character’s discontent with their life and a desire to escape it. Just 
before the waters come, Fred Brangwen, Tom and Lydia’s son and the one responsible for 
most of the work on the farm, is taken with a deep restlessness, the narrator noting that 
“Fred Brangwen, unsettled, uneasy, did not go out, as was his wont… This wet, black 
night seemed to cut him off and make him unsettled, aware of himself, aware that he 
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wanted something else, aware that he was scarcely living. There seemed to be no root to 
his life, no place for him to get satisfied in” (R 226). Fred, the son most tied to the land 
like his father, begins to feel unfulfilled by his current situation, a feeling tied to the rainy 
night that would shortly bring on the flood waters. Like those waters, Fred’s desires 
exceed and overwhelm the farm’s ability to accommodate them, the inundation 
representing these feelings that Fred had seemingly kept buried up until now. This 
understanding of the flood is supported by the fact that it drowns his father, a figure of 
easy contentment with the farm life that Fred finds so unsatisfying, the narrator saying of 
the old man that, “he became indolent. He developed a luxuriant ease” (R 225). This 
contentment would likely be a source of resentment for Fred, as it relies on having Fred 
remain on the farm since, as the narrator notes, “Fred did most of the farm-work, the 
father saw to the more important transactions. He drove a good mare, and sometimes he 
rode his cob. He drank in the hotels and the inns with better-class farmers and 
proprietors,” (R 225), old Tom’s status as happy gentleman farmer, who can slip away 
from his farm to have a drink whenever, depends on Fred’s discontent. Fred’s repressed 
frustrations and anger return in the form of the flood, damaging the farm he feels tied to 
and killing the father he blames for his lack of freedom. 
 Despite its similarities to the one depicted in The Virgin and the Gipsy, Fred’s 
flood differs from Yvette’s in a crucial way: unlike in the later novella, the flood in The 
Rainbow does not appear as uncanny. This is reflected in the comparatively realistic way 
in which the novel describes the flood, the narrator noting that “the flood rose through the 
night, till it washed the kettle off the hob in the kitchen,” and “in the ruddy light of dawn 
she saw the waters spreading out, moving sluggishly” (R 231-2), striking a vastly 
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different tone from surreal images of shuddering walls and upstairs doors opening onto 
outdoor vistas. 
 The reasons for this difference are twofold: the first psychological, the second 
narrative. Psychologically, the difference stems from the fact that, unlike in Yvette’s case, 
for Fred the waters are associated only with his desires, and not also the repression of 
these desires. As a result, the flood represents a return of the repressed but does not at the 
same time become uncanny. On the level of narrative, the flood’s lack of any sense of 
uncanniness serves the novel’s aim of tracing the increasing alienation of modern life. 
With the death of old Tom, an important connection to the more holistic and integrated 
Cossethay is lost to the forces of capitalist modernity, as the flood that killed him is 
caused by a breach in the canal (R 230) that had cut through the farm years earlier as the 
first incursion of modern economic development into the Marsh. The deluge is here not 
intended to reconcile characters and their world, as it did for Yvette, but rather to 
represent the growing distance between them, as is reflected in its association with Fred’s 
sudden dissatisfaction with his life on the farm. 
 This understanding of the flood helps explain something that otherwise seems 
strange, namely the rather sudden change in Ursula’s feelings about young Tom. Prior to 
the flood, Ursula is fascinated by her uncle Tom, the narrator noting that, “to Ursula he 
was a romantic, alluring figure. He had a grace of bringing beautiful presents: a box of 
expensive such as Cossethay had never seen; or he gave her a hair-brush and a long, slim 
mirror of mother-of-pearl, all pale and glimmering and exquisite… With all that, he was 
undefinably an outsider. He belonged to nowhere, to no society” (R 225-6). In Ursula’s 
eyes, young Tom is a glamorous figure, associated with luxurious gifts and far away 
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places. Yet, her feelings toward him undergo a change after the flood. At old Tom’s 
funeral, Ursula sees “her uncle Tom standing in his black clothes, erect and fashionable, 
but his fists lifted and his face distorted, his face curled back from his teeth in a horrible 
grin, like an animal which grimaces with torment, whilst his body panted quick, like a 
panting dog’s,” after which “she could see him, in all of his elegant demeanour, bestial, 
almost corrupt” (R 233-4). In the midst of his grief, Tom reveals a side of himself, an 
animalistic side, that disturbs Ursula and undoes her romantic image of him. Ursula’s 
reaction is perhaps strange, until her feelings for Tom are understood in the context of her 
family life. Tom’s appeal to the girl would seem to stem from his status as an outsider, the 
fact that “he belonged to nowhere,” and thus represents an antithesis to the familiar world 
of her home. Her home is one permeated by her parents’ sexuality, in which “he was the 
sensual male seeking his pleasure, she was the female ready to take hers” (R 218). Yet, 
this sexuality is not romantic, but rather “a sensuality violent and extreme as death. They 
had no conscious intimacy, no tenderness of love. It was the lust and the infinite, 
maddening intoxication of the senses,” this savage enjoyment preoccupying the parents 
as “the children became less important, the parents were absorbed in their own living” (R 
220). The intensity of her parents’ passion cuts Ursula off from them, her relationship to 
them diminished as they plunge headlong into their enjoyment of each other. It is only 
natural for Ursula in response to feel deprived of her mother and father’s attention, and to 
resent their uninhibited sexuality as the cause of this deprivation. Alongside this 
resentment, however, a degree of fascination would also be expected, since for the child 
the scene of parental coitus comes to stand for the affection and pleasure denied to them. 
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As a result, the child comes to desire the very thing it is excluded from, causing its 
fascination to be repressed in order to avoid the pain of frustration. 
 An early indication of this dynamic can be found in a scene where Ursula’s father 
is planting potatoes, the narrator stating that, “Ursula ran up and watched him push the 
setting-peg in at one side of his ready earth, stride across, and push it in the other side… 
then, with a sharp, cutting noise the bright spade came towards her, cutting a grip into the 
new, soft earth” (R 206). Ursula’s fascination with her father’s activity can be seen as 
stemming from its sexual symbolism, her father’s phallic pegs and spade penetrating the 
soft, fertile earth, while the “grip,” defined in the notes as a “shallow open furrow”(R 
513), is of a decidedly vaginal nature. It makes sense to assume that the girl would know 
enough of anatomy to recognize this symbolism, as “she was used to [her father’s] 
nakedness, and her mother’s nakedness, ever since she was born” (R 209), the girl 
familiar enough with her parents’ genitals to spot the similarities. Despite this familiarity, 
it is likely the girl is still has little understanding of the sexual relation between her 
parents, and is enthralled by her father’s work as it seems to speak in some obscure way 
to that relation. Her father, recognizing the girl’s fascination, and asks her if she wants to 
help, giving her the job of dropping potatoes into the furrow. He then resumed work, and 
“she saw him stooping, working towards her. She was excited, and unused… the 
responsibility excited her like a string tying her up. She could not help looking with dread 
at the string buried under the heaped-back soil. Her father was working nearer. She was 
overcome with her responsibility” (R 206). Hunched over the ground and moving, 
Ursula’s father’s posture would seem to recall his position in missionary sex, Ursula’s 
excitement at this sight alluding to her recognition of this posture and its connection to 
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the mystery of her parents’ sexual bond. She also recognizes her exclusion from this 
bond, reflected in her inability to effectively participate in the work, but rather stands 
frozen and separated from the task. Ursula is only made more aware of this as her father 
gets closer, her frustration with this bind mounting as he works her way toward her. This 
frustration can only intensify when her father goes about redoing the few potatoes she 
had been able to drop, while “she stood by with the painful terrified helplessness of 
childhood. He was so unseeing and confident, she wanted to the thing yet could not” (R 
206). Ursula, as a child, must necessarily be excluded from her parents’ sexual 
relationship, the girl feeling ignored as her father disregards her to pursue the mysterious 
“thing” that she could have no part of. In response, “she turned away, and ran down the 
garden, away from him, as fast as she could go away from him, to forget him and his 
work” (R 206), her exaggerated response further evidence for the deeper significance of 
his “work,” her attempt to escape it seemingly an attempt to repress and escape reminders 
of her parents’ sex life.    
 This escape becomes increasingly difficult as her parents’ sexuality comes to 
permeate the house. Into this situation, her uncle Tom appears as an antidote, a glamorous 
figure from elsewhere, refined and elegant, who is generous toward her and whose 
cleanliness and dandyish manner bears no hint of her parents’ earthy passions. At the 
same time, his status as absolute outsider works to keep a degree of distance between him 
and Ursula always, as he does not fit into the staid and stable world of Cossethay in 
which she is immersed; as a result, Ursula can never approach him too closely, allowing 
him to remain an idealized figure for her affection. This changes when the epitome of 
Ursula’s old, staid Cossethay, old Tom, is washed away in the flood, diminishing the 
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distance between the girl and the object of her desire, allowing a different side of young 
Tom to be revealed. The reason this loss of distance would cause Tom to take on this 
“bestial” appearance is at first unclear, until he is considered in his relationship to 
Ursula’s parents. Freud notes that it is fairly common for children to augment their 
knowledge of sexuality with what they observe from the sexuality of animals, resulting in 
sex being tied up with animal behavior3 (IL, ). It is not difficult to imagine Ursula, 
curious about the precise nature of her parents’ sexual activity, concluding that it is 
somehow similar to the sex between animals she would no doubt have seen on Marsh 
Farm, thus connecting their sexuality with the animalistic. In this light, the reason for 
Tom’s strange appearance becomes understandable as reflecting Ursula’s realization that, 
like her parents, Tom is a sexual being, becoming animal-like and “bestial” himself. This 
reading is supported by the Ursula’s otherwise strange ambivalence toward young Tom as 
they say their goodbyes at the funeral’s end, the narrator stating that, “Ursula almost 
shrank from his kiss, now. She wanted it, nevertheless, and the little revulsion as well” (R 
234). Representing both parental sexuality and the refinement meant to evade that 
sexuality, young Tom now inspires both attraction and revulsion in the girl. This mixture 
of desire and disgust resolves itself into a desire for disgust, as her ambivalence toward 
young Tom means that feeling of disgust also heralds the approach of the paternal 
affection she craves. Further evidence for this is found in the fact that, once deprived of 
her idealized image of young Tom, Ursula finds that “at Cossethay all was activity and 
passion, everything moved upon poles of passion. Then there were four children younger 
than Ursula, a throng of babies, all the time many lives beating against each other,” 
                                               
3The most famous instance of this in Freud’s cases is that of the “Wolf Man,” whose understanding 
of his parents’ sexuality became tied up with that of dogs and wolves. 
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causing the girl to seek the solace of the Marsh (R 236). Without the image of kind and 
sophisticated uncle Tom to serve as salve, Ursula confronts anew her parents’ sexuality 
and the younger children who stand as reminders of that sexuality, leaving her feeling 
repulsed and suffocated as she seeks refuge in her grandmother’s house. The flood takes 
away the old, stable world of Cossethay, depriving Ursula of the distance with which to 
idealize young Tom and forcing her to face the reality of her parents’ sexual activity and 
her feelings of betrayal associated with it. 
 Ursula would encounter another such reminder of her parents’ sexual life years 
later, when, as a teenager, she developed a relationship with Winifred Inger, one of her 
teachers. Winifred “carried her head high, a little thrown back, and, Ursula thought, there 
was a look of nobility in the way she twisted her smooth brown hair upon her head. She 
always wore clean, attractive, well-fitting blouses, and a well-made skirt… Her eyes were 
blue, clear, proud, she gave one altogether the sense of a fine-mettled, scrupulously 
groomed person and of an unyielding mind” (R 312). In Ursula’s attraction to her 
sophistication and style, there are echoes of her infatuation with Tom, Winifred’s “look of 
nobility” and “well-fitting blouses” and “well-made skirt” recalling Tom’s sophisticated 
finery and elevated behavior. In her cleanliness, Winifred stands opposed to the earth that 
Ursula likely associates with her parents’ sexuality after the incident in the potato field. 
As she did with Tom, Ursula sees in Winifred a chance to receive affection she feels she 
lost as her parents were absorbed in their desires for each other, as she bares no trace of 
the fecund sort of sexuality that reminds her of her parents. Ursula is attracted to the way 
that Winifred’s body differs from the image of the soft, voluptuous maternal body, 
focusing on how “her knees were so white and strong and proud, she was a firm-bodied 
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as Diana,” taken in by “the beauty of the firm, white, cool flesh! Ah, the wonderful firm 
limbs” (R 313), eschewing any obvious signs of the fertility that the girl associates with 
her parents’ sexual intercourse. At the same time, there is a clear maternal element to their 
relationship, the narrator noting how, “Winifred seemed to delight in having the girl in 
her charge, in giving things to the girl, in filling and enriching her life” (R 317). Winifred, 
like Tom, is a love-object for Ursula because she offers the girl the image of lost parental 
affection without any association with the earthy and animalistic sexuality of her parents. 
 Yet, as was the case with Tom, Ursula’s image of Winifred as free of the baser 
drives is unsettled after some closeness. After a certain amount of time together, Ursula 
finds that, “a sort of nausea was coming over her. She loved her mistress. But a heavy, 
clogged sense of deadness began to gather upon her, from the other woman’s contact. 
And sometimes she thought Winifred was ugly, clayey. Her female hips seemed big and 
earthy, her ankles and her arms were too thick” (R 319). Ursula has begun connecting 
Winifred to maternity, and by extension to her own mother’s sexuality, as seen in her 
focus on the woman’s “female hips,” which “seemed big and earthy,” alluding to the soil 
of the potato field and its resonances with parental intercourse. 
 This revulsion only intensifies when Ursula and Winifred visit Tom. There is 
much in this scene that echoes Yvette’s time with the Eastwoods in The Virgin and the 
Gipsy, Tom and Winifred coming together to form the couple offering the young 
protagonist the vision of a different sort of life, one in which their desires are reconciled 
with the world as it is. Like the Eastwoods’ cottage, Tom’s house stands in stark contrast 
to what the young girl had known in her own home, the narrator noting that, “his house 
was simply but well-furnished. He had taken out a dividing wall, and made the whole 
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front of the house into a large library, with one end devoted to science. It was a handsome 
room, appointed as a laboratory and reading room” (R 321), its open, spacious 
atmosphere the antithesis to the cluttered, crowded cottage Ursula had grown up in. Also 
like the Eastwoods’ cottage, Tom’s house offers its own temptations, promising Ursula 
what she had not experienced before, namely the dark, strange pleasures to be found the 
forces of industrialization, in the form of the nearby mine that Tom manages. During a 
discussion of the working conditions of the miners, the narrator at one point finds Ursula 
thinking, “How terrible it was! There was a horrible fascination in it-- human bodies and 
lives subjected in slavery to that symmetric monster of the colliery. There was a 
swooning, perverse satisfaction in it. For a moment she was dizzy” (R 324), the 
gargantuan forces of modernization intoxicating to the girl accustomed to peaceful village 
life. 
 Most importantly, though, like the Eastwoods, Tom and Winifred manifest 
something that has been repressed, bringing to the surface Ursula’s fascination and 
disgust with the image of her parents’ copulation. There is immediately a magnetism 
between them, alluded to when Winifred, upon seeing him, “was afraid of him, repelled 
by him, and yet attracted” (R 321), this attraction shown to be mutual when, only a short 
time later, she had become his lover (R 325-6). The desire between them can only remind 
Ursula of the sexual tension between her parents, reflected in both Tom and Winifred 
taking on bestial character, the narrator noting that Tom, “still laughed in his curious, 
animal fashion, suddenly wrinkling up his wide nose and showing his sharp teeth” (R 
322). Winifred’s animality comes to light in a particularly strange moment in the 
narration, the narrator noting that 
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“[Ursula’s] coldness for Winifred should never cease. She knew it 
was over between them. She saw gross, ugly movements in her 
mistress, she saw the clayey, inert, unquickened flesh, that reminded 
her of the great prehistoric lizards… [Tom] too had something 
marshy about him-- the succulent moistness and turgidity, and the 
same brackish, nauseating effect of a marsh, where life and 
decaying are one.” (R 325) 
In this bundle of images bursting forth to express Ursula’s revulsion, Winifred becomes 
animal-like, compared to “the great prehistoric lizards,” connecting her, like Tom, to back 
to the passion between her parents. In addition, she is also once again likened to damp 
earth, again connecting her with the potato field and its implied sexuality. Tom is also 
compared to the damp earth, specifically in a way that recalls the flood at Marsh Farm 
and its revelation of Tom’s sexual nature. As such, both Winifred and Tom are both 
associated with the sexual practices of Ursula’s parents; at the same time, both Winifred 
and Tom have served, at different points, as substitute parental figures, offering Ursula 
the promise of a familial love that is without reference to parental coitus. These former 
love-objects revealing the very things they were supposed to help hide accounts for the 
uncanniness at work in these strange images. This understanding of Tom and Winifred is 
only reinforced by the fact that, like the desire between Ursula’s parents, the attraction 
between them is going to result in children, the narrator stating that “Brangwen had 
reached the age when he wanted children. He wanted children. Neither marriage nor the 
domestic establishment meant anything to him… she was his mate” (R 326-7). This 
interpretation is further evidenced by Ursula’s resentment for Tom and Winfred as she 
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watches them together, the narrator stating that, “in the bitterness of her soul, Ursula 
knew that Winifred was become her uncle’s lover. She was glad. She had loved them 
both. Now she wanted to be rid of them both. Their marshy, bitter-sweet corruption came 
sick and unwholesome in her nostrils. Anything to get out of their fetid air” (R 325-6). 
Recognizing their attraction to one another, Ursula is reminded of her parents’ love and 
her exclusion from it, the memories of her frustration leaving her angry and wanting to 
flee from the reminder, as she had in the potato field. 
    The uncanniness of this scene distinguishes it from that of the Eastwoods’ 
cottage, which does not evoke a similar feeling of the unheimlich. Firstly, this difference 
can be attributed to the fact that the Eastwoods in their cottage manifest Yvette’s fantasy 
about her mother’s redemption without betraying at the same time what this fantasy is 
hiding, her seething resentment toward her mother for leaving, while at Tom’s house what 
is hidden and what does the hiding appear alongside each other. Secondly, each of these 
scenes play a different role in their respective narratives, making uncanniness useful to 
the plot in one and less so in the other. Ursula’s disgust toward Winifred and Tom 
foreshadows her refusal to reconcile herself to the world as it is at the novel’s end. 
Fearing herself pregnant by her lover, Anton Skrebensky, Ursula at first unhappily tries to 
resign herself to a life of children and base material concerns, which she associates with 
her mother, the narrator noting that, “suddenly she saw her mother in a just and true light. 
Her mother was simple and radically true. She had taken the life that was given. She had 
not, in her arrogant conceit, insisted on creating a life to fit herself” (R 449). It was 
precisely this sort of life she saw alluded to in Winifred and Tom, accepting as they 
seemed to the same base life of animal fecundity. The possibility they embody, that of 
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making one’s desires fit within the framework of the world as it exists by giving up 
loftier, spiritual goals, is reflected in their uncanniness, Ursula’s psychic life and material 
surroundings connecting and conflating in her encounter with them. The horror and 
revulsion generated by this uncanniness lays the groundwork for Ursula’s rejection of 
such reconciliation as the novel concludes. The Eastwoods, on the other hand, represent 
nothing of the sort to Yvette; rather, in manifesting the girl’s idealized fantasy of her 
mother, they represent the alienated status quo of the rectory and its image of Cynthia the 
“snow-flower.” It is not the Eastwoods, but the flood, that symbolizes Yvette’s 
reconciliation with her world, and is made uncanny in the process. 
Conclusion 
The different placement of the uncanny within these two narratives corresponds to 
a shift in the structural role played by the uncanny. In The Rainbow, the uncanny and the 
accord it presents between mind and material is found near the novel’s middle, and serves 
as an obstacle for the protagonist to overcome; in The Virgin and the Gipsy, it forms the 
novella’s climax, and is the very thing that allows the protagonist to overcome their 
obstacles and find connection with their world. This shift can be seen as a reflection of 
Lawrence’s attempt to move beyond the Expressionism of The Rainbow. Joyce Wexler 
points out that, “the spiritual intensity of prewar art dominates The Rainbow,” that 
Lawrence’s “use of symbolic cues as rhythm, repetition, and extremity creates a verbal 
version of the visual abstraction of Expressionist painting” (79-80). An example of this 
can be found in the extremity of the visionary experience of the rainbow, which eschews 
any contact with the concrete features of Ursula’s current situation in favor of the abstract 
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hope of an unseen future. Yet, Wexler notes that Lawrence would come to be dissatisfied 
with such abstraction, stating that “while Expressionists suppressed outer appearance in 
favor of inner meaning, after the war Lawrence and other Post-Expressionists wanted to 
connect them” (79-80). Instead of creating cohesion by connecting characters to abstract 
and unreal representations of their desires, like the rainbow, Lawrence moves to connect 
them to the actual, physical realities they inhabit. The uncanny offers Lawrence a means 
of doing this without at the same time negating the alienation in the world depicted. 
Instead of having Yvette reject the rectory in the name of something vague, the 
uncanniness of the flood to blur any distinction between her internal life and the external 
world, thus achieving a connection between them, while leaving her as disassociated 
from the rectory as ever before. The Virgin and the Gipsy replaces an idealistic and 
abstract rainbow with a concrete yet uncanny flood, in the process elevating the 
unheimlich to a more central role in the narrative’s structure. 
 By comparing and contrasting the uses of the uncanny in these two works by 
Lawrence, one can more clearly appreciate the uncanny’s utility in addressing the 
problems facing literature in an age of alienation. Lawrence, a writer so keenly aware of 
the psychological and spiritual toll of modernity, and so committed to carving out in his 
art a place where meaning could be celebrated, makes an ideal case in which to observe 
the way the uncanny functions as a possible solution to the aesthetic problem of 
alienation. In his shift from Expressionist abstraction to surreal uncanniness, Lawrence 
can be seen as moving to embrace the promise the uncanny offers for the depiction of 
modern, capitalist life. 
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Chapter 3: 
Psyche and Structure in the Short Story: 
Katherine Mansfield’s Movement toward the Uncanny 
Introduction 
Despite the shortness of Katherine Mansfield’s mature career, spanning only from 
around 1911 to her death in early 1923, a clear evolution in the can be seen in the major 
collections she published during this period, as she steadily changes the way she 
addresses the psychic lives of characters, moving from showing their mental and material 
worlds in stark separation to depicting their possible reconciliation. This change is 
accompanied by a shift in the structure of these stories, their endings becoming less 
anticlimactic over this same period. That these two trends happen together is no 
coincidence, but rather reflect the fact that they are bound up with one another. 
This chapter will present Mansfield’s evolution as the result of her grappling with 
the structural challenges inherent in depicting an alienated, dissonant society in a form, 
the short story, that requires a degree of connection and coherence for its effect. This 
evolution culminates in the uncanny, previously defined as the sense of strange 
familiarity the subject experiences when encountering repressed material and its 
substitute at the same time, taking on an important role in her stories. The unheimlich 
establishes a connection between character and setting that makes a coherent ending for 
the story possible, without at the same time papering over alienation’s existence. The 
uncanniness of Mansfield’s late stories thus represents, among other things, the 
conclusion of a long process of trying to reconcile the detachment endemic to modern life 
with the coherence demanded by the short story form. This will be shown by tracing the 
development of Mansfield’s strategies for connecting the often alienated characters in her 
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stories to their surroundings over the course of her career, following from her earliest 
published collection, In a German Pension (1911), to her The Garden Party and Other 
Stories (1922), published shortly before her death. In this first collection, Mansfield’s 
stories are marked by an acceptance of the dissonance at work in depictions of modern 
life, paired with a subtle nostalgia for the artistic possibilities of earlier times. As a result, 
these stories often conclude in a seemingly arbitrary, underwhelming way when depicting 
characters in a modern setting, as a main character cannot have a meaningful experience 
with their surroundings and thus cannot be changed by them in a way that ties character 
and setting together as the story closes. After examining In a German Pension, the 
chapter will move on to a close reading of “Prelude,” a longer story included in Bliss and 
Other Stories (1920) that forms an intermediate step between the dissonance of the earlier 
stories and the uncanniness of the later. This story tries to turn the alienation that proved a 
problem Mansfield’s earlier stories into its own solution, creating an ending around a 
central character, Linda Burnell, awakening from her fantasies to find herself 
disconnected from the world around her. Linda’s realization ties her to her surroundings 
as the story concludes even while leaving her feeling detached from them, creating a 
coherent ending even as it depicts an alienated character. This strategy has been 
abandoned by the time of The Garden Party, these stories relying instead on the uncanny 
to produce a connection between an alienated character and their surroundings. As a 
result, the stories in this collection are able to conclude with more of a satisfying 
cohesion of parts than those of earlier collections. The uncanny thus comes to play a role 
in structuring Mansfield’s late short stories, providing a remedy to the problem of depict 
alienated life.    
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 This contention, that Mansfield’s turn to the uncanny is motivated by problems 
inherent in the modern short story, would seem to contradict Clare Hanson’s notion that 
this uncanniness rather reflects the morbid fixations of post-World War I society. Hanson 
notes that the Great War took a huge toll on Mansfield, given that she lost a brother and 
many friends to the fighting, and that she spent three nerve-wracking weeks in Paris as it 
was under bombardment (“Uncanniness” 116). For Hanson, these encounters with the 
war pushed Mansfield toward an embrace of the uncanny as part of a general “cultural 
preoccupation with uncanny which marked the years immediately following the First 
World War,” the war’s spectacle of mass destruction forcing society to confront the 
uncanniness of death (“Uncanniness” 115-6). Mansfield’s stories register this ambient 
feeling of the unheimlich, the uncanny in her stories reflecting the atmosphere in which 
they were written. Yet, while this account may explain how Mansfield was inspired to 
write on uncanny topics, it does not address how her stories create a sense of the 
unheimlich, or what role it comes to play within those stories. A writer preoccupied with 
the uncanny does not necessarily equal uncanny writing; rather, the writing must itself 
produce that effect for it to be present in their work. Thus the war, while perhaps a cause 
of a general sense of the unheimlich, cannot directly cause it in specific stories. Nor does 
the war explain what the uncanny does once it becomes part of the story, its effect on the 
story as a whole. In other words, Hanson’s thesis is silent on the properly aesthetic 
dimension of Mansfield’s use of this effect, and how it relates to the short story form. 
Given this, it is fruitful to pursue the structural role uncanniness plays witin Mansfield’s 
stories rather than see it as simply the index of a broader uncanniness of society.   
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 This is not to argue, however, that Mansfield’s uncanniness has no larger social 
resonance. Her turn to the uncanny can rather be seen as a response to the alienation 
increasingly prevalent in modern life. Alienation, the subject’s experience of their world 
as indifferent and meaningless to them, is a feeling that Mansfield likely knew well. The 
daughter of a prominent New Zealand banker, Mansfield wrote throughout her childhood, 
but it was with her travels in Europe, and subsequent relocation to London, that she 
began working in earnest. As a colonial subject in the imperial capitol, Mansfield found 
herself out of place, an experience shared by many of her characters. For Hanson, 
“Mansfield’s identity as a colonial subject in Europe” was “marked by shifting modalities 
of affiliation and estrangement from ‘New Zealand’ and ‘English’ identities” 
(“Uncanniness” 119), resulting in a sense of being unmoored and detached, a theme that 
is palpable in her writing. Claire Tomalin, comparing Mansfield’s work to that of 
Mansfield’s friend and contemporary Virginia Woolf, notes how “Virginia’s writing is 
always reflective. Her people inhabit a world of social, cultural and historical 
connections,” Woolf’s characters meaningfully engaged in society’s institutions and 
ideas, such as Clarissa Dalloway, who finds beauty in Bond Street fashion and solace in 
Shakespeare’s Cymbeline. In contrast, Mansfield’s stories depict people as deeply 
alienated, “equipped with nothing more than charm or absurdity or pathos, against their 
settings of railway trains, seaside houses, hotels, flats, park benches and far, unlabelled 
corners of the world” (201). Unlike Woolf, Mansfield creates characters who are unrooted 
in any social milieu or cultural tradition, forced to confront an essentially alien world. 
This would seem to be particularly the case of the young English narrator who appears in 
Mansfield’s first published collection, In a German Pension.  
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“Tableau grandissimo!”: In a German Pension (1911) 
Mansfield’s first collection consists of two types of stories: those that can be 
termed the “pension stories,” in which a young, English woman narrates her stay in a 
German health spa, and the “provincial stories,” which deal with the everyday lives of 
mostly rural Germans. These two groups of stories also happen to be structurally 
different, with the pension stories tending to have weak, seemingly arbitrary endings; 
when the narrator ends her stories of the spa and its clients, she rarely does so with any 
sense of conclusion, but rather terminates the narrative at seemingly random points that 
contribute little or nothing to the reader’s understanding of the events depicted. This is 
not a coincidence, but rather reflects a challenge inherent in depicting the decidedly 
modern, bourgeois world of the pension, a challenge not presented by the more backward 
society of the provincial stories. In order to present its young, English narrator as a 
modern, alienated subject, these stories must maintain a palpable distance between the 
character and her setting, keeping her at an emotional remove from the events she 
witnesses. However, maintaining this distance means the stories forego the kind of 
meaningful encounter that usually provides a logical point on which to end. Hanson notes 
that short stories in general tend to take one of two forms, the more traditional, in which 
“the subject is the situation- extraordinary, bizarre, extreme in some way- which is 
usually referred back to the ordinary, ‘typical’ human being,” and the modernist that 
“does not deal with the avowedly strange or marvellous but tends to reveal that quality of 
the marvellous which is hidden within the mundane, obscured by habit or by dullness of 
perception” (Short Stories 5-7). The traditional story involves an extraordinary event that 
changes a character’s life, while the modernist story is more concerned with how a 
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seemingly normal event can change a character’s understanding of their life; in either 
case, the story centers on a character altered by a meaningful event, establishing some 
sort of relationship between this character and their world. Mansfield’s pension stories, in 
keeping their main character disengaged in her surroundings, allows for neither, as no 
event is permitted to substantially affect this character. The result of the distance between 
character and setting in these stories is a lack of any moment of change that would 
provide a logical point on which to conclude.   
 For Pamela Dunbar, these sorts of aesthetic problems in the collection result from 
the fact that “we are dealing with a narrator whose persona is imperfectly dissociated 
from that of her creator—and who cannot therefore be regarded as a fully-formed 
fictional construct; a ‘character’ enjoying autonomous and self-contained existence 
within the fiction,” the narrator not so much a distinct character as a stand-in for 
Mansfield herself. At the same time, “ambiguities have been planted in the sketches, and 
relevant information withheld from them, so that problems or mysteries created within 
the text can only be solved outside- by reference to the author’s life” (12-3). The narrator 
is thus an incomplete stand-in, crucial details about Mansfield’s past and personality 
missing from this figure, leaving her enigmatic. The image of the narrator must be 
completed by reference to Mansfield’s biography in order to be understood, the blank 
spaces in the character filled in by facts from Mansfield’s life. Otherwise, the narrator 
remains a psychically impoverished character, lacking an interior life that could be 
reconciled to the world outside of her, the mental and emotional features that could find 
reflection in the pension simply not present in her. In this reading, the endings for the 
pension stories are arbitrary because the narrator does not have enough emotional 
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complexity to be affected by events, the stories thus deprived of any moment of change. 
However, this reading relies, paradoxically, on taking the narrator at her word in her 
reserved behavior and elusive answers to fellow guests; in order for Mansfield’s 
biography to be necessary here, the narrator’s reticent responses must indicate actual gaps 
in her psychic life, rather than alluding to facts about herself that she is hiding or 
repressing. The narrator’s silence must mean real emptiness instead of reluctance, since it 
is only this emptiness that would make reference to Mansfield’s life necessary. Yet the 
stories themselves imply the narrator’s apparent paucity of depth is less the result of her 
lacking internal life than it is that her internal life is hidden. The stories appear suffused 
by the narrator’s refusal to find in her surroundings anything significant and meaningful, 
her ironic detachment cancelling out any attempt to manifest her wishes, fears, or desires 
in the material world of the pension. While the narrator may, at points in the story, flirt 
with this kind of connection to her surroundings, the conclusion always finds her 
returning to her alienated condition. 
 This dynamic is perhaps clearest in the story “Frau Fischer,” in which the titular 
character, the wealthy owner of a candle factory, takes a prying interest in the narrator’s 
personal life.  At one point, Frau Fischer barges into the narrator’s room, insisting she 
discuss her personal life, stating that “when I meet new people I squeeze them dry like a 
sponge,” leading to the narrator to make the facetious claim that her husband is “a sea-
captain on a long and perilous voyage” (IG 50). What results is a rather surreal exchange, 
in which Frau Fischer asserts that the narrator should want to be with her husband, and 
having children would keep her wayfaring spouse at home. The narrator admits that, 
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“This husband that I had created for Frau Fischer became in her 
hands so substantial a figure that I could no longer see myself 
sitting on a rock with seaweed in my hair, awaiting that phantom 
ship for which all women love to suppose they hunger. Rather I saw 
myself pushing a perambulator up the gangway, and counting up the 
buttons on my husband’s uniform jacket.” (IG 52-3) 
Over the course of her conversation with Frau Fischer, the narrator’s fantasy has been 
transformed, becoming something very different from the scene she had herself been 
imagining. 
 There are two possible ways to understand this transformation: as the loss of the 
fantasy, or as its culmination. On one hand, it can reflect the narrator’s pervasive 
alienation from the pension and her general detachment from its guests. The narrator’s 
vision of waiting by a restless shore for a traveling husband allows her to enjoy her 
isolation, eroticizing her loneliness by turning it into romantic anticipation; when Frau 
Fischer intervenes, this isolation is threatened, and her enjoyment with it, the return of 
her imagined husband reflecting the unpleasant loss of this loneliness. In this 
understanding, the moment her fantasy is drawn into any sort of relationship with 
something or someone at the pension, such as Frau Fischer, it becomes as alien as the 
pension itself, losing its relevance to her desires and becoming one more thing from 
which she is disengaged. Such an understanding sets the narrator’s psychic life firmly at 
odds with the pension, her alienation from it remaining intact. 
 On the other hand, the change can be seen not as disrupting the fantasy but rather 
bringing it to its logical conclusion. By introducing the awaited husband to the scenario, 
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Frau Fischer inadvertently forces the narrator to confront the fact that her fantasied 
anticipation is built on a contradiction. The imagined husband that allows her to 
romanticize her isolation also threatens to undo that isolation, the scenario containing the 
seed of its own destruction. Frau Fischer’s insistence on the husband makes the narrator 
aware of this contradiction, forcing the younger woman to consider which of these 
conflicting things, a future husband or to be left alone, she really wants. In this case, the 
scenario is not undone from without, by Frau Fischer’s intrusion, but from within, the 
narrator coming to terms with the paradox that results from following this scenario to its 
endpoint, Frau Fischer responsible only for bringing it to light. In this second 
understanding, the fantasy does not cease to be relevant to the narrator when it is altered 
by the pension, but rather the pension reveals to the narrator a dimension of it she had not 
previously known. As a result, the pension proves meaningful to the narrator over and 
against her sense of alienation from it. 
 The story, however, does not let this ambiguity stand, but comes down on the side 
of the former, on the side of loss. Realizing how her imaginings had been changed under 
Frau Fischer’s influence, the narrator states, “I decided to wreck my virgin conception 
and send [my husband] down somewhere off Cape Horn” (IG 53). This admission offers 
confirmation that the husband story functions as fantasy for the narrator; because she is 
not informing Frau Fischer of her husband’s untimely demise, she can only be conjuring 
such an end for her own benefit, which speaks to her investment in her own story. 
Dunbar’s position, that the narrator has been denied a fully-developed psychic life with 
emotions and desires, seems to run aground on this point. Perhaps the narrator would 
concoct this tale of a seafaring husband in lieu of any actual romantic life (as Mansfield 
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has withheld details of her own love life from this portrait), but it seems strange that for 
this same reason the narrator would feel invested enough in it to alter it after speaking 
with Frau Fischer. Despite this investment, the narrator nevertheless rejects this scenario 
she has conjured, depriving herself of the imagined husband and, by extension, the sense 
of anticipation he offered her loneliness. Rather than recognize in Frau Fischer something 
meaningful about her own desires, and thus in some small way overcoming her 
alienation, the narrator tries instead to dispatch the fantasy that manifests them. By 
sending her fictitious husband to the bottom of the sea, the narrator dispenses both with 
her fantasy and the possibility of it granting a part of the pension meaning for her. This 
choice comes through clearly as the story ends: “‘Come up to my room afterwards,’ said 
Frau Fischer. ‘There is still much that I must ask you.’// She squeezed my hand, but I did 
not squeeze back” (IG 53). The ending sees the narrator refusing to embrace Frau Fischer, 
both literally and figuratively, determined instead to preserve her separation from the 
woman and the pension more generally. 
 What is perhaps most interesting about this moment is that the story gives her this 
choice in the first place. The story creates the necessary conditions for the narrator to 
overcome her isolation, to reconcile herself in some small way to the pension by 
recognizing something of herself in the otherwise inane lectures of Frau Fischer, only to 
show her turning away from it at the last minute. The story brings the narrator up to the 
edge of a revelation, and then pulls her unceremoniously back from it, drawing attention 
to the narrator’s alienation by means of having her choose to remain alienated. 
Alienation, when actively preserved by the narrator, goes from an incidental fact of the 
narrator’s life to the focus of her depiction. 
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 The curious abruptness of the story’s ending is a side-effect of this commitment to 
depicting alienation without papering over it. In refusing to acknowledge the logical 
extension of her fantasy life found in Frau Fischer’s monologues, the narrative ends much 
as it began, the narrator still isolated in the pension, Frau Fischer still simply 
presumptuous and meddlesome.  Against the short story’s usual tendency to build to a 
character’s confrontation with either a strange event or a new perspective on a mundane 
one, “Frau Fischer” does neither, and seems to suffer because of it. The narrator neither 
faces anything out of the ordinary nor reevaluates the ordinary, but instead relates a 
mundane situation leading to no unusual occurrence or change in perspective, resulting in 
an anticlimax; both the narrator’s thoughts and behavior toward Frau Fischer remain the 
same throughout, allowing the narrator to retain her alienated distance from both the 
woman and the pension more generally. The story’s fidelity to the narrator’s 
disconnection from the pension thus means that nothing in the pension can have a 
substantial impact on her. Its main character remaining adamantly unchanged, the story is 
given no logical point to end on, resulting in a failure to create a meaningful conclusion. 
 It is when the pension stories come closest to escaping this fate that this 
dedication to alienation becomes unmistakable. “The Sister of the Baroness,” for 
instance, employs the kind of twist ending that harkens back to the stories of that seminal 
figure in the development of the modern short story, Guy de Maupassant: arriving at the 
pension, a young woman claiming to be the sister of a prominent baroness is feted and 
fawned over by the pension’s guest, who are giddy to be in the presence of nobility, only 
to discover from the baroness that she has no sister, and that her supposed sister was the 
child of a servant. The story is in this regard similar to Maupassant’s classic “The 
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Necklace,” in which Mathilde, the wife of a humble civil servant, is forced into poverty 
to replace a borrowed necklace, which is discovered at the story’s end to have been a 
cheap costume piece (296-304). In both, the ending reveals to characters a truth about 
themselves, connecting them to their surroundings in a new way that creates coherence 
between character and setting. Mathilde, for example, confronts at the story’s end the 
depth of her own vanity and how it has contributed to her suffering; similarly, the ending 
of Mansfield’s story forces the pensioners to realize the way their fascination with rank 
and title has clouded their judgment. However, something curious happens at the ending 
of “The Sister of the Baroness” which sets it apart from Maupassant’s story. When the 
baroness informs the pensioners of the truth, stating, “Fool, I have no sister. My child 
travelled with the daughter of my dressmaker,” the story does not immediately conclude, 
but rather goes on one more line, with the narrator exclaiming “Tableau grandissimo!” 
(IG 40). While this may appear an exceedingly subtle difference, this single line beyond 
the revelation changes the narrator’s relationship toward the events of the story. Earlier, 
the narrator depicts herself as partaking in the excitement surrounding the supposed 
noblewoman, noting that upon hearing of the baroness’ approach, “we positively 
scintillated. Anecdotes of the High Born were poured out, sweetened and sipped: we 
gorged on scandals of High Birth generously buttered” (IG 31). The narrator places 
herself comfortably among those reveling in the promise of nobility’s presence, enjoying 
voyeuristic interest in the glamorous lives of the aristocracy with her fellow guests, an 
enjoyment not at all abated when the baroness’ purported sister arrives. Upon the new 
guest’s announcement that “‘I am the Baroness von Gall’s sister,” the narrator admits that 
“Even for the most jaded of us life holds its thrilling moments. Two Baronesses in two 
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months!” (IG 32). While at first blush it may appear that this is an instance of the narrator 
mocking her German neighbors, she, by speaking of “us,” is implicitly including herself 
in the number of those giddy with the prospect of such high born company. After all, 
there is little in the depiction of her German compatriots which would make them appear 
as jaded; to the contrary, they have been shown by the narrator as nothing if not credulous 
and passionate. If anyone in this scenario were to be “jaded,” it is the narrator herself, 
further linking herself to the excitement caused by the baronesses. 
 The narrator, in overcoming her jaded detachment in regard to the latest guests, 
would seem to be on track to overcome her alienation from the pension more generally. It 
is in the preparation and anticipation surrounding the arrival of nobility that the narrator 
for once can be seen as engaging in a meaningful way with the others, as well as 
investing emotionally in something outside of herself. The narrator states that, after the 
supposed baroness’ arrival, “Absorbing days followed. Had she been one whit less 
beautifully born we could not have endured the continual conversation about her, the 
songs sung in her praise, the detailed account of her movements. But she graciously 
suffered our worship and we were more than content” (IG 34-5). The narrator again can 
be seen as investing emotionally in the figure of the false baroness, her happiness 
generated by attention paid to this young woman and her doings. This emotional 
investment coincides with a sudden tendency, rare in the other stories, to speak of the 
pensioners as “we” or “us” rather than “they” or “them,” reflecting a certain sense of 
solidarity in the wake of the baroness’ arrival. The narrator’s alienation appears at this 
point to be waning in the face of a psychic investment in her surroundings. 
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And yet, as the story concludes, and the sister of the baroness is revealed to be 
nothing of the sort, this investment is disavowed, with the narrator dissolving (or at least 
trying to dissolve) her psychic attachment at a stroke. Her exclamation “Tableau 
grandissimo!” is an obvious allusion to the tableau vivant, the practice of using live 
actors to depict scenes in a manner similar to painting, transforming the pensioners into a 
living work of art, with the narrator now looking on as an audience. In turning the 
pensioners’ reaction into an art piece, she separates herself from the tableau, going from a 
participant to a spectator watching these events with detachment, in an attempt to avoid 
confronting the truth that she had been as infatuated as anyone with this glamourous 
image of the aristocracy. The surprised reaction of the pensioners becomes something that 
the narrator is viewing from the outside, rather than directly experiencing, sparing her 
from acknowledging the role her own desires played in making a commoner appear as the 
perfect image of nobility. In doing so, the narrator preserves her alienation from the 
pension, freeing herself from ever confronting what the phony baroness means to her. 
Yet, this move to extract herself from this confrontation comes at a cost, 
undermining the impact of the story’s ending. Rather than end on the unmasking of the 
fake baroness, the story continues on, however briefly, to ensure that the reader does not 
assume the narrator is sharing in the emotional response of the other pensioners. The 
shock dissipates as the story extends beyond the climax in order to excuse the narrator 
from being drawn in to this shock and recognizing her own desires manifested in the 
counterfeit baroness. The story’s fidelity to the narrator’s sense of alienation comes into 
conflict with the story’s need for a meaningful ending. 
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 One may object at this point that perhaps the weakness of these endings has more 
to do with a simple lack of artistic skill than the narrator’s detachment being at cross 
purposes with the structural requirements of the short story. After all, Mansfield herself 
was reluctant to allow the collection to be reprinted, her husband and editor John 
Middleton Murry noting that “she thought the book itself unworthy,” that it was 
“immature” and “juvenile” (8-9). Could it not simply be these stories are suffering from a 
still underdeveloped talent? Yet, this objection fails to take into account the “provincial” 
stories. Written at the same time, one would expect these stories to share any problems 
resulting from Mansfield’s lack of experience. Yet, these provincial stories do not have 
the same difficulty coming to satisfying and meaningful endings as those set in the 
pension, implying that Mansfield indeed had the skill needed to bring stories to a strong 
conclusion. Unlike the pension stories, however, these stories of rural Germany are not 
burdened with the same need to depict their characters as emotionally cut off from the 
world they inhabit, allowing characters to have the “single moment of intense or 
significant experience” (Short Stories 55) that Hanson locates as central to the structure 
of the modernist short story. It is thus the material, rather than Mansfield’s talent, that 
would seem to cause problems for the stories’ endings.      
 “Frau Brechenmacher Attends a Wedding,” one of the provincial stories, tells of a 
harried housewife attending with her husband a wedding feast in their village, only to be 
disturbed by the proceedings and what they imply for her own life. Upon their arrival at 
the event, the narrator notes with relish how inviting the feast appears, stating, “The 
Gasthaus was very festive. Lights shone out from every window, wreaths of fir twigs 
hung from the ledges. Branches decorated the front doors” (IG 57). This atmosphere of 
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bonhomie only intensifies as they enter, as, “beautiful indeed was the Festsaal. Three long 
tables were grouped at one end, the remainder of the floor space cleared for dancing. Oil 
lamps, hanging from the ceiling, shed a warm, bright light on the walls decorated with 
paper flowers and garlands; shed a warmer, brighter light on the red faces of the guests in 
their best clothes” (IG 58-9). The feast stands in contrast with the dark, wintry night: 
warm, bright, and playing host to verdant life in the form of its flora of evergreen boughs 
and paper flowers. More to the point, the feast for these same reasons stands in stark 
contrast with the home life of Frau Brechenmacher, described as cold, dimly lit, and 
marked with deep discord. The vision of a “warmer, brighter light on the red faces of the 
guests in their best clothes” and the cozy conviviality implied by it could not be more 
different from Herr Brechenmacher barking out orders to his frazzled wife as she 
scrambles to prepare for their evening out. The Festsaal is the image of the pleasurable 
interaction which is sorely lacking from the house the Brechenmachers left.  
 At the center of this image sits the newlyweds, the narrator describing the bride, 
“she in a white dress trimmed with stripes and bows of colored ribbon, giving her the 
appearance of an iced cake all ready to be cut and served in neat little pieces to the 
bridegroom beside her, who wore a suit of white clothes much too large for him…” (IG 
59). While the image of the bride devoured by her groom might seem at first shockingly 
out of place inside the idyllic warmth of the Festsaal, it is quite of a piece when 
understood in its sexual implications, with the bride’s white dress, a symbol of her 
virginity, making her look ready to serve up to the appetite of her bridegroom. It becomes 
even more a fitting expression when taken in the context of the celebration, as the 
consumption of the feast is predicated on this consumption of the bride’s virginity. The 
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feast itself is thus a reflection of this central act of consumption as consummation, a 
consumption without blood, instead sweet and orderly (“…in neat little pieces…”). It is a 
vision of consummation as inoffensive as a fine dessert, soft and sweet. Implicit in this 
scene is the fantasy of orderly and easy copulation, the flesh of the bride, rendered sweet, 
delicate, and neat, offered up to a timid young man in an ill-fitting suit; it is the fantasy of 
a smooth, pleasant, and frictionless sexual experience without discord or pain that 
underpins the image of bride and groom. From this image, the happy sociality of the 
room emanates outward, as at their table “everybody was laughing and talking, shaking 
hands, clinking glasses, stamping on the floor” (IG 59), as though the untroubled social 
relationships reflect the untroubled sexual relationship at the center of the festivities. 
 The easy conviviality of the wedding feast soon spreads to Frau Brechenmacher 
herself, as “she watched the couples going round and round; she forgot her five babies 
and her man and felt almost like a girl again” (IG 63) It is of course not at all strange to 
imagine the excitement of the evening’s celebration could make Frau Brechenmacher feel 
young. However, in the midst of this excitement, she exhibits some surprising behavior, 
the narrator noting that “her roughened hands clasped and unclasped themselves in the 
folds of her skirt. While the music went on she was afraid to look anybody in the face, 
and she smiled with a little nervous tremor round the mouth” (IG 63). It seems odd that, 
amongst the generally jovial atmosphere, she would display such signs of anxiety, 
especially given that her husband and children, shown as her major sources of stress, are 
at the moment far from her mind. She behaves, amongst the joyous scene, as though 
quietly dreading some awful event. 
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 A hint at the source of this dread comes shortly thereafter, when, after delivering a 
comic speech to the newlyweds (which everybody but Frau Brechenmacher finds funny), 
Herr Brechenmacher hands the bride a silver coffee pot. Curious, “she lifted the lid, 
peeped in, then shut it down with a little scream and sat biting her lips. The bridegroom 
wrenched the pot away from her and drew forth a baby’s bottle and two little cradles 
holding china dolls. As he dandled these treasures before Theresa [the bride] the hot room 
seemed to heave and sway with laughter” (IG 64). The bride and groom, who had earlier 
embodied the fantasy of smooth, easy coupling, undermine that very same fantasy. The 
bride responds to the coffee pot, the phallic object offering her “children,” with a scream 
and bitten lips, as though enduring a painful sexual experience. This allusion is 
strengthened by the groom’s rough treatment of the bride, his “wrenching the pot away 
from her” in the process of bringing forth the baby dolls, implying harsh treatment of his 
lover during the act of creating a child. The true ambivalence of the fantasy they manifest 
reasserts itself here; despite the fact it provides an image of a frictionless sexual 
encounter, it is nevertheless suffused with violence, with its reference to “cutting” the 
bride “into pieces.” In stark contrast to the earlier order and care the couple appeared to 
engender, the clumsiness and pain that is often endemic to sexual interaction is brought to 
mind by their handling of the coffee pot. 
 As the couple at the center of the celebration reveals their hidden cruelty, the 
people in attendance follow suit. While the other guests find their display amusing, “Frau 
Brechenmacher did not think it funny. She stared round at the laughing faces, and 
suddenly they all seemed strange to her. She wanted to go home and never come out 
again. She imagined that all these people were laughing at her,” (IG 64-5). The sense of 
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warm sociability has vanished, replaced with a cruel and disturbing atmosphere of 
derision. Her sense that the laughter toward the bride is somehow meant for her speaks to 
the degree to which Frau Brechenmacher identifies with the bride, and is libidinally 
invested in the fantasy presented by the young couple; in the bride, Frau Brechenmacher 
sees manifested her own desire for a sexuality as easy accord, and thus sees herself in the 
bride’s pained response to the coffee pot. Unlike the narrator of the pension stories, she 
cannot retreat back into an alienation she does not experience at the moment that her 
fantasy turns dark; rather, she maintains a meaningful connection with the village society 
in general, and the wedding feast in particular, and thus cannot disavow its relevance to 
her as soon as it becomes uncomfortable. Instead of dismissing the events before her, she 
allows them to remain meaningful. 
 For Frau Brechenmacher, this allusion to cruel sexuality brings to mind painful 
recollections. After returning home from the wedding feast, Herr Brechenmacher reminds 
his wife of their own wedding night, “‘You were such an innocent one, you were… Such 
a clout on the ear as you gave me… But I soon taught you’” (GP 66), referring to a 
sexual encounter marked by violence and struggle, a far cry from his wife’s wish for sex 
as harmonious, easy accord. She claims to not remember that night, a claim which seems 
undermined by her own anxious behavior, implying that she has repressed this memory 
and is disconcerted by the sense that it is returning. Nevertheless, the impact of the return 
of this repressed memory is seen in Frau Brechenmacher’s behavior. The story ends with 
the narrator noting that, after the conversation with her husband, “she lay down on the 
bed and put her arm across her face like a child who expected to be hurt as Herr 
Brechenmacher lurched in” (GP 67). The fantasy that guided her relationship with her 
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husband, which had survived even the savage events of her own wedding night, has been 
altered by what she witnessed at the wedding feast; the fantasy of the smooth and easy 
sexual relationship which had informed her understanding of married life, even in the 
face of events to the contrary, has transformed over the course of the evening’s events 
into something more brutal, forcing Frau Brechenmacher to confront uncomfortable 
recollections. This finds resonance in Breuer and Freud’s now famous declaration that 
“hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences” (7); it is not the direct experience of a 
traumatic event that causes psychic distress, but the later events which threaten to 
resurrect aspects of that event from repression. It was not the brutal experience of her 
wedding night that altered Frau Brechenmacher’s image of a frictionless, smooth 
sexuality (in fact, one may suspect that it allowed her to keep that experience at a 
distance), but the scene at the wedding that worked to bring that brutality to her 
consciousness. The shift in fantasy results from a return of the repressed, a return made 
possible by her libidinal attachment to the bride and groom at the wedding feast. Because 
of this shift, her relationship toward her husband has changed, now seeing violence as an 
inherent part of their sexual interaction. 
 The story thus concludes with a change in Frau Brechenmacher’s behavior, 
brought on by the events depicted, the ending coinciding with her altered understanding 
of the world she encounters daily. The story makes no attempt to exempt her from finding 
the world around her meaningful and relevant in the name of preserving her alienation, as 
she has none to preserve, and therefore is free to end at the moment when a meaningful 
(if unsettling) connection emerges between her and her world; it is this new, sudden 
coherence between the elements of the story that offers an ideal ending point, and, unlike 
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in “The Sister of the Baroness,” there is no need to undo this coherence at the last minute 
to save the distance between the elements of character and setting. Taking place largely 
outside of the forces of capitalist modernity, “Frau Brechenmacher Attends a Wedding” 
does not have to concern itself with depicting the alienation these forces impose on 
subjects, and thus is uninhibited in pursuing the coherence traditionally associated with 
aesthetic enjoyment. 
 In this sense, there is a certain nostalgia implicit in the collection, finding as it 
does that the life most conducive to aesthetic depiction is a life that is fast fading into the 
past, replaced by a less aesthetic modernity. This is not to say that Mansfield romanticizes 
the past; indeed, the provincial stories are more often than not concerned with how cruel 
these traditional societies can be, particularly toward women. Rather, the meaningful 
connections between character and world offered by the traditions of Frau 
Brechenmacher’s village Festsaal are simply not at odds with the artwork’s need for 
coherence, unlike the alienated dissonance between the young English narrator and Frau 
Fischer. The atomized society of the pension works against the short story’s drive to pull 
people and places together into a cohesive whole, if only for a moment, a problem much 
less acute in more traditional, integrated societies like the German village. This should be 
perhaps unsurprising, given Mansfield’s well-documented debt in her early work to the 
Aesthetic Movement, which, as Andrew Eastham notes, “saw itself from the outset as 
belated, looking back to the models of classical Greece, Renaissance Italy, and German 
Romanticism for an ideal of literary form and an image of the aesthetic life” (1). The 
Aesthetic Movement, with its belief that something essential had been lost as those earlier 
epochs gave way to modernity, viewed its own age as artistically poorer, resolving to 
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maintain a link to these more aesthetically fertile times against the influence of industrial 
civilization. While Mansfield here does not harken back to any era or movement in 
particular, she nevertheless seems to share, if unknowingly, the Aesthetes’ conviction that 
modernity stands as uniquely inhospitable to artistic beauty, that the best way to achieve 
beauty in these conditions is to reach back into the past. In a German Pension manifests a 
kind of melancholy, finding the possibility for artistic beauty diminished in modernity 
compared to a previous era now vanishing. 
The Aloe Plant: “Prelude” (1918/20) 
Mansfield’s move away from the alienated and aloof style of the pension stories 
did not go unnoticed by her contemporaries. Leonard Woolf would reflect years later that, 
“I think that in some abstruse way [John Middleton] Murry corrupted and perverted and 
destroyed Katherine both as a person and a writer. She was a very serious writer, but her 
gifts were those of an intense realist, with a superb sense of ironic humour and 
fundamental cynicism. She got enmeshed in the sticky sentimentality of Murry and wrote 
against the grain of her own nature” (204). Woolf saw in Mansfield’s earlier work an arch 
and ironic detachment, informed by a “cynical” derision toward her characters’ wants and 
behavior, which was eventually replaced by a more conciliatory attitude, that, to him, 
degraded her work. While Woolf attributes this change to Murry’s bad influence, a more 
likely explanation is that the problems of maintaining a character’s ironic detachment, as 
seen in the pension stories, motivated this shift. What Woolf saw as Mansfield’s betrayal 
of her “true” style for something maudlin and saccharine can alternatively be viewed as 
an attempt by Mansfield to escape the aesthetic dead end of her earlier “cynical” style 
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and its demand that her characters’ desires be foolishly at odds with reality, an attempt 
which required a more nuanced treatment of her characters’ psyches.   
 Despite Woolf’s verdict that Mansfield had fully given herself over to 
sentimentalism, early on her attempt to resolve the problems of depicting alienation tried 
to retain this cynicism, her characters still shown as deluded and out of touch. This is 
apparent in “Prelude,” a longer story originally published by itself in a slim volume by 
the Woolfs’ Hogarth Press in 1918 before being included in Mansfield’s 1920 collection 
Bliss and Other Stories. The story follows a middle-class New Zealand family, the 
Burnells, as they move from town to a new house in the country and reflect on their lives 
as they settle in. Mansfield again focuses on the gulf between the psychic lives of her 
characters and the alien, indifferent reality they inhabit. Unlike in the pension stories, 
however, where this alienation is accepted and acknowledged by the narrator from the 
beginning, “Prelude” turns this distance between a character’s psyche and their world into 
something that is discovered over the course of the story, resulting in a more dynamic 
main character than was possible in the pension stories. In doing so, the story is able to 
achieve a change in a character’s perception and thus create a logical point on which to 
end, avoiding the problem that plagued the earlier stories. At the same time, it affirms the 
reality of alienation; instead of a character discovering the true meaning of a part of their 
world, they discover that their world is not meaningful at all. 
 The way this method structures the story can be seen as it reaches its climax. 
Strolling one evening through the new property’s gardens, Linda Burnell, the family’s 
mother, encounters her own mother, Mrs. Fairfield, taking in the moonlit scenery: “‘I 
have been looking at the aloe,’ said Mrs. Fairfield, ‘I believe it is going to flower this 
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year. Look at the top there. Are those buds, or is it only an effect of the light?” Mrs. 
Fairfield offers the reader here an essentially objective, clear picture of the aloe itself, 
before the narrator picks up the image, noting, “the high grassy bank on which the aloe 
rested rose up like a wave, and the aloe seemed to ride upon it like a ship with the oars 
lifted.” This extended simile serves as more than a vivid description of the scene before 
them; it is also functioning to connect Linda’s fantasies to the reality of the aloe plant, 
evidenced as the narrator continues, “she dreamed that she was caught up out of the cold 
water into the ship with the lifted oars and the budding mast. Now the oars fell striking 
quickly, quickly. They rowed far away over the top of the garden trees, and the dark bush 
beyond. Ah, she heard herself cry: ‘Faster, faster!’ to those who were rowing” (Bliss 60). 
Linda sees in the aloe her fantasy of escape, imagining the plant as a ship which will 
rescue her, spiriting her away from the property and her life there. The phallic image of 
the “budding mast” grants Linda’s fantasy an erotic connotation, as do the risen oars 
“striking quickly, quickly” the wet surface of the water, Linda’s cry of “Faster, faster!” 
becoming in this context one of sexual enjoyment. This is in keeping with the story’s 
depiction of their marriage as an unfulfilling one, Linda chafing at her husband’s self-
involvement. Linda’s fantasy of escape would appear to be also a fantasy of sexual 
gratification, reflecting the fact that her stifling home life is also largely devoid of 
satisfaction. 
As Linda moves closer to the aloe, the narrator remarks on how “looking at it 
from below she could see the long sharp thorns that edged the aloe leaves, and at the sight 
of them her heart grew hard… She particularly liked the long sharp thorns… Nobody 
would dare to come near the ship or dare to follow it” (Bliss 61, ellipses original). It is 
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here that the objective reality of the aloe begins to assert itself against the fantasy through 
which she sees it: while Linda appears to make these thorns part of her fantasy of her 
escape, in doing so these thorns work to undermine that fantasy by complicating its 
underlying sexual meaning, introducing the feature of pain to the otherwise pleasurable 
content of the fantasy. The appearance of these thorns in connection with her sexually-
charged fantasy seems to remind Linda of the pain present in her own sex life, as she 
remarks to her mother shortly thereafter that “You know I’m very delicate. You know as 
well as I do that my heart is affected, and the doctor has told you I may die any moment. I 
have had three great lumps of children already…” (Bliss 62, ellipsis original). Linda here 
tacitly connects her ill health and suffering with her sexual relationship with her husband 
Stanley by way of the children the marriage produces, as without being sexually involved 
with him, she would not have to endure the pain of childbirth and risk her health. This 
would seem to counter Josiane Paccaud-Huguet’s contention that the aloe invites 
characters into an “arboreal epiphany” defined as “where the viewer [ie, the character] 
confronts a figure of the maternal object which is infinitely desirable,” the aloe a “figure 
of the imaginary maternal phallus” which brings characters to a place where “it is the 
sense of oceanic plentitude that stands out, beyond male or female sexual identity” (136). 
For Paccaud-Huguet, the sight of the aloe speaks to Linda of a pleasure that lies outside 
any rigid system of sexual difference by harkening back to the infantile fantasy of the 
uncastrated mother, which is the child’s image of the mother as having a penis and who 
lacks nothing, and can thus offer full enjoyment. However, against this understanding of 
the aloe as the emblem of an enjoyment beyond the framework of sexual difference, it 
appears by Linda’s linking it to childbirth that the pleasure promised by the aloe is a 
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specifically heterosexual one, and thus remaining within the confines of conventional 
sexual identities. The fantasy of the ship Linda entertains before the aloe is less one of 
obliterating the divisions of sex than it is one of finding enjoyment within a world 
marked by those divisions. In seeing the aloe plant up close, her erotic fantasy of escape 
is interrupted by a reminder of how painful her sexual experience tends to be in reality. 
Rather than holding the key to her escape from her current life, sexuality suddenly 
appears to Linda as one of the things in this current life tormenting her, the painful reality 
disrupting her fantasy. That the aloe offers such a reminder of reality over fantasy is 
supported when, after viewing the aloe, Linda reflects upon her relationship with her 
husband Stanley, with the narrator noting that “it had never been so plain to her as it was 
at this moment. There were all of her feelings for him, sharp and defined, one as true as 
the other. And there was this other, this hatred, just as real as the rest” (Bliss 62). The way 
the narrator describes these feelings, now apparent to Linda, as “sharp and defined,” 
recalls the thorns of the aloe, further connecting her encounter with the plant to both 
fantasies of enjoying the phallus and the disappointing reality which lies obscured 
beneath her fantasies of pleasure and escape. Facing the stark, bristling reality of the aloe 
which complicates Linda’s sexual fantasies, she catches a glimpse of the world beyond 
those fantasies, placing her living situation in a clear light. 
  This has the effect of turning the aloe into a symbol of alienation: when, standing 
before the aloe, Linda ruefully asks herself “what am I guarding myself for so 
preciously? I shall go on having children and the gardens will grow bigger and bigger” 
(Bliss 62-3), she is acknowledging the distance between her fantasies and the reality of 
her life; the physical world around her will proceed without any concern for what she 
  113 
wants. The aloe, in resisting the desires Linda has connected it to, comes to stand for a 
reality beyond fantasy; in its ultimate indifference to her desires, the aloe comes to 
represent for Linda her alienation, the plant made relevant to her by the very fact that it 
communicates to her how irrelevant her desires are in a meaningless, inhuman world. In 
contrast to the narrator in “Frau Fischer,” who begins the story feeling disconnected from 
the pension and finds nothing in Frau Fischer’s ramblings to change that, for Linda this 
disconnection from her world comes as a revelation, resulting in an intense moment of 
insight where Linda connects with the material reality her fantasies had once clouded as 
she comes to finally understand it, creating coherence between the character and the 
setting in which the story plays out. Like Frau Brechenmacher, Linda is disabused of her 
fantasies about sex. Linda, however, is not granted by this experience a new and different 
meaning for the situation in which she lives, as Brechenmacher is, but rather realizes that 
her situation has no intrinsic meaning, that the estate is indifferent to her imaginings and 
desires. The story is thus able to end with an encounter that changes a character’s 
perspective while at the same time not creating a meaningful relationship between 
character and setting, resulting in a coherence without meaning that would seem to 
nevertheless reinforce the character’s alienation.      
   At the same time, Linda’s encounter with the aloe also brings to light a limitation 
to this strategy. In order to show her overcoming her dreams and fantasies in front of the 
plant, the narrator must render these fantasies in fine detail; only after seeing Linda’s 
imagined ship can the reader appreciate her rebuke of that ship in the name of the reality 
of the aloe. Yet, when Linda reaches her epiphany, this same fantasy, now richly 
rendered, must be excluded, jettisoned in favor of reality, by the same narrator who 
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introduced it into the story, precisely at the climactic moment where one would expect all 
of the different parts of the story finally to be drawn together. The strategy employed in 
“Prelude” thus creates coherence between a character and their setting at the cost of 
abandoning any such coherence between that setting and the character’s richly rendered 
psychic life. In service of the story’s climax, the narrator must sunder what the reader 
expects to be brought together, diminishing somewhat the effectiveness of the story’s 
conclusion. 
 The story itself seems to concede this point as it closes. Coming immediately after 
Linda’s climactic encounter with the aloe, the story’s denouement finds Kezia, Linda’s 
younger daughter, standing at the vanity in her aunt Beryl’s bedroom, where the child 
“unscrewed a little pot of cream and sniffed it. Under her arm she carried a very dirty 
calico cat” (Bliss, 69) Beryl leaves the room, and the girl “set the cat up on the dressing 
table and stuck the top of the cream jar over its ear,” showing the cat itself in Beryl’s 
mirror. In response, 
“the calico cat was so overcome by the sight that it toppled 
backwards and bumped and bumped on the floor. And the top of the 
cream jar flew through the air and rolled like a penny in a round on 
the linoleum- and did not break. But for Kezia it had broken the 
moment it flew through the air, and she picked it up, hot all over, 
and put it back on the dressing table. 
 Then she tiptoed away, far too quickly and airily... (B 69-70, ellipsis 
original) 
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Kezia ignores the fact that the jar lid is clearly not broken, instead convinced that it had 
been damaged, but by falling rather than by landing on the floor. Her conviction would 
seem to stem from the reoccurring nightmare she spoke of early in the story, stating that 
“I often dream that animals rush at me- even camels- and while they are rushing, their 
heads swell e-enormous” (B 10). Falling backwards from the mirror, the stuffed cat 
would look to Kezia to be rushing toward her, calling to mind her fearful dreams. 
Confusing this fear for the fear of being punished for damaging Beryl’s things, Kezia is 
thus certain the lid is broken. This interpretation of Kezia’s reaction is reinforced by the 
fact that it was the moment the lid went flying, while the cat rushed toward her, and not 
when the lid hit the ground, that Kezia considered it broken. Kezia’s dreams are thus 
seemingly manifested before her, embodied in the incident at the vanity, the event thus 
meaningful, if misunderstood. 
 The story thus ends on a curious note, effectively reasserting the kind of confusion 
of fantasy with reality that it had just dispelled, even as the narrator assures the reader 
that the two are nevertheless distinct. This otherwise mystifying ending makes sense, 
however, when it is understood as an attempt at compromise, the story trying to have it 
both ways, with the psychic lives of its characters tied to physical objects while their 
separation is nonetheless acknowledged by the narrator so as to depict these characters as 
alienated; the narrator attaches Kezia’s dreams to the stuffed cat and the jar lid while at 
the same time asserting the distance between the two. Kezia’s scene at the story’s end 
seems to revert back to the correspondence between mind and material seen before 
Linda’s epiphany about her alienation, while still holding on to the implications of that 
epiphany. The story is unwilling to end on Linda’s sudden realization of how 
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disconnected her desires are from the life she lives, and rather attempts some 
reconnection between these two spheres as the story ends, even while maintaining the 
fact of general alienation. In looking to conclude on a conflation of psychic and material 
realities while still speaking to the characters’ fundamental alienation, the ending of 
“Prelude” attests to the limitations of Mansfield’s strategy in this story, while also 
foreshadowing her turn to the uncanny in later collections. 
“A Dream-- a Wa-kening”: The Garden Party and Other Stories (1922) 
By turning Linda’s alienation into a revelation, “Prelude” can be seen as 
attempting to avoid the weak endings that plagued the pension stories while maintaining 
their commitment to depicting alienation. Although this revelation creates for the story an 
intense, climactic encounter connecting the character to her world and thus serving as a 
fitting ending, it does so at the price of leaving that character’s psyche unreconciled to the 
story’s other elements. It is only with The Garden Party and Other Stories that Mansfield 
seems able to remedy the dissonance between the characters and settings of her stories 
that had worked to undermine their endings while still allowing her to depict these 
characters as fundamentally alienated. This is accomplished by the use of the uncanny in 
creating a climactic moment that ties together the character, their desires and fantasies, 
and the world they inhabit as the story comes to a close. By structuring the stories of The 
Garden Party around a character’s uncanny encounter, Mansfield achieves a coherence 
between these elements and can thus more effectively bring her stories to a conclusion. 
The titular story of the collection, in which a well-to-do family learns in the midst 
of hosting a lavish party that a poor worker living nearby has died in an accident, 
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foreshadows this death by having Meg, one of the family’s daughters, play at the piano a 
song that goes “This Life is Wee-ary,/ A Tear—A Sigh./A Love that Chan-ges/ This Life 
is Wee-ary/ A Tear—A Sigh/ A Love that Chan-ges, And then…Goodbye/…./ This Life is 
Wee-ary/ Hope comes to Die/ A Dream—a Wa-kening” (GP 42-3). While this 
melancholy song seems out of place among the general gaiety of the party preparations, it 
both hints at the tragic events later in the story (as well as the family’s flippant reaction to 
it, as sorrow is just a song to test the piano), and leaves off with a curious moment, 
likening the sorrows of life to both a dream and an awakening. Either image, on its own, 
would have made sense within the song’s logic: life’s happiness is as fleeting as a dream; 
life offers a cruel rebuff, waking us from our cherished hopes. In each of these, too, one 
can hear echoes of the distinction between psychic and material reality Mansfield relies 
upon for the climax in “Prelude:” our lives are lived largely within our dreams and 
fantasies; life itself works to wake us from our dreams. Presenting them side by side, 
however, and equating the sorrow in life to our dreaming and our waking, the song 
creates a paradox, comparing the same thing to two seemingly contradictory states. The 
response that the song is claiming that life encompasses both of these states, is made up 
of both, misses both the fact that equating life with one of its aspects, sorrow, is the 
song’s entire logic and, that the line itself gives no indication of an “and” or anything else 
to imply combination. Instead, the dash between “Dream” and “a Wa-kening” would 
seem to speak to a conflation of these two states. The song would appear to not only 
foreshadow the death, but also to characterize the coming encounter with it as a moment 
of “waking sleep,” an uncanny moment in which the subject’s waking life suddenly 
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following the dream-logic that combines hidden material and what represses it, in the 
process blurring the line between the subject’s mind and the outside world.      
 The significance of this foreshadowing is lost on Laura, another of the family’s 
daughters and the story’s protagonist, since she feels largely detached from her family 
and their preoccupation with entertaining, seen in her assumption that her mother would 
be the one making decisions around the party preparations (GP 38). This detachment is 
further evidenced by Laura’s quickness in deciding of the workmen that “she would get 
on much better with men like these,” rather than her own friends and relatives, the 
narrator noting that “she felt just like a work-girl” (GP 40), as she eats her breakfast in 
front of them; her sudden identification with the working people she in reality shares little 
with indicates how little she identifies with her own place in society, suggesting a feeling 
of disconnection with the comfortable environs and social pretensions of her family 
home. While Paccaud-Huguet holds this to mean that “the absurdity of class distinctions 
is unbearable to Laura” (134), it would appear rather that she finds these distinctions 
fascinating, and is looking to find a place within the class system where she can feel like 
she belongs, implying a lack of such a place in her own privileged existence. Although 
Laura may indeed enjoy the party, she is, in this sense, similar to the narrator in “Frau 
Fischer,” keeping her distance from a place which seems to hold little of value for her. 
 This distance from her surroundings vanishes as Laura is deeply affected by the 
news of the death, and volunteers to take some leftovers to the newly-widowed Mrs. 
Scott. Upon arrival, the widow’s sister shows Laura the young man’s body, the narrator 
describing her experiencing it as: 
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…a young man, fast asleep—sleeping so soundly, so deeply, that he was 
far, far away from them both. Oh, so remote, so peaceful. He was 
dreaming. Never wake him up again. His head was sunk in the pillow, his 
eyes were closed; they were blind under those closed eyelids. He was 
given up to his dream. What did garden parties and baskets and lace frocks 
mean to him? He was far from all of those things. He was wonderful, 
beautiful. (GP 51) 
It is crucial to note that nowhere in this passage is it mentioned that the young man is 
indeed dead, implying a reluctance on Laura’s part to accept this fact. The presence of the 
phrase “never wake him up again” is particularly important, as it points to the use of 
sleep less to describe death than as a way to obscure it, the possibility of his waking 
contradicting and covering over death’s permanence. Seeing the dead body as only 
sleeping, Laura seems suddenly unwilling to acknowledge the very thing that brought her 
to this cottage, the demise of this young man. And unlike in the final scene of “Prelude,” 
the narrator does not intervene to reassure the reader of the reality of the situation, 
allowing instead for Laura’s refusal to accept the death to come to the fore. 
 The cause of this strange refusal is alluded to by the very phrase that most signals 
it: a belief that it is somehow possible for the young man to “wake” from his death. It is a 
fear that the dead can return to the living that, for Freud, accounts for the fact that “in 
hardly any other sphere has our thinking and feeling changed so little since primitive 
times,” stemming from the fact that “our unconscious is still as unreceptive as ever to the 
idea of our own mortality,” (“Uncanny” 242 ). The unconscious cannot imagine its own 
demise or, by extension, the demise of others, with the comparison to sleep suggested by 
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the fact that sleep is likely the closest approximation to death that the unconscious can 
grasp; the unarticulated beliefs that stood beneath the ancient fears of the dead’s return 
are still extant in even the modern psyche. In the passage’s description of the young 
man’s body, what would appear to be interfering with an objective picture of his death is 
Laura’s unconscious disbelief in death’s reality, the metaphoric comparison to sleep a 
reflection of her psyche’s inability to see death as anything else. 
 Laura’s experience of the body is thus distorted by the presence of her 
unconscious beliefs. Yet, this distortion alone cannot account for the uncanniness of this 
moment of the story. For Hanson, what makes this encounter uncanny is it allows the 
violence and bloodshed of the wider world, a world so recently rent by global war, to 
invade a domestic sphere assumed safe from such carnage, she notes that “Mansfield here 
dramatizes the traumatic intrusion of death into the space of the non-combatant who 
nonetheless, as Freud well knew, could suffer extreme mental distress during wartime,” 
(“Uncanniness” 125). Stripped of its sense of safety, the home becomes properly 
“unhome-like,” or uncanny. Yet, in this case, it is unclear why a contemporary reader, far 
removed from the Great War and thus much less sensitive to the echoes of its young dead 
in the body of the workman, would find this moment at all uncanny. Rather, to understand 
why the appearance of the young man’s body strikes the reader as uncanny, this moment 
must be placed within its context in the story. 
 The story begins with the women of the family making preparations for the large 
party to be held on the family’s property that afternoon, preparations which require the 
very middle class girls to interact with the markedly proletarian workmen setting up for 
the party. Laura’s sister Meg, the narrator tells us, “could not possibly go and supervise 
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the men. She had washed her hair before breakfast, and she sat drinking coffee in a green 
turban, with a dark curl stamped on each cheek,” while her other sister, Jose, “always 
came down in a silk petticoat and a kimono jacket.” In response to this, Laura is told by 
her mother that she’ll have to deal with the workmen (GP 38). Both Meg and Jose are 
described as too exposed, too undressed, to interact with the workmen, who because of 
this immediately carry the suggestion of sexuality. While Laura’s mother claims that it is 
because Laura “is the artistic one,” the narrator makes it clear that Laura’s duty is the 
result of her sisters’ skimpy clothing. The workers are thus not to be enticed, implying 
that they are viewed as sexually volatile and easily provoked by any hint of uncovered 
flesh. 
 This supposed sexuality is not lost on Laura, who, observing the men, is shown 
thinking, “they looked impressive. Laura wished now that she was not holding that piece 
of bread-and-butter, but there was nowhere to put it, and she couldn’t possibly throw it 
away. She blushed and tried to look severe and even a little bit short sighted as she came 
up to them” (GP 38). Laura greets the workmen with a blush, traditionally associated 
with sexual arousal, and is frustrated that she does not feel as impressive to them, eating 
her bread and butter, as they do to her. Any objection that Laura simply wants to seem 
authoritative around the workmen falters when, in response to a rather expressive, but 
hardly vulgar, statement from one of the workmen about a marquee hitting one “bang 
slap in the eye,” the narrator notes that “Laura’s upbringing made her wonder for a 
moment whether it was quite respectful of a workman to talk to her of bangs slap in the 
eye” (GP 39). Laura finds something offensive about this turn of phrase, especially 
coming out of the mouth of a workman. While at first it appears possible that it is the 
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violent implications of the phrase that she finds off-putting, it is not clear why this is any 
more offensive voiced by a workman than anyone else; would not any violence alluded to 
in such a turn of phrase be offensive to Laura regardless of who used it? If, instead, 
Laura’s objection to the phrase lies in its closeness to a euphemism for sexual activity, it 
becomes clearer why the fact that a workman is using it makes it more scandalous. It is, 
after all, her “upbringing” that makes her find it offensive, an upbringing shaped by a 
mother who herself seems to consider workmen to be particularly lascivious. Thus, Laura 
only finds it objectionable when spoken by a workman because she more readily 
associates the workman with sexuality; a workman saying “bang” is more likely to spark 
for Laura a sexual connotation, as the workman for Laura is more connected to sexuality. 
 As the workmen go off to begin their tasks, the narrator states that “only one tall 
fellow was left. He bent down, pinched a sprig of lavender, put his thumb and forefinger 
to his nose and snuffed up the smell” (GP 40). This display of sensual enjoyment by the 
workman immediately resonates with Laura: “when Laura saw that gesture she forgot all 
about the karakas in her wonder at him caring for things like that—caring for the smell of 
lavender. How many men that she knew would have done such a thing. Oh, how 
extraordinarily nice workmen were, she thought. Why couldn’t she have workmen for 
friends rather than the silly boys she danced with and came to Sunday night supper?” (GP 
40). Laura, impressed by the sight of the workman’s open sensuality, is immediately 
reminded of the young men in her circle, those whose dancing and dining with her imply 
their romantic intentions, and how she finds them wanting. The workman’s attention to 
the smell on his fingers is for Laura a sign of a concern for delicacy and pleasure that 
seems to her woefully lacking in those who would be her potential lovers. The workman, 
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and then the workmen more generally, come to represent for Laura an easy sensuality 
alien to her own experience.    
 When, back inside the house, Laura indulges in the quiet pleasures of her 
bedroom, it would seem that she is taking her cue from this workman, attentive to the 
sensuality of her surroundings while the house is prepared for festivities: “She was still, 
listening. All of the doors in the house seemed to be open. The house was alive with soft, 
quick steps and running voices… But the air! If you stopped to notice, was the air always 
like this?” The sounds of the house are here like the workman’s lavender, small moments 
of delight often ignored by those who live in the house; Laura seems to emulate the 
workman’s concern for these small sources of pleasure by stopping in the midst of the 
general activity and indulging in what others seem to pass by. And, according to the 
narrator, she is not disappointed in what she finds, noticing that, “little faint winds were 
playing chase in at the tops of the windows, out at the doors. And there were two tiny 
spots of sun, one on the inkpot, one on a silver photograph frame, playing too. Darling 
little spots. Especially the one on the inkpot lid. It was quite warm. A warm little silver 
star. She could have kissed it” (GP 41). In a seemingly short period of time, Laura’s 
surroundings take on the intense luster of enjoyment, as she finds herself enthralled by 
the simple stimuli of these surroundings. Her experience of the “warm little silver star” 
on the inkpot depicts something of ecstasy, as Laura’s delight gives way to an attraction, 
the feeling of warmth, and the desire to embrace the node of light in orgasmic 
culmination of her enjoyment, implying that her time in repose on her bed had a hidden, 
masturbatory purpose. Lying alone in her room, Laura experiences an autoerotic pleasure 
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suggested to her by the young workman’s open sensuality, a sensuality that motivates her 
to self-satisfaction. 
  Laura’s erotic interest in the young workmen helps explain her otherwise strange 
excitement upon learning about the death of one living nearby, the recently deceased 
young man and the sensual workmen from earlier likely converging in her mind. As a 
result, she displays a certain ambivalence toward the news, the socially-expected pity and 
grief mingled with a restlessness at contemplating the young man’s body, bringing to her 
mind the body of the young workman from that morning who had so excited her. Laura’s 
eagerness to deliver food to the young widow reflects this ambivalence, as it allows her to 
at once pay her respects while affording her proximity to an object of sexual fascination.  
However, as is the case with objects of desire, excitement often turns into anxiety when 
they are approached too closely; Laura, once eager, is suddenly apprehensive upon 
reaching the shanty where the body rests awaiting burial. She “was terribly nervous... Oh, 
to be away from this! She actually said ‘God, help me,’ as she walked up the tiny path 
and knocked,” and is hesitant when invited to view the body itself, the narrator noting 
that “Laura only wanted to get out, to get away” (GP 50). Stepping into the bedroom, 
Laura is confronted by the eroticized body of her young workman in the broken body laid 
out before her on the bed. 
 The presence of her fantasy within this mournful scene helps explain why Laura, 
in her thoughts as voiced by the narrator, is so insistent that the body before her never be 
awoken, as the prospect of his waking, a real possibility to an unconscious unconvinced 
of death, threatens to fully realize this fantasy of a well-muscled young working man in 
bed before her, which likely crossed her mind as she lay in masturbatory bliss in her own 
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bedroom. Indeed, the image of this young man lying quietly on the bed recalls nothing so 
much as Laura herself as she lay in autoerotic enjoyment. Their similarity is supported by 
Laura’s thinking “What does he care for garden parties?”, a strange thing to say about the 
deceased unless she saw in him her own retreat from her family’s party preparations into 
the self-pleasure of her own room. The body before her, then, not only reminds Laura of 
her fantasies but also the autoerotic pleasure accompanying these fantasies. That she sees 
the body as resting, as “asleep,” harkens to the “rest” she took earlier in her bedroom, 
justifying her quiet pleasures forbidden to a well-brought-up girl of her class under the 
guise of sleeping. Her pleasure is displaced onto the idea of sleep, resulting in the 
description of her time at “rest” taking on an erotic charge, as seen in such moments as, 
“It was quite warm. A warm little silver star. She could have kissed it.” This seemingly 
restless rest becomes more understandable when it is seen as taking on the autoerotic 
enjoyment of her fantasies of the workman, thus becoming a less scandalous replacement 
and substitute for her indulgence in those fantasies. 
 Sleep, then, would seem to hold contradictory meanings for Laura, hiding her 
sexual desires even while threating to return those same desires to the surface: it is under 
the conceit of “sleep” that she hid her enjoyment of her fantasy, yet if asleep, the young 
man can then awaken, bringing her fantasy to life right before her.  It is this contradiction 
that she is confronted by in the young man’s body, which strongly alludes to her fantasies 
while reminding her of the thing that was supposed to hide her enjoyment of these 
fantasies. Laura’s masturbatory fantasies coincide with the state of sleep that obscured 
them, as she confronts in the corpse her desires for young workmen and the self-pleasure 
inspired by those desires, alongside the very figure of sleep that was supposed to make 
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this confrontation impossible. It is for this reason the corpse is here encountered as 
deeply uncanny: in this corpse, Laura sees both her repressed fantasy of the workman and 
the sleep meant to hide that fantasy together, combined without one or the other being 
cancelled out. The fantasy survives alongside the substitute seeking to replace it, leaving 
the work of repression exposed before Laura. 
 Laura’s uncanny moment with the corpse ties together the events of the story, 
recalling the party preparations and her own retreat from them, with Laura’s psychic life, 
creating coherence between them. Unlike the aloe in “Prelude,” the corpse does not so 
much disabuse the protagonist of her fantasies as manifest them directly before her, 
conflating psychic with material reality rather than asserting an unbridgeable gap 
between them. The climax of “The Garden Party” is thus able to integrate Laura’s psychic 
life with the events of the story, in contrast to “Prelude,” where Linda’s desires and 
fantasies must be cast aside and left unreconciled in its climactic moment in order to 
connect character to setting. At the same time, this connection does not diminish Laura’s 
essential alienation from the impoverished cottages or her own comfortable middle class 
life, allowing that alienation to persist even as she is changed by her encounter; in its 
uncanniness, the young man’s body is strangely affecting, speaking to Laura’s psyche 
without reconciling her to her material surroundings. 
 At the same time, this encounter with the uncanny does not result in Laura 
overcoming her feelings of alienation. Looking on the young man’s body, she is struck by 
the meaninglessness of the world she inhabits, the narrator noting, “what did garden 
parties and baskets and lace frocks mean to him? He was far from all those things” and 
that “while they were laughing and while the band was playing, this marvel had come to 
  127 
the lane” (GP 51). Laura contrasts the frivolity and emptiness of their gaiety to the serene 
detachment of the corpse, finding him “wonderful” and “beautiful” and leaving her as at 
odds with her lush existence as before, if not more so. Although this uncanny moment has 
created coherence between character and setting, it has nonetheless left the character’s 
alienation intact.     
       The uncanny also creates such coherence, albeit perhaps more subtlety, in another 
of the collection’s stories, “The Daughters of the Late Colonel.” In it, adult sisters 
Constantia and Josephine, having recently lost their father, try to grapple with his death 
while seeming unconvinced that he is actually gone, their disbelief a source of humor for 
the story. The narrator maintains an ironic distance from the sisters’ fear of their father’s 
wrath, noting, for instance, at the funeral that “neither of them could believe that father 
was never coming back. Josephine had had a moment of absolute terror at the cemetery, 
while the coffin was lowered, to think that she and Constantia had done this without 
asking his permission” (GP 57). Josephine cannot fathom that she would not, at some 
point, have to answer to her father, creating the absurd moment where she frets having to 
explain to him her part in burying him. At this early part of the story, the narrator remains 
objective, presenting these fears as belonging entirely to the daughters, reassuring the 
reader that, objectively, they have little to fear from the old man at this point. In contrast 
to the climactic moment of “The Garden Party,” where the narrator does not step in to 
remind the reader that Laura’s sleeping young man is indeed dead, here Josephine’s fear 
is clearly distinguished by the narrator from the world around her. Thus, her experience 
remains absurd, at extreme odds with the reality, rather than becoming surreal. 
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 However, one should pause to ask, what exactly are Josephine and her sister afraid 
of in regard to their father? The apparent answer is that they fear his finding out that they 
are treating him as though he were dead, burying him as though he had passed away. In 
this sense, the daughters fear their father taking offense to their acknowledging his 
demise. Yet, this reading seems undermined earlier in the story when, while lying in bed, 
Constantia asks, “Do you think we ought to have our dressing-gowns dyed as well?,” 
feeling they too should be black, as “it doesn’t seem quite sincere, in a way, to wear black 
out of doors and when we’re fully dressed, and then when we’re at home-- ” (GP 52). 
Constantia feels that, in not wearing black around the house, their mourning is not 
convincing enough. That Constantia would want to her grief on display in the house she 
had shared with her father, even, as Josephine remarks, “nobody will see us,” makes 
sense if she still feels her father’s eyes upon her, and wishes for him to witness their 
grieving for him. It is before her father, in this case, that Constantia feels insincere, as he 
sees them change out of their mourning clothes whenever at home with him. This would 
seem to receive some support in Josephine’s response; although she speaks incredulously, 
the narrator notes that, when it was mentioned, “she gave the bedclothes such a twitch 
that both her feet became uncovered” (GP 52), pulling the covers more closely over the 
part of her body covered by the dressing-gown, as though she found herself suddenly 
embarrassed at the fact that it was not black. Josephine too, it appears, feels as though her 
father still inhabits the house, and expects their mourning of him to be complete and 
honest. 
 The contradiction exposed here, the daughters at once wanting to appear to their 
father to mourn him properly but not so much so that he seems really gone and unable to 
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witness their mourning, is responsible for much of the story’s conflict. This contradiction 
is on display when the two enter their father’s bedroom to clear out his belongings. The 
narrator notes, “it had been a rule for years never to disturb father in the morning, 
whatever happened. And now they were going to open the door without knocking even… 
Constantia’s eyes were enormous at the idea; Josephine felt weak in the knees” (GP 58). 
The prospect of entering is approached as though their father were still present to enforce 
his rules for the house, leading them to step softly, and keep their voices down upon 
entering (GP 59). Although terrified of going against their late father’s will, the sisters 
nonetheless attempt to go about the normal mourning routine of removing and packing 
away the deceased belongings. This conundrum appears a strange one: after all, if they 
feel their father still very much present in the house, so much so that they regard his rules 
as still in effect, why bother with packing away his belongings at all? What would serve 
as appropriate motivation? Much like the daughters’ nightdresses, the room would likely 
go unseen by others, and like the nightdresses, clearing the room is a gesture of mourning 
they do not want to forgo because it is directed at the one person who could conceivably 
see, their deceased father. To placate their father, they therefore must transgress his will. 
This dilemma leads Josephine to hesitate before the drawers, the narrator noting, “how 
could she explain to Constantia that father was in the chest of drawers? He was in the top 
drawer with his handkerchiefs and neckties, or in the next with his shirts and pajamas, or 
in the lowest with his suits. He was watching there, hidden away—just behind the door 
handle—ready to spring” (GP 59). Opening the drawers, and thus continuing to remove 
the items therein, means inciting their father’s wrath; and yet, feeling that her father is 
observing her, Josephine cannot bring herself to evade this wrath by simply leaving the 
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room.  Under her father’s eyes, she is able neither to mettle in his belongings nor leave 
the room and shirk the responsibilities of mourning, leaving her stuck. 
 Josephine finally communicates this hesitance to her sister, adding, “But—it 
seems so weak,” to which Constantia responds “But why not be weak for once, Jug?... 
Let’s be weak—be weak. It’s much nicer to be weak than to be strong” (GP 60, ellipsis 
original). From this exchange, one would assume that Constantia is advocating they leave 
the belongings alone, allowing their fear of their father to dictate their actions. Yet, 
Constantia appears to immediately contradict that, as “she marched over to the wardrobe, 
turned the key, and took it out of the lock. Took it out of the lock and held it up to 
Josephine, showing Josephine by her extraordinary smile that she knew what she’d done, 
she’d risked deliberately father being in there among his overcoats” (GP 60). Against 
expectation, Constantia, while counseling weakness, unlocks the wardrobe, something 
that would appear to require the strength to overcome their terror at the thought of 
disobeying their father. What, then, is the weakness that Constantia gives into by opening 
the wardrobe and risking their father’s punishment? This rather abrupt turn begins to 
make sense if one views Constantia as referring not to the weakness of being cowed by 
their father into obeying but the weakness of being unable to continue obeying their 
father now that he is gone. Instead of weakness before their father’s irresistible presence, 
it refers to weakness before his resounding absence. 
 In light of the daughters’ dilemma, this otherwise inexplicable scene makes sense: 
caught between the temptation to perform their mourning for their dead father and to 
allow that mourning to render him gone and unable to see them, “weakness” can refer to 
moving too far in either direction. In this case, it is giving in to the latter. Yet, while this 
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understanding illuminates Constantia’s behavior, the scene’s ending remains mysterious. 
After Constantia opens the wardrobe, the narrator remarks, “nothing happened. Only the 
room seemed quieter than ever, the bigger flakes of cold air fell on Josephine’s shoulders 
and knees. She began to shiver” (GP 60). Josephine, whose knees were shaking before 
they entered the room, is shown shaking once again, betraying a similar dread. Although 
what she feared earlier has not come to pass, she nevertheless remains terrified. Her 
sister’s response is even more strange, “‘Come, Jug,’ said Constantia, still with that awful 
callous smile, and Josephine followed just as she had the last time, when Constantia had 
pushed Benny into the round pond” (GP 60). Constantia, with her wicked smile, seems to 
register some sense of transgression, comparable to a piece of playful cruelty committed 
against their father’s friend. Yet it is not clear why she would feel such guilty pleasure, as 
her father, the figure before whom she would likely feel any guilt for her pleasurable act, 
has just been shown absent. At the very moment that one would expect her guilt to vanish 
along with her father, Constantia recognizes, with perverse glee, a transgression where 
one would seem impossible. What could possibly account for the guilt that pleases 
Constantia and terrifies Josephine?   
 Grasping this means grasping the sisters’ motivation for performing grief for their 
father in the first place. In the very next scene, the two decide to send their father’s watch 
to the aforementioned Benny, who is stationed in Sri Lanka. Fearing the watch will be 
stolen in transit, Josephine resolves to make the package appear as though it contains 
something else. The narrator notes that 
“she liked the idea of having to make a parcel such a curious shape 
that no could possibly guess what it was. She even thought for a 
  132 
moment of hiding the watch in a narrow cardboard corset-box that 
she’d kept by her for a long time, waiting for it to come in for 
something. It was such beautiful firm cardboard. But, no, it 
wouldn’t be appropriate for this occasion. It had lettering on it: 
Medium Women’s 28. Extra Firm Busks” (GP 61, italics original). 
Josephine is at first excited at the prospect of hiding the watch, rendering this reminder of 
her father unrecognizable. The narrow box that she considers for the task can only bring 
to mind the coffin that the two had, while greatly conflicted, buried their father in only 
recently. Similarly here, Josephine is suddenly wracked with doubt and fear, at once 
wanting to go forward and place the reminder of her father from view while at same time 
hesitant to remove her father from his vantage on their mourning of him. Like burial, 
making the watch unrecognizable obscures the feeling of their father’s presence, as does 
sending it across the sea to Benny. That the hesitance to do so comes here in the form of a 
reminder of the corset is telling. Josephine’s own reasoning, relayed by the narrator as “It 
would almost be too much of a shock for Benny to open that and find father’s watch 
inside” (GP 61), feels like a non-sequitur, more of a feeble rationalization than a 
compelling reason. Rather, the corset and the box it came in likely once belonged to their 
mother, who died while they were young, which would explain Josephine’s desire to keep 
it “by her for a long time,” implying some sentimental attachment leading her to want it 
nearby. The thought of ridding themselves of a reminder of their father seems to be 
immediately accompanied by a reminder of their mother, the lettering on the box calling 
to mind their mother’s presence and body. This reminder would appear an uncomfortable 
one, given that it results in Josephine deciding not only against using the corset box, but 
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against sending the watch to Benny at all. Instead, it is decided that the watch go to their 
nephew Cyril, an occasional visitor to the house for tea, therefore keeping it close by, 
rather than sending it off to Benny. The sisters resolve to preserve their father’s presence, 
as his absence is accompanied by disquieting recollections of their mother. 
 The dynamic dramatized here points to an explanation for the otherwise odd guilt 
the sisters feel before the opened wardrobe. In disobeying their father’s rules with 
impunity and thus rendering him effectively absent in that moment, Constantia makes it 
impossible for their father to “see” them mourning him, resulting in guilt in regard to 
their late mother. That memories of their mother would be accompanied by guilt is not 
surprising, given how young they were when she died. Freud holds that a young girl’s 
relationship with her mother is often marked by “a hostility which develops in the child 
towards her mother in consequence of the manifold restrictions imposed by the latter in 
the course of training and bodily care” (“Female” 227). The daughter resents her mother 
for her demands that the girl give up sources of sexual satisfaction deemed inappropriate. 
This resentment drives the girl away from the mother to whom she had been previously 
deeply attached and toward her father, who serves as a replacement, Freud noting that “a 
woman’s strong dependence on her father merely takes over the heritage of an equally 
strong attachment to her mother” (“Female” 227). This same resentment also fuels a wish 
in the child to be rid of her mother; in the event that this wish is granted, as with 
Constantia and Josephine, guilt naturally follows, as though the child’s wish had made it 
so. From this perspective, the daughters’ deep devotion to their father the Colonel 
becomes understood as displaced love of their mother, love that has been exaggerated to 
assuage the guilt they feel over her death. By lavishing care and admiration on their 
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father, the two are trying to keep at bay self-accusations regarding their mother’s demise. 
Because of this, when their father is felt absent and thus unable to witness their 
mourning, the guilt associated with their mother returns. 
This reading finds support in the story’s climactic scene, where the sisters 
reflexively jump to chase away a street performer making his rounds in front of the 
house, as they always did at their father’s request, when “in the street below a barrel 
organ struck up” (GP 67). Yet it is here when the full force of their father’s death finds 
the sisters, with the narrator noting: 
Then they remembered. It didn’t matter. They would never have to stop 
the organ- grinder again… Never would sound that loud, strange bellow 
when father thought they were not hurrying enough. The organ-grinder 
could play there all day and the stick would not thump. 
It will never thump again, 
It will never thump again, 
the barrel organ played. (GP 68) 
The first thing to be noted here is the narrator’s move from the ironic distance which 
marked much of the story to something more sympathetic; rather than play Josephine’s 
perspective off against the reality that it seems divorced from, such as during the funeral 
or the sisters’ excursion into their father’s room, the narrator instead seems to take on her 
perspective. As in the climactic moment of “The Garden Party,” the reader is forced to 
share in the apparent conflation of the characters’ thoughts and their surroundings. That it 
is the organ-grinder manifesting the sisters’ psychic life in their material reality may seem 
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odd, given how abruptly the street-performer appears in the story. Unlike “The Garden 
Party,” that more or less clearly foreshadowed the young man’s body with the presence of 
the workmen in the story’s beginning, the reader is less primed for the climax of “The 
Daughters of the Late Colonel,” the organ-grinder feeling like a sudden and late addition 
to the story’s logic. The climax relies on an importance for the organ-grinder, an 
importance that makes it more able than either their father’s funeral or his personal 
effects to bring home the reality of his death, which the story does not seem to establish. 
However, while looking at first blush like a deus ex machina, the organ-grinder subtly 
recalls the scene with the corset box, as the encounter with the street performer manifests 
the dynamic revealed when Josephine contemplates mailing the watch. 
 The organ-grinder is linguistically connected to the same glimpse of the sisters’ 
mother Josephine had earlier. Firstly, the street performer, or “busker,” recalls the word 
“busks” printed so prominently on the outside of the box that made it an inappropriate 
vessel for their father’s watch. Secondly, the instrument is described as a “barrel-organ,” 
which recalls the popular barrel-shape style of corset, further connecting the scene of the 
corset box that occasioned Josephine to reconsider sending their father’s watch away. In 
addition, the term “organ-grinder” itself alludes to the much-circulated notion attributing 
organ damage in women to the constrictive nature of corsets4. The organ-grinder would 
                                               
4Despite a tendency to think that worries about the health hazards of corsets are a more 
contemporary phenomenon, these concerns had already long been circulating in the public 
discourse by the early twentieth century. Valerie Steele notes, “The Lancet, Britain’s most 
important medical journal, published more than an article a year from the late 1860’s to the 
early 1890’s on the medical dangers of tight-lacing,” including dangers to the wearer’s heart, 
lungs, and kidneys, among other ailments (67). 
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therefore appear to be manifesting their mother’s death, and their feelings in regard to it, 
in reality by way of memories of her corset. 
Why the corset would hold such a powerful association with their mother is 
hinted at later in this scene. While listening to the organ-grinder play, “Josephine 
remembered standing on a chair and pointing out [their late mother’s] feather boa to 
Constantia and telling her that it was the snake that had killed their mother in Ceylon” 
(GP 69). This memory shows how, in the sisters’ minds, their mother’s death is connected 
to her feather boa, the snake that killed her thus becoming itself a “boa,” a snake 
renowned for its ability to constrict and squeeze its prey. The constrictor, thought of by 
the sisters to have killed their mother, brings to mind the corset that also squeezed their 
mother’s body.  Their mother’s sudden death, the cause of the sisters’ guilt, becomes 
associated with constriction, which calls to mind the constriction of the body performed 
by her corset. The corset, alluding to their mother’s death, seems to come to life in the 
form of the barrel organ and the organ grinder operating it. 
 It is no coincidence that the linguistic nature of these connections resembles 
nothing so much as the function of the dream-work, treating things and their names as 
inseparable and creating bundles of associations built on seemingly arbitrary similarities 
between words. Indeed, such an incursion of dream-logic into waking life is a hallmark of 
the uncanny. What faces the sisters in the organ-grinder is the condensation of their 
feelings of guilt surrounding their mother’s death, and the extreme loyalty to their father 
that was meant to replace and hide this guilt. By obeying their father and performing the 
duties expected of good daughters, up to and including mourning one’s parents, the 
sisters attempt to shield themselves from their lingering sense of being complicit in their 
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mother’s death. As the organ-grinder’s song continues, Constantia asks her sister, “‘do 
you know what day it is? It’s Saturday. It’s a week today, a whole week.’ A week since 
father died/ A week since father died cried the barrel organ” (GP 68). The barrel organ’s 
repetition of their mourning of their father (“It will never thump again,” “A week since 
father died”) puts their mourning in the mouth of one representing their feelings of guilt 
surrounding their mother, the sisters encountering their guilt about their mother and the 
exaggerated loyalty to their father meant to hide that guilt at the same time, these opposed 
features of their psychic lives coinciding. What the sisters hear in the organ-grinder’s 
song are the mechanisms of their psychic lives, their guilt and its repression, laid bare 
before them, in a manner that makes these mechanisms indistinguishable from the 
material reality surrounding them. This appearance of the hidden along with that which 
was supposed to hide it, making processes of the psyche evident within the very fabric of 
the supposedly indifferent material world, accounts for the uncanniness of the organ-
grinder’s playing. 
 The uncanniness of the organ-grinder, establishing the scene’s importance both to 
the sisters and to the story’s earlier scenes, offers a means for the climax to tie together 
the story’s various elements, including the psychic lives of the sisters. Unlike Linda in 
front of the aloe in “Prelude,” Constantia and Josephine do not experience connection 
with their material surroundings when their psychic lives fail to correspond to reality, but 
when it corresponds too closely, forcing an encounter with that psychic life instead of 
shunting it aside. Experiencing the uncanny, the sisters find their surroundings significant 
to their psychic lives. At the same time, it is a significance that heightens rather than 
diminishes their experience of alienation: as the story closes, the sisters find themselves 
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questioning the life they had built in their father’s house, their recollections bringing the 
story to a close on a note of missed opportunity that works to make their time there the 
result of blind happenstance instead of conscious attachment. In their uncanny moment, 
alienation and conflation coincide, leaving the sisters at once deeply connected to the 
house by way of its manifestation of their psychic fantasies, and at the same time 
alienated from it by way of the revelation that a combination of guilt and circumstance 
brought them there. In lieu of conscious significance, the house becomes important to the 
sisters by means of their unconscious. 
Conclusion 
Contrary to Leonard Woolf’s assessment that the change in Katherine Mansfield’s 
writing over her career was a betrayal of true style, Mansfield’s development can be seen 
as a succession of attempts to address the problem of depicting alienation in the short 
story, the sentimentalism Woolf sees in her later work in fact an effort to reconcile the 
psyches and emotions of her characters to their surroundings. This effort reaches its apex 
in her embrace of the uncanny in her later stories, which reconciles these elements of the 
story by directly manifesting the character’s psychic life in the material world with which 
they are otherwise at odds. In “The Garden Party,” for instance, Laura is linked to the 
world she feels detached from not by finding any meaning in it, but by finding the forces 
of her unconscious manifested in it. In stark contrast to her earliest stories, where 
alienation was portrayed with little effort to mitigate its effect on the story’s structure, 
these later stories are able to facilitate the coherent, cohesive endings expected of short 
stories, without sacrificing their clear picture of alienated life. With the uncanny at their 
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center, these stories written near the end of Mansfield’s life are able to navigate the 
seemingly contradictory demands placed on them.   
 This understanding of Mansfield’s development not only informs the 
interpretation of the individual stories, but also illuminates how these stories relate to 
their historical context. Their adaptation of the uncanny, a response to the social and 
economic conditions of the time in which they were written, situates them as the product 
of a specific moment in literature, when many writers were seeking a way to integrate the 
experience of life under an increasingly modernized and capitalistic world into literary 
forms developed under very different circumstances. As such, the uncanny in Katherine 
Mansfield’s stories indicates a concrete link between the conditions of the time period 
and the condition of the short story form.   
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 140 
Conclusion 
Hugh Haughton, in his introduction to Penguin’s collection of Freud essays titled 
The Uncanny, states that “psychoanalysis after the First World War increasingly conjures 
up a Gothic closet, an uncanny double, at the heart of modernity”(xlii). This is nowhere 
more at work than in its exploration of the uncanny, a concept which is “a paradoxical 
mark of modernity. It is associated with moments when an author, fictional character, or 
reader experiences the return of the primitive in an apparently modern and secular 
context. For Freud as uncanny theorist, however, this is also a survival from the 
abandoned psychic culture of our own childhood” (xlix). The uncanny does not simply 
rebuke the present in favor of the past, but rather injects the present with the past, the 
subject’s personal history in the form of repressed content invading the current moment 
and giving a sense that something “archaic” has arisen within their contemporary life. In 
doing so, it creates the strange sensation that what had passed away somehow persists, 
and that what was taken as new is somehow very old. It involves a coincidence between 
past and present that at the same time confuses the two, which disrupts the subject’s sense 
of linear time. 
Fittingly, the uncanny is called upon to do just this when it is used in these 
modernist texts, to erase the gulf between literary forms of the past and a disenchanted 
modernity. In both Lawrence and Mansfield, the discordant world of the present is made 
to appear, if momentarily, like the more integrated world of the past, and thus more 
conducive to forms like the novella and short story, by the appearance of the uncanny. 
Yet, the intrinsic strangeness of the unheimlich preserves how alien the world feels to the 
modern subject inhabiting it. In creating a paradoxical “past within the present,” the 
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uncanny opens up the possibility that the culture of previous eras can relate to the much 
different world of modern capitalism. That, according to Haughton, this sort of possibility 
is a central concern of psychoanalysis after the Great War reflects the way the conflict 
made plain the ways capitalism had changed the world and plunged it into a crisis with 
which thinkers and artists sought to grapple. 
 As has been shown in the preceding chapters, among the reasons certain writers of 
the early twenieth century gravitated toward the uncanny was what it offered them in 
terms of coherence as they attempted to depict the alienated life of their time. As such, 
the unheimlich comes to be understood, at this study’s close, as both a psychological and 
aesthetic category, encouraging an expansion of our thinking on it, as well as our 
understanding of its effect on the literary works in which it appears. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 142 
References 
Adorno, Theodor W. Aesthetics. Edited by Eberhard Ortland. Trans Wieland Hoban. 
Cambridge, UK and Metford, MA: Polity, 2018. Print. 
________________ . Aesthetic Theory. Edited by Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann. 
Trans Robert Hullet-Kentor. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013. Print. 
________________. Minima Moralia: Reflections From Damaged Life. Trans. 
E.F.N. Jephcott. London: Verso, 2005. Print. 
________________. “The Position of the Narrator in the Contemporary Novel.” Notes to 
Literature, Vol. 1. New York: Columbia UP, 1991, pp 30-6. Print. 
Barnaby, Andrew. “After the Event: Freud’s Uncanny and the Anxiety of Origins.” The 
Psychoanalytic Quarterly, Vol. 84, 2015, pp. 975-1006.Web 
Bell, Michael. “D.H. Lawrence: Sex, Love, Eros-- And Pornography.” Modernist 
Eroticisms: European Literature after Sexology. Edited by Anna Katherina 
Schaffner and Shane Weller. London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, 
pgs 44-62. Print. 
Benjamin, Walter. “The Storyteller: Reflections on the Works of Nikolai Leskov.” 
Illuminations. Edited  by Hannah Arendt. Trans. Harry Zohn. New York: 
Schocken, 2007, pp. 83-109. Print. 
Breton, Andre. “The Automatic Message.” What is Surrealism?: Selected Writings. 
Edited by Franklin Rosemont. New York: Monad Press, 1978, pp 97-109. Print. 
Breuer, Josef and Sigmund Freud. Studies on Hysteria. The Standard Edition of the 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol II (1893-1895). Ed. and Trans. James 
Strachey and Anna Freud. London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of 
Psychoanalysis, 1955. Print. 
Boone, Joseph Allan. Libidinal Currents: Sexuality and the Shaping of 
Modernism. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1998. Print. 
Callinicos, Alex. “Bourgeois Revolutions and Historical Materialism.” International 
Socialism: Quarterly Journal of the Socialist Workers Party, vol. 2, no. 43, 1989, 
pgs. 113-171, 
www.marxists.org/history/etol/writers/callinicos/1989/xx/bourrev.html. Accessed 
14 July 2019. 
Dunbar, Pamela. Radical Mansfield: Double Discourse in Katherine Mansfield’s Short 
Stories. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997. Print. 
Eastham, Andrew. Aesthetic Afterlives: Irony, Literary Modernity and the Ends of Beauty. 
London and New York: Continuum, 2011. Print. 
Fisher, Mark. The Weird and the Eerie. London: Repeater Books, 2016. Print. 
Freud, Sigmund. “ ‘A Child is Being Beaten’: A Contribution to the Study of the Origin 
of Sexual Perversions.”  The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychoanalytic 
Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XVII. Edited and trans. by James Strachey and 
Anna Freud. London: The Hogarth Press and Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1955, pp 
175-203. Print.
______________. “Female Sexuality.” The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works 
of Sigmund Freud, Vol XXI (1927-31). Ed. And Trans by James Strachey and 
Anna Freud. London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 
1971. Print. 
  143 
_____________. Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety. The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychoanalytic Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XX. Edited and trans. by 
James Strachey and Anna Freud. London: The Hogarth Press and Institute of 
Psychoanalysis, pp 77-178. Print. 
_____________. “Instincts and their Vicissitudes.” The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 14. Edited and Translated by James 
Strachey and  Anna Freud. London: Hogarth Press, 1957, pgs 105-40. Print. 
_____________. The Interpretation of Dreams. The Standard Edition of the 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol IV (1900). Ed. and Trans. James 
Strachey. London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1953. 
Print.    
_____________. Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychoanalytic Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XVI. Edited and trans. by 
James Strachey and Anna Freud. London: The Hogarth Press and Institute of 
Psychoanalysis. Print. 
_____________. “The Uncanny.” The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, Vol XVII (1917-1919) Ed. and Trans. James Strachey. London: 
The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, pp 217-56. Print.   
Hanson, Clare. “Katherine Mansfield’s Uncanniness.” Celebrating Katherine Mansfield: 
A Centenary Volume of Essays. Ed. Gerri Kimber and Janet Wilson. London and 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pp 115-30. Print. 
____________. Short Stories and Short Fictions, 1880-1980. New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1985. Print.    
Haughton, Hugh. “Introduction.” The Uncanny by Sigmund Freud. Trans. David 
McLintock. Edited by Adam Philips. London and New York: Penguin, 2003, pgs 
vii-lxv. Print.   
Hoffmann, E.T.A. “The Sandman.” The Golden Pot and Other Tales. Trans. Ritchie 
Robertson. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008. Print. 
Jameson, Fredric. “The Poetics of Totality.” The Modernist Papers. London: Verso, 2007. 
Print. 
Jones, Bethan. “Novellas.” D.H. Lawrence in Context. Edited by Andrew Harrison. 
Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge UP, 2018, pgs 111-20. Print. 
Kristeva, Julia. The Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection. Trans. Leon S. Roudiez. 
New York: Columbia UP, 1982. Print. 
Laplanche, Jean. Life and Death in Psychoanalysis. Trans. Jeffrey Mehlman. Baltimore 
and London: Johns Hopkins UP, 1976. Print. 
_____________. “A Short Treatise on the Unconscious.” Essays on Otherness. Trans. 
Luke Thurston. London and New York: Routledge, 1999, pp 86-119. Print. 
Lawrence, D.H. Late Essays and Articles. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge 
UP, 1989. Print. 
_____________. Movements in European History. Cambridge, UK and New York: 
Cambridge UP, 1989. Print. 
_____________. The Rainbow. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge UP, 
1989. Print. 
_____________. The Virgin and the Gipsy and Other Stories. Cambridge, UK and New 
York: Cambridge UP, 2005. Print. 
  144 
Lukacs, Georg. Theory of the Novel: A Historico-philosophical Essay on the Forms of 
Great Epic Literature. Trans. Anna Bostock. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971. 
Print. 
Mansfield, Katherine. Bliss and Other Stories. London: Constable and Company, 1923. 
Print. 
_________________. The Garden Party and Other Stories. London and New York: 
Penguin Books, 1997. Print. 
_________________. In a German Pension. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926. Print. 
Marx, Karl. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Trans. Martin Mulligan. 
Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961. Print. 
Maupassant, Guy de. “The Necklace.” A Parisian Affair and Other Stories. Trans. Sian 
Miles. New York and London: Penguin, 2004. Print. 
Murry, John Middleton. “Introductory Note.” In a German Pension, by Katherine 
Mansfield, 1926, Alfred A. Knopf, pp 7-10. Print.    
Ollman, Bertell. Alienation: Marx’s Conception of Man in Capitalist Society. Cambridge, 
UK and New York: Cambridge UP, 1976. Print. 
Paccaud-Huguet, Josaine. “A Trickle of Voice: Katherine Mansfield and the Modernist 
Moment of Being.” Celebrating Katherine Mansfield: A Centenary Volume of 
Essays. Ed. Gerri Kimber and Janet Wilson. London and New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011, pp 131-43. Print. 
Pascarelli, Gia. “Geist in the Machine: Freud, the Uncanny, and Technology.” 
Confronting Mass Democracy and Industrial Technology: Political and Social 
Theory from Nietzsche to Habermas. Edited by John P. McCormick. Durham, 
N.C.: Duke UP, 2002, pp 111-36. Print. 
Royle, Nicholas. The Uncanny. Manchester: Manchester UP, 2003. Print. 
Steele, Valerie. The Corset: A Cultural History. New Haven and London: Yale UP, 2001. 
Print. 
Tomalin, Claire. Katherine Mansfield: A Secret Life. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989. 
Print. 
Toscano, Alberto. “‘European Nihilism’ and beyond: commentary.” The Century by Alain 
Badiou. Trans. Alberto Toscano. Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA: Polity, 2012, 
pgs. 179-201. Print. 
Wexler, Joyce. Violence without God: The Rhetorical Despair of Twentieth Century 
Writers. New York and London: Bloomsbury, 2017. Print. 
Woolf, Leonard. Beginning Again: An Autobiography of the Years 1911-1918. London: 
Hogarth Press, 1964. Print.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 145 
Vita 
Delmar R Reffett Jr. was born in Ashland, Kentucky. He has a B.A. in English from 
Northern Kentucky University in Highland Heights and a M.A. in English from DePaul 
University in Chicago, in addition to a certification in Social Theory from the University 
of Kentucky. He has worked as a graduate instructor at the University of Kentucky in 
Lexington, and is now an adjunct professor of English at Kentucky State University in 
Frankfort.   
